

## Connected and separate knowing: Toward a marriage of two minds

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In *Women's ways of knowing* (WWK, 1986) Mary Belenky, Nancy Goldberger, Jill Tarule and I described an epistemological position we called "Procedural Knowledge," which took two forms, encompassing two "procedures" that many of the women we interviewed seemed to use in searching for truth; we called them "separate" and "connected" knowing. In the ensuing years, observing the varied and often surprising meanings assigned to these notions by some who have befriended them, and the abuse that has been heaped upon them by some of their foes, I have occasionally felt like the character played by Woody Allen in the film *Annie Hall*, who, returning to childhood as an invisible presence, observes his parents engaged in one of their customary and (to him) imbecilic arguments. Incensed by the absurdity of both their positions, he shouts, "You're both wrong!," but his shouts are inaudible. In this chapter I want to make my views on separate and especially connected knowing audible.

Connected knowing was originally a serendipitous discovery. We did not ask the women we interviewed to tell us about it; they did so spontaneously, and from their comments we constructed the procedure as a sort of "ideal type." Since then, I have been attempting through systematic research and conversations with colleagues (alive and dead, in person and in print) to ascertain how the two procedures (or various versions thereof) play out in actual practice. Annick Mansfield and I (1992) developed an interview designed to elicit the ways in which men and women define the two procedures, how they feel about them, what they see as their benefits, drawbacks, and purposes, when and where and with whom they do and do not use each procedure, and how their use of them has changed over time. A number of researchers, including

my own students, as well as other investigators at various institutions working with widely varying populations, have also used some version of this interview. Drawing on this work, I shall try in this chapter to clarify and complicate the concepts of separate and connected knowing, and, along the way, contest misreadings of the two modes that seem to me especially pernicious.

**Believing and doubting.** Let me begin by defining the two orientations as we intended to define them in WWK. If you approach this chapter as a separate knower, you examine its arguments with a critical eye, insisting that I justify every point. In Peter Elbow's terms you "play the doubting game" (1973), looking for flaws in my reasoning, considering how I might be misinterpreting the evidence I present, what alternative interpretations could be made, and whether I might be omitting evidence that would contradict my position. The standards you apply in evaluating my arguments are objective and impersonal; they have been agreed upon and codified by logicians and scientists. You need not be a person to apply these rules; you could be a cleverly programmed computer.

If, on the other hand, you take a connected approach to this chapter, you read it with an empathic, receptive eye. Instead of inspecting the text for flaws, you play "the believing game:" (Elbow, 1973): if something I say seems to you absurd, you do not ask, "What are your arguments for such a silly view as that?" but rather, "What do you see? . . . Give me the vision in your head. You are having an experience I don't have; help me to have it." "The focus," Elbow writes, "is not on propositions and validity of inferences but on experiences or ways of seeing." (1986, p. 261). In asking, "Why do you think that?," connected knowers are not demanding logical or empirical justification; they are asking, "What in your experience has led you to that point of view?" They are concerned not with the soundness of the position but with its meaning

to the knower; their aim is not to test its validity but to understand it.<sup>i</sup> Given our present primitive grasp of the "rules" for connected knowing, it would be impossible to program a computer to practice it, and, given its "personal" character, it may never be possible.

In fact, of course, you will probably approach this chapter with a mixture of the two orientations. Although for the sake of convenience I will cast separate and connected knowing into dualistic terms, I do not mean to suggest that the two modes are mutually exclusive. "Separate knowers" and "connected knowers" are fictional characters; in reality the two modes can and do coexist within the same individual. Later in the chapter I will try to deconstruct the dualities and complicate the picture. But for the moment, to paraphrase Virginia Woolf (1929/1989), let these lies flow from my lips, and remember that they are lies.

In separate knowing one takes an adversarial stance toward new ideas, even when the ideas seem intuitively appealing; the typical mode of discourse is argument. In WWK we used the following excerpt from an interview with a college sophomore to illustrate the orientation, and we have used it in research and in workshops to stimulate discussion of separate knowing:

I never take anything someone says for granted. I just tend to see the contrary. I like playing the devil's advocate, arguing the opposite of what somebody's thinking, thinking of exceptions, or thinking of a different train of thought.

People often use images of war in describing separate knowing. Consider, for example, a young man we call Mel,<sup>ii</sup> who espouses a sort of Patriot Missile epistemology: "If I could get a job shooting holes in other people's [ideas]," he said, "I would enjoy my life immensely."

If somebody explains [their position] to me and I can . . . shoot holes in it, then I won't tend to believe it, and if they can explain away every misgiving that I have

about the [position], then I'll tend to believe it. . . . [And] if they seriously believe in something which you think is very wrong, if you -- if you shoot enough holes in what they're saying, they'll start doubting it themselves. It could happen to you too. It happens the other way around.

In contrast, in connected knowing one tries to embrace new ideas, looking for what is "right" even in positions that seem, initially, wrong-headed or even abhorrent. An excerpt from another college sophomore illustrates this approach:

When I have an idea about something, and it differs from the way another person is thinking about it, I'll usually try to look at it from that person's point of view, see how they could say that, why they think that they're right, why it makes sense.

As an undergraduate we call Cecily said, "If you listen to people and listen to what they have to say, maybe you can understand why they feel the way they do. There are reasons. They're not just being irrational." Virginia Woolf, posing the question, "How should one read a book?

(1932/1948) advises the reader to "try to become" the author, and Cecily agrees:

When I read a philosopher I try to think as the author does. It's hard, but I try not to bias the train of thought with my own impressions. I try to just pretend that I'm the author. I try to really just put myself in that person's place and feel why is it that they believe this way.

Connected knowers act not as adversaries, but as allies, even advocates, of the position they are examining. Become the author's "fellow worker," his "accomplice," Woolf says, and Sheila, one of our research participants, tells us that in counseling undergraduates she is "usually a bit of a chameleon:" "I try to look for pieces of the truth in what the person's saying instead of

going contrary to them. Sort of collaborate with them."

Some of our research participants and some of our readers perceive the separate knower's argumentative style as a pig-headed attempt to bully the opponent into submission, but I regard this as a primitive or degenerate form of separate knowing. Properly practiced, the procedure requires that one hold one's views loosely, remaining open to competing positions. For Mel, other people's ideas are fair game, but so too are his: "It happens the other way around too," he says. "It could happen to you." For mature separate knowers, the doubting game is a fair game.

While separate knowers are sometimes perceived as stubbornly attached to their own opinions and deaf to the views of others, connected knowers are sometimes perceived as excessively open-minded -- indeed, having no minds of their own, like the "over-empathizers" characterized by the psychologist Robert Hogan as "equivocating jellyfish" (1973, p. 224). But the picture of the connected knower as merely a jellyfish, clone, chameleon or wimp, like the picture of the separate knower as merely a bully, is a caricature. It portrays, perhaps, a primitive or regressive form of connected knowing, but it grossly distorts more mature forms. Sheila, one of our most proficient connected knowers, describes herself as only "a *bit* of a chameleon," and is careful to distinguish between understanding a point of view and agreeing with it. She is not gullible. She does not believe everything she hears -- at least not for long. She "believes" in a point of view only in order to understand it. "Believing" is a *procedure* that guides her interaction with other minds; it is not the *result* of the interaction.

**Connected knowing as procedure.** Notice the recurrence of the word "try" in the descriptions connected knowers give of their approach; Cecily, for instance, uses it four times in four sentences. Although some people exhibit a proclivity toward connected knowing that

appears to be "natural," those who really seem to understand and use the approach rarely describe it as effortless and often allude to its difficulties. The philosopher Elizabeth Spelman refers to the "strenuousness of knowing other people, even people very much like ourselves" (Spelman, 1988, p. 181), and the poet Adrienne Rich in a brilliant essay recounting her attempt to enter the mind and heart of Emily Dickinson by journeying to the poet's home, depicts herself as "an insect, vibrating at the frames of windows, clinging to the panes of glass, trying to connect" (Rich, 1979, p. 161). True connected knowing is neither easy nor natural. As the anthropologist Clifford Geertz says,

Comprehending that which is, in some manner of form, alien to us and likely to remain so, without either smoothing it over with vacant murmurs of common humanity, disarming it with to-each-his-own indifferentism, or dismissing it as charming, lovely even, but inconsequent, is a skill we have arduously to learn, and having learnt it, work continuously to keep alive; it is not a connatural capacity, like depth perception or the sense of balance, upon which we can complacently rely. (Geertz, 1986, p. 122)

In WWK we defined connected knowing as a rigorous, deliberate, and demanding *procedure*, a way of knowing that requires *work*. Contrasting it with the epistemological position we called "subjectivism," we said, "It is important to distinguish between the effortless intuition of subjectivism (in which one identifies with positions that feel right) and the deliberate imaginative extension of one's understanding into positions that initially feel wrong or remote. (WWK, 1986, p. 121). Many of our readers -- friends and foes alike -- have ignored the distinction, conflating connected knowing with subjectivism by treating it more as a reflex than a procedure;

"connected" and "procedural" become antonyms ("procedural" apparently being synonymous with "separate"), which seems to render connected knowing non-procedural. Lorraine Code makes this error, when, in discussing WWK, she describes people behaving "connectedly or procedurally" (Code, 1991, p. 261), and so does a member of my own household, who has read, apparently with care, every draft of everything I have written on this topic.

My immediate reactions to such misreadings are decidedly oppositional: like Mel, I prepare to launch a few verbal missiles. But then I seem to hear Cecily's voice whispering in my ear that perhaps our readers and my house-mate are "not being irrational;" perhaps "there are reasons" for their "silly ideas." I resolve to use connected knowing procedures to try to understand why people are unable to see connected knowing as a procedure, why they persistently confuse it with subjectivism. Utilizing one of my favorite defense mechanisms, I transform a source of irritation into a subject for research.

In qualitative research, as Grant McCracken says, "the investigator serves as a kind of 'instrument' in the collection and analysis of data:" "Detection proceeds by a kind of 'rummaging' process. The investigator must use his or her experience and imagination to find (or fashion) a match for the patterns evidenced by the data (McCracken, 1988, p. 18, 19). 19) I did not need to rummage very deeply before coming up with a couple of matches, two occasions upon which I had interpreted as subjectivist, and dismissed as relatively mindless, behavior which I now believe might have exemplified connected knowing.

Match #1: I first began teaching at a women's college while still attending graduate school at Harvard, where class discussions followed the ballistic model favored by separate knowers. Although I sometimes found it hard to breathe in this atmosphere, I also found it stimulating, and

it became for me the mark of a "good class." When I tried to create the same atmosphere in the classes I was teaching, however, I met with considerable resistance from students like Sue, who said to her interviewer, "In class, when you want to say something, you just want to have it float out in the air and just, you know, stand. You don't want to have it, like, shot down ." My students spoke their piece and listened politely as others spoke theirs, but they would not take issue with one another, and, in my opinion, they spent far too much time exchanging anecdotes about their personal experiences. In *Professing Feminism* Daphne Patai and Noretta Koertge speak scornfully of Women's Studies groups in which everyone agrees with everyone else, "and everybody feels validated and cozy" (Patai & Koertge, 1994, p. 174). That is how I regarded these classes: It is embarrassing to recall that in a piece written at the time, I dismissed them as "sewing circle classes." (How's that for gender stereotyping?).

A second "match" drawn out of the compost of memory came from a longitudinal study that preceded and overlapped with the WWK research in which Claire Zimmerman and I (Clinchy and Zimmerman, 1982; 1985) were using William Perry's (1970) "scheme" (largely derived from and illustrated by interviews with Harvard males) to trace the epistemological and ethical development of a sample of undergraduate women. Some of the questions we asked were designed to ascertain whether the students had reached a position in Perry's scheme that involves critical thinking. Some clearly had. For instance, during the first year of the project a student made a comment we would now consider prototypical of separate knowing: "As soon as someone tells me his point of view, I immediately start arguing in my head the opposite point of view. When someone is saying something, I can't help turning it upside down." The next year, we converted this response into a stimulus and asked the students to respond to it.<sup>iii</sup> To our

dismay, most of them said that they didn't much like that approach and they didn't use it much. Grace, for instance, said that even when she disagreed with someone she didn't start arguing in her head; she started trying to imagine herself into the person's situation. She said, "I sort of fit myself into it in my mind and then I say, 'I see what you mean.'" She said, "There's this initial point where I kind of go into the story, you know? And become like Alice in Wonderland falling down the rabbit hole." Search as we might, we could find no place in Perry's scheme for falling down rabbit holes, and so we interpreted Grace's comment as evidence not of a particular way of thinking but of the absence of any kind of thinking. We saw it, as our critics often see connected knowing, as a sort of naïve credulity: Grace, we concluded, was the sort of person who would fall for anything.

It took me a long time to see that people like Grace and the students in those sewing-circle classes might be following some sort of (admittedly tacit) procedure, rather than simply wallowing in subjectivity. Because connected knowing has much in common with subjectivism, the difference can be difficult to discern. Both subjectivists and connected knowers show respect for views that differ from their own: they seem to listen, and refuse to criticize. Both value the sort of knowledge that emerges from first hand experience, and both draw upon feelings and intuition as sources of information. In each of these respects, however, connected knowing does not simply incorporate features of subjectivism; it builds upon them, and the resulting construction is quite different.

**Validity, understanding, and trust in the knower.** Incidents of miscommunication between men and women like the ones Deborah Tannen (1990) recounts in *You just don't understand* often come about because the men are operating out of a separate knowing

perspective, while the women are operating out of a connected knowing perspective. For instance, a wife listens intently and nods encouragingly as she draws from her husband his reasons for wishing to buy a new car; the next day he turns up with the new car and is hurt and astonished by her angry reaction. The husband has taken the wife's uncritical acceptance as evidence of her agreement and approval; the wife, however, was merely trying to understand.

Miscommunications between the authors of WWK and their readers take a similar form, especially when the readers are schooled in philosophy, a discipline founded on adversarial reasoning (Moulton, 1983) and, according to the philosopher Richard Rorty, preoccupied with questions concerning the validity of knowledge.<sup>iv</sup> This is the separate knowing perspective. Connected knowing is concerned with matters that, as Rorty (cited by Bruner, 1986, p. 12) says, Anglo-American philosophy does not often address, questions about the meaning of experience.

Lorraine Code believes, as do we, that in dealing with the formula "S knows that p," philosophers have paid too little attention to S, to characteristics of the knower and her situation that can affect what is known, but she argues that we go too far in the other direction, focusing exclusively on the knower -- on how she knows -- and ignoring what she knows, the content and validity of her views.

We invite that charge, I think, by using the word "know"<sup>v</sup> instead of, say, "believe" or "think" or "feel." For most philosophers, to "know" something is to make some claim to validity. I may believe that Martians are filling my cellar with poison gas, but surely I do not "know" it. Although we were aware that the word "know" was ambiguous and possibly misleading, we decided, nonetheless, to use it, because it seemed the connected thing to do: we wanted as much as possible to hear the women in their own terms, and "knowing" seemed to come closest to what

most of them meant. We rejected "thinking" because, given the dichotomy in this culture between cognition and affect, we were afraid that "thinking" might imply absence of feeling, and for many of the women feeling was intimately involved in "knowing." We rejected "belief" because while some of the women we interviewed distinguished between believing and knowing, others did not: in subjectivism, for example, the terms are synonymous. The literary theorist Patsy Schweickart (see her chapter in this volume) writes, "One cannot assert meaningfully that something is true or valid only for oneself." This, of course, is precisely what subjectivists do assert. "Everyone's opinion is right for them," they say, and, while such a statement may not be meaningful in some discourse communities, it is meaningful to them. Schweickart goes on, "I have beliefs, prejudices, or presuppositions; but I *make* validity claims." (Schweickart, 1988, p. 299). Again, although this is a sensible distinction, it is not one that subjectivists make: "Anyone's interpretation is valid, if that's the way they see it. I mean, nobody can tell you that your opinion is wrong, you know."

In interviewing the women and poring over transcripts of their interviews, we relied predominantly on connected knowing, suspending judgment in an attempt to make sense of the women's ways of making sense of their experience. Code regards connected knowing as "epistemologically problematic" (Code, 1991, p. 253) because it precludes evaluation, and she notes with disapproval a presumption shared by subjectivists and connected knowers that, as one student said, "A person's experience can't be wrong." Although she is aware of the damage done in the past by "experts' telling women what they are really experiencing," (Code, 1991, p. 256), and acknowledges that our "quasi-therapeutic" techniques may be useful in "empowering women who have been "damaged by patriarchal oppression" (Code, 1991, p. 252), Code argues that our "acritical acceptance" of the women's autobiographical accounts "is not the only - or the best -

alternative" (Code, 1991, p. 256). For us, however, at the data-collection stage of our research, there was no alternative. In order to hear a person in her own terms, the listener must suspend judgment. We may object to the lessons a woman has drawn from her experience. We may feel that she is a victim of "false consciousness," that she has been brainwashed by her oppressors, and that the terms in which she casts her experience are not "her own," but have been foisted upon her by the patriarchy. Nevertheless, we must put these thoughts aside and accept her reality as her reality, not only accept it but collude with her in its construction. As Stephanie Riger says,

In contrast to traditional social science in which the researcher is the expert on assessing reality, an interpretive-phenomenological approach permits women to give their own conception of their experiences. Participants, not researchers, are considered the experts at making sense of their world. . . .The shift in authority is striking. (Riger, 1992, p. 733)

Morawski and Steele show how in traditional psychological research "the power of the psychologist is increased at the cost of the subjects" (Morawski & Steele, 1991, p. 112), offering as an illustration Walter Mischel's (1969) pronouncement that while "subjects" perceive continuities in their personality traits over time, statistics prove them wrong.

According to [Mischel], in so far as the subjects are numbers on 'IBM sheets', that is, objects of scientific reductionism, they are reliable. However, as sentient subjects, that is, beings capable of self-reflection and of constructing a personal history, they are untrustworthy. (Morawski & Steele, 1991, p. 113)

Distrust of the "subject" also permeates accounts of traditional psychoanalytic psychotherapy.

After perusing this literature, Evelyne Schwaber concluded that "analytic listening remains steeped

in a hierarchical two-reality view" (Schwaber, 1983, p. 390), "the one the patient experiences, and the one the analyst 'knows'" (Schwaber, 1983, p. 386). Schwaber writes,

My first supervisor listened by sifting the material through her own perspective -- that is, from the vantage point of the analyst's reality -- in trying to aid the patient's observing ego to recognize the distortions in her perceptions. The second supervisor sharpened the focus from within the patient's perspective, to see in it a certain plausibility, however outlandish, unrealistic, entitled, it may have seemed to the outside observer. (Schwaber, 1983, pp. 379-380)

Schwaber, like the "constructed knowers" in WWK, sees value in the more separate as well as the more connected approach, and uses elements of both in her work, but she firmly rejects the notion that the analyst's view is more accurate than the patient's: the two realities, she says, are "relative" rather than hierarchical (1983, p. 390).

Like the males in Tanner's anecdotes, readers sometimes interpret our "acritical acceptance" of the women's stories as implying approval of their views. To refrain from criticism, however, means to refrain from approval as well as disapproval. (Good critics, after all, illuminate the merits as well as the faults of the things they examine.) Connected knowing shares with subjectivism an appreciation of subjective reality, but it does not adhere to the subjectivist doctrine of "subjective validity," the view that all opinions are equally valid and "everyone's opinion is right for them."<sup>vi</sup> Connected knowing does not imply relativism in this sense. When one is using techniques of connected knowing, as in the initial stages of our research, issues of validity are simply irrelevant.

Although both subjectivists and connected knowers might say that "experience can't be

wrong," they mean different things when they say it. Subjectivists *are* unmitigated relativists. They do believe that whatever truths have emerged from a person's first hand experience are valid for that person. They do believe that these truths are unambiguous, in Hawkesworth's (1989) terms, "transparent" and "unmediated" by personal or cultural preconceptions. Asked how she decides what a poem means, a student speaking from this perspective replies, "Whatever you see in the poem, it's got to be there." Although her teacher may feel that such a student has ignored the words on the page, treating the text as a mirror or an inkblot upon which she projects the contents of her own mind, to the student the meaning is simply there on the page. Much (although not all) of Hawkesworth's critique of feminist positions based on intuition can be applied to subjectivism:

The distrust of the conceptual aspects of thought, which sustains claims that genuine knowledge requires immediate apprehension, presumes not only that an unmediated grasp of reality is possible but also that it is authoritative. Moreover, appeals to intuition raise the specter of an authoritarian trump that precludes the possibility of rational debate. Claims based on intuition manifest an unquestioning acceptance of their own veracity. . . . Thus, intuition provides a foundation for claims about the world that is at once authoritarian, admitting of no further discussion, and relativist, since no individual can refute another's 'immediate' apprehension of reality. Operating at a level of assertion that admits of no further elaboration or explication, those who abandon themselves to intuition conceive and give birth to dreams, not to truth."<sup>vii</sup> (Hawkesworth, 1989, p. 545)

Code (1991, p. 258, footnote 74), persisting in reading WWK as an endorsement of

subjectivism, quotes this passage from Hawkesworth in criticizing what she interprets as our position. In fact, we could have written the passage ourselves, and we nearly did, in describing Minna, an Hispanic woman enrolled in a community college who, in our view, was beginning to struggle out of subjectivism into procedural knowledge. Deserted by her husband and left with an eight year old daughter, no money, no employable skills, and no friends, Minna saw now that as Hawkesworth puts it, in abandoning herself to intuition she had "conceived and given birth to dreams, not to truth." "I was confused about everything," she said. "I was unrealistic about things. I was more in a fantasy world. You have to see things for what they are, not for what you want to see them. I don't want to live in a dream world." Now, she says, "I think everything out, and I want to make sure I understand exactly what's going on before I do anything" (WWK, 1986, p. 99). Code warns that "a subjective knower's 'gut' often lets her down", and subjectivism is not necessarily "conducive to empowerment" (Code, 1991, p. 254). This is not news to Minna, nor to the authors of WWK.

Unlike the feminist scholars who are the objects of Hawkesworth's critique, Sue, the student who wished that her words might float out into the air and just stand, does not choose to rely on private, intuitive truth; she has not yet developed an alternative method. Encapsulated in her own world, she can only assert her own truth. For many women who speak from a subjectivist perspective conversations, especially with like-minded people, are a source of great pleasure, for Sue "discussion" in English class is futile: "Because I know I can't see where they're coming from, so why, you know, why keep trying at it if it doesn't feel comfortable to you, but you have your own thoughts that feel right?" With the advent of procedural knowing, epistemological isolation comes to an end, and collaborative construction of knowledge through

discussion becomes not only possible but, because truth is now problematic rather than transparent, essential. Separate knowers can engage in "rational debate," rather than mere assertion and counter-assertion, in order to adjudicate truth claims. And connected knowers can obtain vicarious experience through mutual "elaboration and explication" of personal narratives.

This is the sort of interchange, I now believe, that was struggling to be born and may occasionally have emerged, although I could not hear it, in those sewing circle classes I perceived as utterly unproductive. It is easy to misperceive active listening as passive and polite, hard to see it as a genuine procedure, a "skill requiring arduously to be learned." Anyone who has tried to teach (or to learn) the art of connected interviewing,<sup>viii</sup> however, knows how difficult it is to learn to listen "objectively," in the connected sense, that is, to hear the other in the other's own terms, to become "an observer from within" (Schwaber, 1983, p. 274).

**Affirming the knower.** In connected knowing it is essential to refrain from judgment "because," as the psychologist Carl Rogers says, "it is impossible to be accurately perceptive of another's inner world if you have formed an evaluative opinion of that person" (Rogers, 1980, p. 152). If you doubt that assertion, Rogers says, try to describe the views of someone you believe is definitely wrong in a fashion that the person will consider accurate. "In the believing game," Elbow writes, "the first rule is to refrain from doubting" (Elbow, 1973, p. 149). In an analysis of interviews on separate and connected knowing with undergraduates from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Wellesley College, collected in the Clinchy-Mansfield project, Carolyn Rabin (1994) noted that for many of the MIT men this is what "connected knowing" meant -- to refrain from criticism -- and this is all it meant; they had not progressed beyond the first rule of the game. I argue, however, that fully developed connected knowing requires that

one "affirm" or "confirm" the subjective reality of the other, and affirmation is not merely the absence of negative evaluation; it is a positive effortful act. Affirmation of a person or a position means, as Elbow says, "to say Yes to it" (Elbow, 1986, p. 279), rather than merely offering sympathetic understanding. Confirmation means, in Buber's wonderful phrases, to "imagine the real," to "make the other present" (Buber, quoted by Friedman, 1985, p. 4). It involves "a bold swinging . . . into the life of the other" (Buber, quoted by Kohn, 1990, p. 112), and as the psychologist Alfie Kohn says, this other, for Buber, is a particular other, not an "interchangeable someone" (Kohn, 1990, p. 112), and the knower is "not merely avoiding objectification but affirmatively invoking, . . . addressing the other's status as a subject, . . . an actor, a knower, a center of experience" (Kohn, 1990, p. 100).

This "bold swinging into the life of the other" is a far cry from polite tolerance or "to-each-his-own indifferentism, but it is also not to be confused with approval or agreement. It should be obvious that, as Geertz puts it, "Understanding what people think doesn't mean you have to think the same thing" (Geertz, quoted in Berreby, 1995, p. 4). "Understanding," Geertz writes, "in the sense of comprehension, perception, and insight needs to be distinguished from 'understanding' in the sense of agreement of opinion, union of sentiment, or commonality of commitment. . . We must learn to grasp what we cannot embrace" (Geertz, 1986, p. 122).

From the connected knowing perspective, of course, we must first try very hard to embrace it.

Conversations involving mutual confirmation are not to be confused with the "relatively harmonious situations" described by Patai & Koertge and mentioned above, in which "everyone feels validated and cozy" (Patai & Koertge, 1994, p. 174). If "everyone feels validated" in this situation, it is not because they have been told they are right; it is because they have been heard.

As one young woman said, "When people [are] interested in why I feel the way I do and why it makes sense to me, . . . I feel that what I have to say might mean something and has some impact." This sort of validation is especially welcome to procedural knowers. While subjectivists are confident that they can arrive at the truth (the truth for them) simply by reading it off from experience (Whatever you see in the poem, it's got to be there) or attending to their infallible guts, procedural knowers have no such assurance. Separate knowers need to know whether their views can survive the scrutiny of an outsider's critical eye, and connected knowers need to know whether their thoughts can "mean something" to someone else, even, perhaps, "an attentive stranger" (Ruddick, 1984, p. 148).

In swinging boldly into the mind of another, truly saying "yes" to it, two perversions of "connected knowing" are avoided. One is to "use it as a weapon, " as one woman said, as "when people say, 'Well, I can see how you would say that given your background,' . . . referring to my background as some wacky thing that nobody else has ever experienced." In this patronizing version, known, I am told, as "the California fuck off," one distances one's self from the other's experience, in effect saying "No" to it. A second perversion is to say yes too quickly, to assume without reflection that others feel as we do or as we would feel in their situation, that is, to assimilate the other to the self: "I know just how you feel!," we say, having, in fact, very little idea or quite the wrong idea.

**The self as instrument.** While separate knowing requires "self-extrication", "weeding out the self," in Elbow's terms, connected knowing requires "self-insertion" or "projection in the good sense" (Elbow, 1973, p. 149) or, to use a more feminine image, "receiving the other into [the] self" (Noddings, 1984, p. 30). Procedures for minimizing "projection in the bad sense" (Elbow,

1973, p. 149)), or, as Piaget puts it, "excluding the intrusive self" (Piaget, 1972, quoted by Keller, 1983, p. 134) have been well developed and are known to be effective, although of course not perfectly so. For instance, the effects of "bias" are reduced if observers in an experiment are "double-blinded," unaware of both the hypothesis being tested and the treatment to which the subjects have been assigned. Procedures for using the self as an instrument of understanding are less well developed, but practitioners of the increasingly prevalent "new paradigm" research have made considerable progress in developing and articulating them.

This is not the place to inventory these techniques, but I have already mentioned the procedure by which the investigator rummages through her experience in search of a "match." "The diverse aspects of the self," McCracken says, "become a bundle of templates to be held up against the data until parallels emerge" (McCracken, 1988, p. 19). "To understand a poem," an undergraduate said, "You must let the poem pass into you and become part of yourself, rather than something you see outside yourself. . . . there has to be some parallel between you and the poem." This is an active procedure: we must construct the parallels, by conjuring up "metaphorical extensions, analogies, associations" (Elbow, 1973, p. 149), and we need not simply wait for a poem or a person or a patient to strike a chord, for by "fine tuning" (Margulies, 1989, p. 16) the instrument of our subjectivity we can increase the likelihood of its "empathic resonance" (Howard, 1991, p. 189). Instead of simply "letting" the other in, we can prepare our minds to receive it by engaging in arduous systematic "self-reflection." McCracken advises, for instance, that in preparation for qualitative research, the investigator should construct a "detailed and systematic appreciation of his or her personal experience with the topic of interest. . . . The investigator must inventory and examine the associations, incidents and assumptions that surround

the topic in his or her mind" (McCracken, 1988, p. 32) thus "preparing the templates with which he or she will seek out 'matches' in the interview data. The investigator listens to the self in order to listen to the respondent" (McCracken, 1988, p. 33).

In conducting the interview, too, one uses the self as an instrument of understanding. The sociologist Marjorie DeVault, who has forcefully urged us to "analyze more carefully the specific ways that interviewers use personal experience as a resource for listening" describes her own procedure as focusing "on attention to the unsaid, in order to produce it as topic and make it speakable." It "involves noticing ambiguity and problems of expression in interview data, then drawing on my own experience in an investigation aimed at 'filling in' what has been incompletely said" (DeVault, 1990, p. 104).<sup>ix</sup>

In using the self to understand the other, we risk imposing the self on the other; projection in the good sense can easily degenerate into projection in the bad sense. Patti Lather, a sympathetic practitioner of new paradigm research, worries that "rampant subjectivity" could prove to be its "nemesis" (Lather, 1986, p. 68). How are we to distinguish between the psychoanalyst Heinz Kohut's "empathy," defined as "the recognition of the self in the other" (Kohut, 1978, quoted by Jordan, 1991, p. 68), and the subjectivist's "Whatever you see in the poem, it's got to be there"? How do we ensure that we are not treating the other as a mirror or a blot of ink, a mere receptacle for our own subjectivity? As the psychologist Alfred Margulies says, "Because empathy is by definition the 'imaginative projection of one's own consciousness into another being,' we will unavoidably find ourselves reflected within our gaze toward the other. I look for you and see myself" (Margulies, 1989, p. 58).

Clinicians and qualitative researchers agree that the matches one pulls from one's own

experience should serve only as "clues" (DeVault, 1990, p. 104)), "merely a bundle of possibilities, pointers, and suggestions that can be used to plumb the remarks of a respondent" (McCracken, 1988, p. 19). "Imagining how one would feel -- or actually has felt," Kohn says, should be regarded as only a "provisional indication" (Kohn, 1990, p. 133), or as Margulies puts it, "a map constructed second-hand from another life's travels, a map that undergoes constant reworking, revision (re-vision), and clarification. (Margulies, 1989, p. 53). One must remain open to "subtle surprises," to emerging discrepancies between the map and the patient's "inscape." Qualitative researchers devise strategies for inviting surprise, often enlisting the cooperation of participants in reworking the map. Indeed, one must move beyond matching to achieve true understanding. In Kohn's terms we must move beyond "imagine-self" to "imagine-other." If we assume that we have reached full understanding once we run out of matches we are indeed assimilating the other to the self. The psychiatrist Maurice Friedman calls this truncated procedure "identification:"

[T]he therapist resonates with the experiences related by the client only to the extent that they resemble his or her own. It says, in effect, 'I am thou,' but misses the Thou precisely at the point where its otherness and uniqueness takes it out of the purview of one's own life stance and life experience." (Friedman, 1985, p. 197)

**I, thou, and it.**<sup>x</sup> Some of our readers and research participants conceive of connected knowing as useful only in dealing with people. At worst, they describe it as a way of "being nice," "getting along with people," and "keeping the peace;" at best, they see it as a way of understanding directed only at live and present people. In WWK, however, we said, "When we

speak of separate and connected knowing we refer not to any sort of relationship between the self and another person but [to] relationships between knowers and the objects (or subjects) of knowing (which may or may not be persons)" (WWK, 1986, p. 102). We said that "the mode of knowing is personal, but the object of knowing need not be," citing Cecily's comment (WWK, 1986, p. 121) that in reading a philosopher she "tries to think as the author does," and the comment of another student who said that "you shouldn't read a book [in this case Dante's *Divine Comedy*] just as something printed and distant from you, but as a real experience of someone who went through some sort of situation" (WWK, 1986, p. 113).

In connected knowing, the "it" is transformed into a "thou," and the "I" enters into relationship with the thou. Scientists use this procedure. The biologist Barbara McClintock says, in words that have grown familiar, that you must have the patience to hear what the corn "has to say to you" and the openness "to let it come to you" (Keller, 1983a, p. 198), and the pseudonymous biochemist portrayed by June Goodfield in An imagined world says "If you really want to understand about a tumor you've got to *be* a tumor" (Goodfield, 1991/1994, p. 226). According to the psychologist Seymour Papert, even toddlers are capable of a sensorimotor version of connected knowing. Before the age of two, he says, he "fell in love with gears;" indeed, he became a gear. "You can be the gear," he writes. "You can understand how it turns by projecting yourself into its place and turning with it." (Papert, 1980, pp. vi-vii). Papert and his colleague Sherry Turkle found that some of the students they observed learning to construct computer programs -- especially girls and women -- also "reasoned from within" their programs. Anne, for instance, "psychologically places herself in the same space as the sprites" (the objects whose movements she is programming). "She is down there, in with the sprites. . . When she

talks about them her gestures with hand and body show her moving with and among them. When she speaks of them she uses language such as "I move here" (Turkle & Papert, 1990, p. 144).<sup>xi</sup>

Anne treats the computer rather like "a person" (Turkle, 1984, p. 112), "allowing ideas to emerge in the give and take of conversation with it" (Turkle, 1984, p. 104).

Our research participants often describe their way of reading in similar terms. "You should treat the text as if it were a friend," a student said, and she meant, as Schweickart means, not just to treat it nicely, but to regard it as "not a mere object, like a stone, but the objectification of a subject" (Schweickart, 1989, p. 83). Adrienne Rich, Schweickart writes, aims to make Emily Dickinson "live as the substantial palpable presence animating her works (Schweickart, 1989, p. 50)," to "make [her] present" as Buber (quoted by Friedman, 1985, p. 4) would say. Connected reading is an intersubjective procedure: "The reader encounters not simply a text, but a 'subjectified object': the 'heart and mind' of another woman. She comes into close contact with an interiority -- a power, a creativity, a suffering, a vision -- that is *not* identical with her own." Schweickart contrasts this feminist version of reader response theory with a **version** put forth by Georges Poulet. Poulet also takes a personal approach, saying that "To understand a literary work . . . is to let the individual who wrote it reveal [herself] to us *in us*" (Poulet, 1980, p. 46, quoted by Schweickart, 1986, p. 52), but he portrays reader and author as opponents in a zero-sum game. The reader "becomes the 'prey' of what he reads. . . . His consciousness is 'invaded,' 'annexed,' 'usurped.' . . . In the final analysis, the process of reading leaves room for only one subjectivity. (Schweickart, 1986, pp. 52-53)

In the feminist version of the theory (we call it "connected reading"), on the other hand, there is a "doubling" of subjectivity: "one can be placed at the disposal of the text while the other

remains with the reader." Schweickart warns, however, that ultimately, because the reader constructs the meaning of the text, "there is only one subject present -- the reader. . . . The subjectivity roused to life by reading, while it may be attributed to the author, is nevertheless not a separate subjectivity but a projection of the subjectivity of the reader" (Schweickart, 1986, p. 53).

Projection in the bad sense is a very real danger when the author, being absent, cannot speak for herself.<sup>xii</sup> Schweickart:

In real conversation the other person can interrupt, object to an erroneous interpretation, provide further explanations, change her mind, change the topic, or cut off conversation altogether. In reading, there are no comparable safeguards against the appropriation of the text by the reader. (Schweickart, 1986, p. 53)

The best that can be done in connected reading is to encourage absent authors to speak and to join them in a semblance of collaboration. The writer and critic Doris Grumbach recounts a mid-life change in her ways of reading that sounds like a transition from a relatively separate to a relatively connected approach. "It is hard work to read more slowly," she says. "But when I slow down, I interlard the writers' words with my own. I think about what they are saying. . . . I dillydally in their views." (Grumbach, 1991, p. 15). Reading becomes a kind of conversation, and the reader apprentices herself to the writer. "Reading in the new way now, I learn. Before, I seemed to be instructing the book with my superior opinions" (Grumbach, 1991, p. 15).<sup>xiii</sup> ("Do not dictate to your author, try to become him" [Woolf, 1932, p. 282]).

"Subjectivist theories of reading," Schweickart says, "silence the text" (Schweickart, 1989, p. 83). This applies to the informal subjectivist theories of ordinary readers as well as to members of the lit-crit community: "We're all allowed to read into a poem any meaning we want," and

"Whatever you see in the poem, it's got to be there," whether the poet likes it or not. Objectivist readings, on the other hand, such as the ones offered by people adhering to the epistemological position we call "Received Knowing," silence the reader: to find out what a poem means, "you'd have to ask the poet; it's his poem." For connected readers it is different: A poem does not belong solely to its author. "Poems are written," a student explained, "but you also have to interpret them." A poem is not something "that sits there and does nothing. It has to be interpreted by other people, and those people are going to have their own ideas of what it means." Those ideas, however, must be grounded in the text: interpretation is "a two-person activity," involving the poet as well as the reader.

In sharing with the text the task of interpretation, instead of claiming it as solely their own, it might seem that connected readers possess less authority than subjectivist readers. But the authority of subjectivism is, in fact, derivative, and, being derivative, it is fragile. Who is it who "allows" us to interpret poetry for ourselves, and if They have the power to allow it, might They not also have the power to take away the privilege? ("My English teacher lets me have my own opinions," a student said, but she worried that next semester's teacher might be less lenient.)

Authority in subjectivism is limited, as well as tenuous. In one of our studies, we asked students to tell us how they assessed the merits of a poem. "To me," one woman replied, "what makes one poem better than another one is that I can get something from it as a person. That says nothing about the poem itself. I mean, I have no authority." I hear in this comment an appropriate humility, a refusal to lay down the law and speak for the text. But I hear, too, a poignant diffidence: The student is saying that she has no public voice, that, while she is free to make her own judgments, there is no reason for anyone to listen to her. Her judgments have no

objective value. They say nothing about the poem -- they are just about her; there is no "it," here; subjectivist reading is a one-person activity.

In granting some voice to the text, the connected reader actually increases the power of her own voice. Although acknowledging that the authority of her interpretation is qualified, she asserts that it does have *some* authority, and, because she constructed the interpretation herself, no one can take it away (although she, herself, may decide to abandon it). Like the subjectivist, the connected reader speaks "as a person," but, because her words concern the poem as well as herself, they are comprehensible to others and worthy of attention. And, far from silencing the author, by speaking as a person the connected reader leaves space for the text to speak.

Schweickart astutely observes that while Rich's "use of the personal voice . . . serves as a reminder that her interpretation is informed by her own perspective," it also "serves as a gesture warding off any inclination to appropriate the authority of the text as a warrant for the validity of the interpretation" (Schweickart, 1986, p. 54). Like the subjectivist, the connected reader does not presume to speak for the text, but, unlike the subjectivist, she does not speak only to herself; she assumes that her words might "mean something, and have some impact" on other readers.

**Thinking and feeling.** To adopt the perspective of the other requires thinking (reasoning, inference) as well as empathy. Indeed, although the term "empathy" has come to connote merely an affective "feeling with," the German word from which it was translated, *Einfühlung* meant, literally, "feeling into," and referred, according to Basch, to "the ability of one person to come to know first-hand, so to speak, the experience of another," and "inference, judgment, and other aspects of reasoning thought" were as central to its meaning as affect (Basch, 1983, p. 110). The loss in translation of these cognitive aspects can be seen as an instance of the

Western tendency to treat thinking and feeling as mutually exclusive, the same tendency which has led readers of WWK to assume that because separate knowing involves reasoning, and connected knowing differs from separate knowing, then connected knowing must involve merely feeling. A tendency to place a "separate spin" on essentially connected notions is also evident here. To "feel with" seems to preserve the autonomy of knower and known: their feelings are parallel but not fused. "Feeling into," in contrast, suggests a more intimate relation. In any case, connected knowing and *Einfühlung*, in its original meaning, seem to be close relatives, if not twins.

Kohn writes that "without imagining the reality of the other, empathic feeling is ultimately self-oriented and thus unworthy of the name." (Kohn, 1990, p. 131), and imagining the reality of the other requires responding to its cognitive content as well as its affect. Kohn recalls an incident from his student days when he raised a concern with his instructor, a psychiatrist, about some aspect of the course. "I can see you're angry," the instructor said. Up to that point, Kohn says, he had not been angry, but the instructor's response did anger him, because "it referred only to what he believed was my mood, effectively brushing aside the content of what I had expressed. His exclusively affective focus felt dismissive, even infantilizing, rather than empathic or understanding" (Kohn, 1990, pp. 311-312).

Subjectivism is especially prone to this "noninferential empathy" (Flavell, 1985, p. 139). "I'm very empathic," a student told us, "very sensitive to other peoples' emotions, even if I don't know them. Somebody could be depressed across the room, and I'll be depressed all day because that person's depressed who I don't even know." Emotional contagion is not sufficient for mature connected knowing (although may constitute a rudimentary basis for it),<sup>xiv</sup> nor is "situational role-taking," Kohn's "imagine-self," meaning, What would *I* do, given *my* background, personality,

values, etc., in *his* situation?. In connected knowing one must "imagine-other" (my rephrasing of Kohn's "imagine-him"), put one's self into the head and heart, as well as the shoes of the other.

Kohn:

The issue is not just how weepy I become upon learning that your spouse has died; it is also whether I am merely recalling and reacting to a comparable loss in my own life or whether I am resonating to your unique set of circumstances -- the suddenness of the death, the particular features of this person you loved that are especially vivid for you, your rocky marital history and the resultant prickles of guilt you are now feeling, the way your initial numbness is finally giving way to real pain, the respects in which your unconscious fears of being abandoned are about to be freshly revived by this event, the relationship that you and I have had up to now, and so on. (Kohn, 1990, p. 132-133)

It is this intense concentration on the unique aspects of the object that characterizes the objectivity of connected knowing. If you act as the author's accomplice, Woolf says, "if you open your mind as widely as possible, then signs and hints of almost imperceptible fineness, from the twist and turn of the first sentences, will bring you into the presence of a human being unlike any other. Steep yourself in this, acquaint yourself with this. . . ." In separate knowing one regards the object as an instance of a category (a type of person, say, or a genre) and measures it against objective standards. In connected knowing, the focus is on the object in itself, in all its particularity of detail. Once having constructed a complex constellation of specific circumstances peculiar to the particular worlds of the novelist or the next-door neighbor, or who- or whatever, connected knowers are forced to acknowledge disjunctions between these worlds and their own, and the

danger of imagining the other as the self is sharply diminished.

"Nonempathic inference" (Flavell, 1985, p. 139) seems as problematic as noninferential empathy. Kohn asks us to "imagine a continuum: on one side are universal experiences, where imagine-self will do (burning hand); on the other side are things one has not personally experienced, where imagine-him is obviously required (giving birth)" (Kohn, 1990, p. 134). ("Him" seems an odd choice of pronoun in this context.) "The interesting cases," Kohn writes, "are in the middle (death of spouse). One can get away with treating that example as a generic grief, but only at a considerable cost to the integrity of the empathic response." (Kohn, 1990, p. 134). It seems likely that we are especially prone to assimilation to the self concerning these "things in the middle," those "universal" events which appear to be similar but are experienced differently, like the ones listed by the philosopher Elizabeth Spelman: "birth, death, eating, cooking, working, loving, having kin, being friends" (Spelman, 1988, p. 179). To fully "imagine other" in these situations seems to me to require feeling as well as thinking, but the MIT men do not seem to think so: in delineating their versions of "connected knowing", not one of them --even among those who claimed to use the procedure -- referred to empathy or, indeed, made any mention of affect, while many of the Wellesley women did. The difference is rooted not in gender but in epistemology (which, while related to gender, is not synonymous with it). Women who are predominantly separate knowers also practice nonempathic inference, and, perceiving their ideas as autonomous, independent of their persons, they wish that others would do the same with them. Roberta, for instance, said that while she welcomed the opportunity to defend her carefully constructed opinions, when people tried to delve into the experiences behind the opinions instead of treating them on their own merits, she tended to "push [them] away:" "I feel like they're

belittling me. ... Why don't they just ask me straight out why I think my idea, because I've thought my idea through. They don't have to like beat around the bush about it" (Mansfield & Clinchy, 1992).

To people like Roberta, who present themselves as heavily tipped in the direction of separate knowing, it is especially important that people respond to the impersonal cognitive content of their ideas; they tend to be suspicious of more personal approaches, experiencing them as Kohn experienced his instructor's noninferential empathy, as "belittling" (Roberta) "infantalizing" and "dismissive" (Kohn). People who present themselves as heavily tipped toward connected knowing, on the other hand, are wary of *impersonal* approaches: like the women in Tannen's accounts, they feel bereft when their listeners (in Tannen's account, men) offer analyses and solutions to the painful problem they have recounted, instead of resonating to their pain. Some adolescent males, observing this response in girls of their acquaintance, have formed a theory about it. "Girls don't want you to fix their problems," eighteen-year-old David Constantine writes to Parade Magazine. "they just want to talk about them, and they want you to listen. They don't want you to say, "What do you care?" or 'It's nothing to worry about.'" David infers correctly that girls don't want their worries dismissed, but his grasp of empathy seems limited: "Girls want you to say things like, 'Hmmm...,' and 'Really?' and 'Wow, I don't blame you.'" According to David, girls just want to feel validated and cozy. "A good 'Hmmm...,' and a feigned interested look is more important to them than the greatest answer we could come up with to all their troubles" (What bothers me about girls, 1994). David would claim, as have several of our students and colleagues who appear to be tipped toward separate knowing, that it is not necessary to feel what a person is feeling in order to understand him. From the connected knowing

perspective, however, thinking cannot be divorced from feeling. Fully developed connected knowing, like Kohn's fully developed empathy, means to "truly experience the other as a subject." Kohn uses the word "experience" rather than "understand" -- and so, I think, should I -- "because something more than an intellectual apprehension is required. . . . "[T]he connection . . . must be felt viscerally. . . ." (Kohn, 1990, p. 150).

**Connected knowing with the self.** I first read these words, "[T]he connection . . . must be felt viscerally. . ." after teaching an especially intense session of my seminar, and they seemed to me just right, but the next phrase brought me up short: "The connection must be felt viscerally *as surely as one's own humanness and uniqueness are felt*" (Kohn, 1990, p. 150). Whoa. Was Kohn asserting that knowledge of the self is prerequisite to knowledge of others, that we experience others as subjects only by analogy to our experience of ourselves as subjects? My fifteen seminar students had asserted that afternoon with nearly perfect unanimity that they found it far easier to understand other people's beliefs and values and desires than to know their own. They would agree with Addie, an interviewee who said, "It's easy for me to see a whole lot of different points of view on things and to understand why people think those things. The hard thing is sitting down and saying, 'Okay, what do I think, and why do I think it?'" When in our research we asked young women to "describe themselves to themselves," they said things like "I'm about average" and "My ideas are just sort of like the norms." They seemed often to respond not as compassionate observers from within, but as stern judges from without: "I'm too fat . . . fairly good with people . . . pretty smart. . .not as tolerant as I should be. . ." Brown and Gilligan describe how in adolescence girls come up against "a wall of shoulds" (Brown & Gilligan, 1992, p. 97); they "come to a place where they feel they cannot say or feel or know what they have

experienced" (Brown & Gilligan, 1992, p. 4). For many adult women, the wall remains in place; they cannot seem to connect with her own humanness and uniqueness. Muttering aloud, I reported all this to Kohn, interlarding my words with his, and apparently he heard me, for he went on: "[T]his last formulation gives us pause. . . . [I]t is not clear that everyone does experience his or her own subjectivity" (Kohn, 1990, p. 150). It is crystal clear from research (as well as common observation) that many do not.

In our interviews, Annick and I tried to determine if our respondents used separate knowing with themselves. We asked, "Do you ever use this approach with yourself -- with your own thinking? Play devil's advocate with yourself, or argue with yourself?" Almost everyone said they did, some describing the internal critic as a destructive antagonist, others drawing a more benign picture of "a friend behaving as an enemy" (Torbert, 1976), like the one inhabiting the philosopher Alice Koller's head, "thinking up the strongest possible arguments against my own position" in order to "find the flaws in my reasoning, the blunt edges of the ideas I'm trying to sharpen (Koller, 1990, p. 27). No one was baffled by our question; everyone could make some sense of it.

One day Annick happened to notice that we asked no comparable question about connected knowing, while in every other respect we had constructed parallel questions about the two approaches. Although we wanted to repair the omission, we were uncertain how to phrase such a question, or even whether such a question made sense. It seemed nonsensical to ask whether people tried to step into their own shoes; surely they were already in their own shoes. Bewildered, we asked our friends, "What would it mean to use connected knowing with yourself?" Ann Stanton (see her chapter, this volume) instantly replied, "It means to treat your

mind as if it were a friend." This seemed to make sense. After all, we had ample evidence that the women we had interviewed found it hard to befriend their ideas, hard to "believe" them, to "say yes" to them. And so we added a question to the interview which, after repeated rephrasing, emerged (still a bit awkwardly) as "Do you ever use this approach with yourself? Try to see why you think what you do, what's right about it?" Our respondents had as much trouble answering the question as we had had in formulating it. "Huh? What? What do you mean? I don't get it," they said. Often, they heard the question as asking not about a friend but an enemy in the head: "Oh, yeah," they said. "I'm forever second-guessing myself." Not one of our research participants managed to articulate with much clarity a practice of connected knowing with the self.

For most of the women we interviewed, then, connected knowing with the self was at least as difficult to achieve as connected knowing with the other, and possibly more so. These women were like the patient described by the psychotherapist Judith Jordan who, prior to therapy, "did not seem able to take her own inner experience as a serious object for interest and attention." "I care for others sometimes like a shepherd," the woman said. . . . I put myself in their place and I understand. With myself, though, I used to be like a lion tamer with a bull whip." (Jordan, 1991, p. 78). The clinical literature suggests that "intrapyschic empathy" (Schafer, 1964, p. 251) is a skill arduously to be learned, requiring discipline and practice, usually under the guidance of some sort of tutor (a therapist, perhaps, or a Zen master).

The psychoanalyst Joanna Field, tells a compelling story of her own efforts to achieve intrapsychic empathy. Feeling "utterly at sea as to how to live my life," thinking second-hand thoughts and "whipping" herself in pursuit of second-hand goals, she developed over a period of

years her own "method" of "active passivity" that enabled her, ultimately, to step inside her own shoes, to "see through [her] own eyes instead of at second hand." The method requires that one take an active stance toward one's thoughts and feelings, rather than simply letting them run on as a sort of "unconscious monologue" in the background of one's mind, but the activity is the sort practiced by midwives rather than taskmasters. "I began to see," Field writes, "that I must play the Montessori teacher to my thought, must leave it free to follow its own laws of growth, my function being to observe its activities, provide suitable material to enchannel them, but never to coerce it into docility" (Field, 1936/1981, p. 7). The process has much in common with the modes of fostering growth used by the public leaders Mary Belenky in her chapter in this volume.

Field writes,

By continual watching and expression I must learn to observe my thought and maintain a vigilance not against 'wrong' thoughts, but against refusal to recognize any thought. Further, this introspection meant continual expression, not continual analysis; it meant that I must bring my thoughts and feelings up in their wholeness, not argue about them (Field, 1936/1981, pp. 204-205).

Field found that one way of bringing her thoughts and feelings up in their wholeness was to let them "write themselves" into the friendly pages of her journal. The journal turns the "I" into an "it," objectifying the knower's subjectivity, and in perusing the journal the knower turns the "it" into a "thou," in effect practicing connected knowing with herself.

But it is difficult to penetrate the wall of shoulds and speak truly, even in the privacy of one's journal, and in public it is even harder. The novelist Mary Gordon says that in striving to develop her own voice as a writer she was haunted by "bad specters" who infused her with a fear

of being "trivial" (Gordon, 1980, p. 27), two famous male poets, perhaps, peering over her shoulder as she sat at the typewriter, and murmuring, "Your experience is an embarrassment; your experience is insignificant" (Gordon, 1980, p. 28). "Do you talk much in class?" we asked an undergraduate. "It's hard," she said. "I think -- I always think, 'Do I really want to say this or not? Is it important enough to say?'"

Given the presence of strangling self-doubt, most of us find it impossible to achieve intrapsychic empathy on our own. Lacking the skill and stamina to serve as Montessori teachers to ourselves, we depend upon external "teachers" -- friends and colleagues, as well as certified teachers -- who help us to say what we want to say (WWK, 1986, p. 218), reading our early drafts as "sympathetic allies," "trying to see the validity" in what we have written, and telling us "the ways in which [it] makes sense" (Elbow, 1986, p. 287).

It is reasonable to argue that without intimate knowledge of one's self one cannot enter into intimacy with another, that one "who is essentially a stranger to himself is unlikely to forge an affective connection to someone else" (Kohn, 1990, p.152). Without self-knowledge we cannot exploit genuine similarities between self and other, using "templates" in the self to guide us to "matches" in the other. Without self-knowledge we cannot preserve the otherness of the other; he, she or it becomes a creature of our projections. But how *well* must we know ourselves before we can know another, and must self-knowledge always come first? After all, as the philosopher Iris Murdoch says, "self is as hard to see justly as other things" (Murdoch, 1970, p. 67) -- harder, for people like Addie.

**Fear of fusion.** Addie reports that when she entered her friends' subjective frames of reference, she lost touch with her own: "I felt, 'My God, I'm becoming -- I'm not me anymore.

I'm not thinking my own ideas anymore.' I was becoming very affected by other people's opinions and ideas." Writers on empathy seem to live in dread of such an event; anxiety over the possibility of "fusion" pervades the literature, expressed at times in hyperbolic terms and seeming to my mind to reach near phobic proportions. "What happens to the self when it feels into the other?" Kohn asks, and he answers, apparently in an effort to quell anxiety that I was not experiencing, "All is not lost." (Kohn, 1990, p. 153). Kohn reports that Buber rejected the word "empathy" because it connoted "loss of the self in the process of experiencing the other" (Kohn, 1990, p. 153), and Buber was at pains to emphasize that one could experience the other "without forfeiting anything of the felt reality of his [own] reality" (Buber, 1947, p. 62). Schweickart assures us that Adrienne Rich does not "identify" with Dickinson, but merely "establishes an affinity" (Schweickart, 1989 p. 64). The literary theorist R. S. Steele warns that "the reader must claim her or his independence as a subject, not allowing her or himself to be subjugated by the text" (Steele, 1986, p. 259). Rogers advises therapists "[t]o sense the client's world as if it were your own, but without ever losing the 'as if' quality . . .," (Rogers, 1964, p. 284). Kohn asserts that empathy does not require that "the self become submerged in the other" or that "its subjectivity be demolished" (Kohn, 1990, p. 153), and Elbow reminds players of the believing game that "it's only a game;" they can quit at any time.(Elbow, 1973, p. 174)

Although of course there is truth in the view that the empathic self can (indeed, must) maintain its integrity and need not (indeed, must not) allow itself to be consumed by the other, these statements raise the specter of reducing a paradox -- "the paradox of separateness within connection," as Jordan defines it (Jordan, 1991, p. 69) -- to a dichotomy: "seeing the self as *either* distinct and autonomous *or* merged and embedded" (Jordan, 1991, p. 72). Words like "forfeit,"

"claim," and "allow" seem to partake of a "justice" orientation, common among those who conceive of themselves as "separate" rather than "connected" in relationships (Lyons, 1983). Formulations of empathy seem often to begin from a premise of distance and difference -- "strain[ing]" after similarity" (Barber, 1984, p. 175) across a divide over an "abyss" (Buber, 1947, p. 175), rather than solidarity and similarity. Perhaps it is possible to "leave the self *intact* but also leave the self *transformed*" (Kohn, 1990, italics added) if "intact" is defined as "unimpaired", but the word carries traces of its root meaning of "untouched," and so in this context connotes an impregnable self. Indeed, if empathy is defined as projection into the other, as it is in The Oxford Universal Dictionary among many others, one may even detect a whiff of castration anxiety in forebodings of fusion.

The women we interviewed used images of reception rather than projection in describing connected knowing (WWK, 1986, p. 122). The biographer Elizabeth Young-Breuhl puts it this way:

Empathizing involves. . . putting another person *in yourself*, becoming another person's habitat, without dissolving the person, without digesting the person. You are mentally pregnant, not with a potential life but with a person, indeed, a whole life, a person with her history. So the person lives on in you and you can, as it were, hear her in this intimacy. But this depends upon your ability to tell the difference between the subject and yourself, to appreciate the role that she plays in your psychic life.' (Young-Breuhl, as quoted by Breslin, 1994, p. 19).

For Young-Breuhl "the other is incorporated as other" (Breslin, 1994, p. 19). There is a "doubling" of subjectivity, as in Schweickart's account of reading, in spite of the (paradoxical) fact

that "there is only one subject present" (see above, and Schweickart's chapter, this volume). In "caring," says the philosopher Nel Noddings, "I become a duality. . . . The seeing and feeling are mine, but only partly and temporarily mine, as on loan to me." (Noddings, 1984, p. 30) In this "receptive" conception of empathy one need never leave home, and so, perhaps, the risk of being stranded, like Adrienne, behind the eyes of the other, is diminished.<sup>xv</sup> Although Buber's concept of "inclusion" (explicated by Friedman) contains images of moving out, ("bold swinging into the life of another"), in (paradoxical) fact, it does not require that one leave one's home ground:

"Inclusion . . . does not mean at any point that one gives up the ground of one's own concreteness [or] ceases to see through one's own eyes." (Friedman, 1985, p. 199) Inclusion means "making present." Through "mutual confirmation," Friedman says, "partners" make each other present in their "wholeness, unity, and uniqueness"<sup>xvi</sup> (Friedman, 1985, p. 4). In this context, connected knowing with the other and connected knowing with the self are reciprocal rather than oppositional processes: neither partner disappears into the other; each makes and keeps the other present.

**Knowing communities.** Both separate and connected knowing achieve their full power when practiced in partnership with other like-minded knowers. Separate knowers benefit from partnership with friends willing to behave as enemies. Francis Crick, one of the discoverers of the structure of DNA says, "A good scientist values criticism almost more highly than friendship; no, in science criticism is the height and measure of friendship. The collaborator points out the obvious, with due impatience. He stops the nonsense" (Crick, as reported by Judson, 1978, and quoted by Bruffee, 1981, p. 178). An MIT student supplied a moving illustration of this process and, incidentally, of the detachment that is, for me, the heart and soul of separate knowing. Ed

was one of several summer student interns working in a hospital laboratory on various projects.

Each week the students met with the dozen or so scientists who were the "brains of the group," to present their problems and their ideas.

I would say something like, "You know, we had this spike in the frequency plot here, and I think it's because of this," and before you could blink an eye one of the big older guys would go, "No, no, that's wrong." And I'm like -- "Uh, okay." I mean, like, for three or four days I've been thinking that it was this thing. And I thought I was so clever for figuring it out. And the guy will -- in - in five seconds shoot it down and say, "No, that's absolutely wrong because of this." And of course he's right.

It took me a good part of the summer to realize how much it wasn't malicious. And that all these gentlemen were there for the purpose of science and for engineering. And they didn't mean anything personal, when they shot you down right away. But it was -- the way they saw it is, they were dismissing a wrong proposition so it wouldn't have time to -- They would -- they would just take care of it right away.

I thought it was real neat. To see that happen -- I mean, some of these doctors are some of the best doctors or bioengineers around. And they were able to -- they didn't see ideas as *possessions*. They saw ideas as ideas. (pause) And ideas were sort of like the group's ideas. You sat there and you formulated something

for a project that the group was working on. So it was a group idea. (pause) It just continues to amaze me.<sup>xvii</sup>

Collaboration may be more essential to connected than to separate knowing. We are better at playing solitaire in the doubting game than in the believing game, Elbow thinks, because we've had more practice at it (Elbow, 1973, p. 175), and certainly the women we've talked with seemed more adept at doubting than believing themselves. It is easier to internalize a partner in the doubting game, because the rules of that game are codified within discourse communities, and anyone who knows the rules will do: the partner, to borrow a phrase from Kohn, is an "interchangeable someone" (Kohn, 1990, p. 112). Berkowitz and Oser (1987), found that once adolescents reached the highest stage of skill in argumentation, achieving the ability to integrate a partner's argument with their own and to anticipate weaknesses in both, the partner became "superfluous . . . because one can now fully anticipate the other and take a more objective perspective on one's own reasoning, critically examining it as if from an outside perspective." (Berkowitz & Oser, 1987, p. 9).<sup>xviii</sup>

Because the partners in connected knowing are not interchangeable someones, but particular persons whose unique perspectives cannot be anticipated and so cannot be internalized, connected collaboration would seem to be minimally a two-person activity, although, of course, the external collaborator need not be a real and present person. Jill Tarule examines processes of connected collaboration in detail in her chapter in this volume. Here, I offer only one example, drawn from a famous short story, "A jury of her peers," written by Susan Glaspell and published in 1917. Ed's story illustrates the power of detachment in the collaborative construction of knowledge; Glaspell's story shows how attachment can be an equally powerful force.

In the story, Mrs. Wright, a farmer's wife, has been taken off to jail on suspicion of murder, after apparently tying a rope around her husband's neck and strangling him in his sleep. Mrs. Hale, a neighbor who knew Mrs. Wright as a girl, but has rarely visited her in recent years, and Mrs. Peters, the sheriff's wife, are collecting household articles to take to Mrs. Wright in jail, while their husbands search the bleak homestead for clues to the motive for the crime. It is the women who come upon two crucial clues: a birdcage with its door-hinge ripped apart, suggesting that "someone must have been -- rough with it" (Glaspell, 1917, p. 273), and a strangled canary, laid in a pretty box. "She liked the bird," Mrs. Hale says. "She was going to bury it in that pretty box." Mrs. Peters, recapturing feelings she has trained herself to disown, remembers, "When I was a girl. . . my kitten -- there was a boy took a hatchet, and before my eyes -- before I could get there --. . . If they hadn't held me back I would have --' -- hearing the men's footsteps overhead she finishes "weakly," -- 'hurt him.'" "Wright wouldn't like the bird," Mrs. Hale says, "a thing that sang. She used to sing. He killed that too." Thinking of the bleak, childless, cheerless household, dominated by the chilly presence of the stern and silent Mr. Wright, which she has loathed to visit, and recalling Mrs. Wright as "Minnie Foster, when she wore a white dress with blue ribbons and stood up there in the choir and sang" (Glaspell, 1917, p. 278), Mrs. Hale says, "If there had been years and years of -- nothing, then a bird to sing to you, it would be awful -- still -- after the bird was still." Glaspell writes, "It was as if something within her not herself had spoken, and it found in Mrs. Peters something she did not know as herself." "I know what stillness is,' she said, in a queer, monotonous voice. `When we homesteaded in Dakota, and my first baby died -- after he was two years old -- and me with no other then --'" (Glaspell, 1917, p. 278).

The empathic interchange seems to involve not just a "doubling" but at least a tripling of subjectivities: Each woman achieves greater understanding of herself and the other, and both come to understand a crime that had seemed initially inexplicable, especially to Mrs. Peters, a woman who is, after all, "married to the law." Digging down deep, the women find a commonality of experience that dissolves the distance between them and leads to the construction of knowledge. Although Glaspell is aware of distinctions among the three women, it is the similarities she emphasizes. Mrs. Hale says, "We live close together and we live far apart. We all go through just a different kind of the same thing! If it weren't, -- why do you and I *understand*? Why do we *know* -- what we know this minute?" (Glaspell, 1917, p. 279).

**Transformation of self and other.** Theories of empathy which stress preservation of an intact self seem irrelevant to Glaspell's story. They connote a conception of the self as "finished" as well as separate -- a sort of packaged self that one carts about from one relationship to the next. My (partially) post-modern mind is more comfortable with a notion of selves-in-process, being co-constructed and reconstructed in the context of relationships, and this is the story Glaspell tells: Mrs. Peters, in particular, is transformed by the visions Mrs. Hale shares with her and by her own "retrospective self-empathy" (Blanck & Blanck, 1979, p. 251). Friedman's notion of "mutual confirmation" (adopted from Buber) does seem to imply such a conception: he says that "mutual confirmation is essential to becoming a self" (Friedman, 1985, 119), and confirmation, in Buber's terms means "accepting the whole potentiality. . . . I accept you as you are' [means that] I discover in you just by my accepting love. . . what you are meant to become'." (Buber, 1966, pp. 181 f., quoted in Friedman, 1985, p. 136).

In highly developed forms of connected knowing with the other, it becomes possible to

view the self from the **other's perspective**. As Kohn says, "[i]n order to make the *other* into a subject by taking her perspective, one must . . . make the self into an object. . . . come to see ourselves from the outside, the way others see us" (Kohn, 1985, p. 150). Schwaber describes how in becoming **what I would call a** more "connected" therapist, she moved from a traditional conception of the "transference" as "a phenomenon arising from internal pressures within the patient, from which the analyst, as a blank screen, could stand apart and observe, to that in which the specificity of the analyst's contribution was seen as intrinsic to its very nature" (Schwaber, 1983, p. 381. Taking the patient's reality seriously, "believing" it, forced her to see herself as the patient saw her, and to own (take seriously) her own response, instead of seeing it as merely a reaction to the patient's view, as is implied in the term "counter-transference."

In one sense, it is not easy to objectify the self, to see one's self as others see us, especially, as Spelman points out, if it means entertaining the view of those whom we have oppressed toward ourselves as oppressors (Spelman, 1988, p. 178). (Oppressors objectify the oppressed, of course, in order to avoid such revelations.) In another sense, however, women often find it all too easy to turn themselves into objects: the critic in their heads speaks from a distance, and it speaks in "shoulds," telling them how they ought to be and preventing them from seeing who they are and how they want to be. "Healthy self-objectification," Kohn says, consists of allowing one's self to be "watched and weighed" (Kohn, 1990, p. 151), an uncomfortable experience, but one that can be borne by "someone confident in her subjectivity, unafraid of being object to another." Many of our research participants, however, confess that they are not confident in their subjectivity, and, given the unhealthy objectifications to which they have been subjected in the past, perpetrated by not-so-friendly enemies within and without, they are

understandably wary of being "watched and weighed." It is true that **we** need to face up to friends acting as enemies, but we also need friends acting as friends (Marshall and Reason, 1993), people who will view us with a compassionate rather than a critical eye, and who will invite us to do the same with them. "Subjectification" -- joint subjectification -- seems a better term than "objectification" to describe this process.

Spelman contrasts people (such as Schwaber) who actively seek out another person's viewpoint, "taking seriously how it represents a critique" of their own with people who practice mere "tolerance" (Spelman, 1988, p. 183). The former are open to transformation; the latter are not. The subjectivist's spontaneity, her tendency to trust her own judgment and "go with her gut," are sources of genuine power, but they may limit her capacity for transformation. She is apt to emerge from **encounters** with ideas with her own prior positions intact. Asked how she decides among competing interpretations of a poem, a student replied:

I usually find that when ideas are being tossed around I'm usually more akin to one than another. I don't know--my opinions are just sort of there. . . It's almost more a matter of liking one more than another. I mean, I happen to agree with one or identify with it more.

In connected learning, on the other hand, both the learner and the subject matter are, as Elbow puts it, "deformed:"

Good learning is not a matter of finding a happy medium where both parties are transformed as little as possible. Rather, both parties must be maximally transformed--in a sense deformed. There is violence in learning. We cannot learn something without eating it, yet we cannot really learn it either without being

chewed up. (Elbow, 1986, p. 147)

Subjectivism is a form of what the psychologist David Perkins (Perkins, Farady, and Bushey, 1991) calls ["it" ~~deleted~~] "makes-sense epistemology." A makes-sense epistemologist "believes that the way to evaluate conclusions is by asking whether they 'make sense' at first blush" (Baron, 1991, p. 177). The person

only has to get to the point of telling one story about the situation that weaves together the facts in one way, from one point of view, congruent with the person's prior beliefs. Then the model 'makes sense.' When sense is achieved, there is no need to continue. (Perkins, Farady, & Bushey, 1991, p. 99)

Both separate and connected knowing are procedures which transcend makes-sense epistemology and meet the criteria for Perkins's "critical epistemology." Both procedures contain the premise that "it is not enough for a particular story to match one's prominent prior beliefs, (Perkins, Farady, & Bushey, 1991, p. 100) and "it is not enough for a particular story about a situation to hang together. One must consider what other, rather different stories might also hang together" ((Perkins, Farady, & Bushey, 1991, pp. 99-100). In separate knowing one generates arguments that compete with a given position -- another person's or one's own -- and looks for flaws beneath the apparently sensible surface. In connected knowing one enters into stories beyond the bounds of one's own meager experience, and attempts to make meaning out of narratives that "at first blush" make little sense. Players in the believing game, Elbow says, are anything but credulous.

The credulous person really suffers from *difficulty* in believing, not ease in believing: give him an array of assertions and he will always believe the one that

requires the least expenditure of believing energy. He has a weak believing muscle and can only believe what is easy to believe. . . . The fact that we call this disease credulity when it is really incredulity reflects vividly our culture's fear of belief.

(Elbow, 1973, p. 183)

Perhaps it was my own fear of belief and [omit "my"] addiction to doubt [omit comma] that made it so hard for me to see that when Grace told us of "falling down the rabbit hole, like Alice in Wonderland," she might be describing a hard-won ability, rather than an involuntary swoon, that an uncritical way of knowing might qualify as a critical epistemology, and that "going into the story" could be a powerful strategy for discovering how "other stories, rather different" from one's own, "might also hang together."

A part of me would like to end this chapter here, leaving you with a picture of connected knowing as a tough-minded, counter-intuitive way of knowing, a critical epistemology that is in some sense the absolute opposite of the subjectivist makes-sense epistemology with which it is so often confused. This is how Elbow presents the believing game, as a way of achieving "distance" from one's spontaneous beliefs. And this is how we represent connected knowing in our research: "When I have an idea about something, and it *differs* from the way another person is thinking about it . . ." But I cannot leave it at that. Neither Elbow's concept of the believing game nor the quotation we use in our research captures the full meaning I would like the concept to have.

Although it is important to distinguish the connected knower from the makes-sense epistemologist who accepts without further exploration whatever appears at first blush to be true, it is also important to remember that what appears at first blush to be true may in fact *be* true and should not be dismissed out of hand. This is a notion that frightens academicians, who greet with

suspicion books like WWK and Gilligan's (1982) In a different voice precisely because the stories they tell "resonate so thoroughly" with the experience of women readers that they are accepted without further exploration as true and may serve to reinforce sexist stereotypes (Greeno & Maccoby, 1986, p. 315).

Of course it is dangerous to accept without further exploration ideas that seem intuitively right, but it is equally dangerous to dismiss out of hand knowledge gleaned from experience which fails to meet conventional standards of truth. That is what women and other groups marginal to the academy have done for years. We have been taught, to paraphrase Gilligan, "to forget what we know." It is well, I think, to remember what we know, or think we know, to preserve rather than abandon the respect for one's own intuition that is at the heart of subjectivism. Of course, what feels right may be wrong, but it may be right; "They" may be wrong. And while I agree that it is important to subject apparent truths to further exploration, I believe it is important to do so along connected as well as separate paths.

It took me a long time to recognize that there was a connected path. Separate knowing came easily to me, as I believe it does for most academic women, our proclivities in this direction being part of the reason we became academics: we like to argue and, as academics, we're allowed to. I first drifted into graduate school in search of the tough-minded reasoning I had known in college and had found largely missing during the years since college, spent mainly in the company of children under the age of eight and their mothers. I knew I had come to the right place when, at one of the first class meetings, the professor said, "Whenever an idea rings a bell with me, seems intuitively true, I'm immediately suspicious of it" -- critical epistemology in a nutshell, and, to mix a couple of metaphors, just my cup of tea!

Like Sara Ruddick (this volume), I too have had a love affair with reason. The affair has endured, and although, as is often the case in long-term relationships, I have grown less starry-eyed and idealistic about this lover than I once was, like Ed, the MIT summer intern, I still find it "real neat" that a group of scientists can treat ideas "not as possessions" but "as ideas." On twenty-fifth reading, Ed's story still sends thrills down my spine. I want my students, too, to fall in love and stay in love with separate knowing.

Once upon a time, this was my only wish. My pedagogical duty, as I saw it, was to stamp out any sign of reliance on first hand experience and intuition, and instill a reliance on hard-headed critical thinking. For instance, when, objecting to my pronouncement from on high that males proved to be more adept on tests of spatial intelligence than females, a student in Developmental Psychology argued that she had a terrific sense of direction, while her brother couldn't find his way out of a paper bag, I would explain, patiently, through gritted teeth (accompanied, sometimes, by a sickly smile, but it's hard to do both at once) that of course there were exceptions, that psychological laws were merely probabilistic statements -- saying to the student, in effect, "Your experience is irrelevant, your experience is embarrassing." In a sense, of course, I was "right," but so, in another sense, was she. Elsewhere, I have told how an African-American student taught me, before Diana Baumrind (1972) did, that parental practices defined as "authoritarian" might have a different meaning and different consequences in African-American than in White families (Clinchy, 1995). Experiences such as these have led me to see that my job is not to suppress the lessons students have gained from first hand experience, but to help them build upon them. The other day, a colleague said, "Anecdotes are not data." "Nonsense," I replied, in characteristically connected fashion. "Of course they are."

As this essay attests, my relationship with connected knowing has become a full-blown affair. The procedures that Glaspell's Mrs. Hale and Mrs. Peters bring to bear on their problem are as exciting to me the ones Ed's bioengineers bring to bear on theirs, and the knowledge they construct is just as powerful; indeed, as Mary Belenky's chapter (this volume) suggests, the Mrs. Hales and Mrs. Peters's might even transform the world.

I now bring to my teaching a polygamous epistemology, and I find that far from disrupting the first marriage, the second has stabilized it; the two are complementary. My students and I are amenable to argument, if we know that people are really listening. We are willing to dilly-dally in one another's embryonic notions, aware that with careful cultivation, these notions might blossom into powerful ideas -- possibly even testable hypotheses to be subjected to the rigors of the doubting game. And, while once I hoped only that my students might achieve competence in the skills of separate knowing, now I wish for them what has meant so much to me -- a marriage of two minds.

Notes

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- i. Connected knowing differs in this respect from the believing game, the ultimate purpose of which is to test validity.
  - ii. Unless otherwise indicated, quotations are from participants interviewed in various research projects, and names are pseudonyms.
  - iii. In this research we frequently adopted responses given in one year as stimuli the next year, in an attempt to conduct a sort of quasi-conversation among students across the period of the study.
  - iv. Although there have always been less adversarial strains in philosophy and in social science (notably *verstehen*) they have not been dominant.
  - v. I thank Margaret Osler for helping me to understand this.
  - vi. We may invite misreading by careless use of the terms "subjective knowledge" and "subjectivism," sometimes using them interchangeably, as Code (1991, p. 255) points out.
  - vii. Subjectivists are not "authoritarian" in the usual sense however; they make no claim that what is true for them should be true for others or that, as some standpoint theorists assert, their own views are privileged. They are honestly unmitigated relativists.
  - viii. Separate (adversarial) interviewing also has its place, of course, and also requires skill, of a different sort.
  - ix. In another instance of the perhaps inevitable failure of understanding across disciplinary divides, Code speaks of WWK's researchers as taking their respondents' words "literally," "from the surface" (1991, p. 256), a characterization which scarcely does justice to the sort of procedures DeVault describes, nor, indeed, to the complexity of any decent qualitative research procedure.
  - x. I have borrowed the phrase "I, thou, and it" from the philosopher of science David Hawkins (1967) who uses it in a different but related fashion in discussion of primary education.
  - xi. These "body syntonic" (Turkle & Papert, 1990, footnote, p. 144) forms of connected knowing should be explored further. In some cultures, as Nancy Goldberger says, (see her chapter in this volume), support these ways of knowing, but the computer culture does not. Turkle & Papert tell of a fourth-grade boy who, overhearing a classmate speaking of "getting down inside the computer", sneered: "That's baby talk." Instructors in a Harvard programming course were no more hospitable to these "primitive" modes.

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xii. Spelman (1988), following Sartre, points out that the danger is not eliminated even when the subject is present. We can "imagine" the person sitting next to us instead of really trying to make her acquaintance.

xiii. Grumbach's description is reminiscent of Schwaber's account of the shift in her perspective as therapist from external expert, instructing the patient with her superior opinions, to "observer from within," dillydallying respectfully in their views.

xiv. In observations of very young children Zahn-Waxler et al. found that "self-referential behaviors" such as "pointing to one's own injury when another is injured" and reproducing or imitating others' affective experiences" predicted later "empathic concern" (Zahn-Waxler et al., 1992, pp. 133, 134).

xv. Although this is sheerly -- perhaps wildly -- speculative, both "doubling" and the emphasis on receptivity vs projection may have precursors in early childhood. Doubling is reminiscent of the "double-voiced discourse" in which one attends simultaneously to one's own and one's playmates' agendas, observed by Amy Sheldon (1992) among preschoolers, especially girls. The spontaneous stories of preschool girls are often structured around domestic harmony, while boys' stories involve venturing forth into an often frightening and chaotic unknown (Nicoloupoulo, 1994).

xvi. In my view, of course, the partner need not be a person.

xvii. I thank the student who conducted this interview as part of her work for a seminar I teach. the student must remain anonymous in order to protect Ed's identity, but she know who she is.

xviii. "I have always had in my head an adversary," Piaget says (1972, p. 222). Piaget's adversary, usually a logical positivist, seems to me to have been something of a pushover.