are performed in that of our prelingual mindbodily being in the world, which is their condition of possibility" (p. 13). The central thesis of the work is that 'logic' is not simply a set of rules that automatically determine the matrix of thought, but that 'logic' is itself an intrinsic part of the way we think. For Polanyi, the legacy of Cartesianism is not simply a set of rules, but a way of thinking about the world. This is evident in his discussion of the relationship between logic and the way we think about the world. For Polanyi, logic is not simply a set of rules that determine the matrix of thought, but is itself an intrinsic part of the way we think. For Polanyi, the legacy of Cartesianism is not simply a set of rules, but a way of thinking about the world.
aspect, no more and no less, of our total "luminous presence in the world." Hence the move by which it takes over our sense for the connectedness of things in an abstraction whose claims to primacy have no greater a priori status (1) than those of hearing or of any other aspect of the sensorium.

One of the key moments of Potter's discussion of these matters centers on Polanyi's claim that "Our acceptance of what is logically anterior is based on our a priori acceptance of what is logically derivative, as being implied in our acceptance of the latter." (p. 19). Potter focuses upon the "intricate and bewildering interplay in this passage between the temporal and the strict, logical senses of 'logically,' 'anterior,' 'prior,' 'derivative,' and 'being implied'" (p. 33). At the heart of his discussion there seems to be a fundamental claim of the following sort: The legacy of the CartesianCogito would have been of an utterly different order had the Cartesians paid attention to the "Isam," in all of its temporal thickness, as being present—proleptically—and, hence, assumed in the presumptive premise, the "I think." Indeed, no subject-object split, no dichotomy of knowing and being, mind and body, percept and concept, belief and doubt, and no subordination of 'knowing' and of 'logic' to a purely timeless visual metaphor ever could have emerged so thoroughly to usurp the Western intentional horizon. In fact, in that usage Potter speaks to us of a 'logic' informed by assuming the total mindbody phenomenon with a specific focus on hearing—paradigmatically, the hearing of human speech in which these concepts ("anterior," 'derivative,' 'implied,' etc.) receive a temporal qualification. This is a decisive point of departure for Potter's comprehension of 'logic.'

Reading-listening to Potter's essay is not to be undertaken as a single evening's assignment. There is a kind of dialectical reduplication here. There is a thickness in which, for instance, to a reader whose Cartesian schema has never been questioned, may seem almost impenetrable. Without needing to defend all of the particulars of the style, the reader would do well to reject at the outset the kind of objection so often made by those informed by the tradition from which Potter is seeking to disentangle himself and his readers—"explicitly" as defined, of course, by the saying can be said "clearly, directly, explicitly." My own reading/listening suggests that comprehending here, in essence, is no more or less difficult and no more important or less important than freeing human intelligence from that kind of mental bewitchment, a kind of mental vision of its own life, which is succumbing in ontological-epistemological matters has been picture-seeing.

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SPECIAL POLANYI ISSUE OF PRE/TEXT
Prof. Sam Watson, co-ordinator of Communication and Rhetorical Studies for the Polanyi Society, has edited a special issue of Pre/Text: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Rhetoric. The twelve essays deal broadly and deeply with Polanyi's thought and are not rhetorical. The titles and authors in their order are:
A Breakfast in the Tacit Tradition: Preface 1. Sam Watson

Page 4

Some Ideas of Michael Polanyi and Some Implications for Teaching Writing.
James A. Reither
Tacit and Explicit Tulips, Diane Gauthier
Into the Tacit Dimension: Reflections on Michael Polanyi's Personal Knowledge.
Renebert Herbert
Making Sense and the Means for Doing So, Robin A. Hodgson
Polanyi and Peak: A Short Semantic Symphony, William E. Cogdil
The Tacit Dimension and Rhetoric: What It Means To Be Persuading and Persuaded, Robert L. Scott
Michael Polanyi and the Problem of Toleration, James L. Wiles
Reconstructing the Conditions for Cultural Coherence, Loyal D. Rue
The 'Primitive'/'Civilized' opposition and the Modern Notion of Objectivity: A Linkage, Dale W. Cannon
Further Polanyi in Meditation, William B. Pocat
Polanyi and Rhetoric, Harry Prosch

Besides the essays the issue has nine pages of photographs of Polanyi. Copies of this special issue, Vol. 2, Nos. 1-2, 1981, may be ordered from Victor J. Vizzini, Pre/Text General Editor, Department of English, F.O. Box 19035, University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington, Texas 76019. The price is $4.00.

ON OUR HISTORICAL PARTICULARITY AND OUR PURSUIT OF TRUTH

Prof. Edward J. Echeverria of Rockmont College, Lakewood, Colorado has published
Criticism and Commitment: Major Themes in Contemporary 'Post-critical' Philosophy
(Notre Dame, 1981). It is available through Humanities Press Inc., 171 First Ave., Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey 07716. Done as a dissertation at the Free University in Amsterdam, Echeverria has taken post-critical as designated by Polanyi to include those contemporary philosophers who insist that all knowledge presupposes knowledge that is historically conditioned. His survey deals basically with the common ground and differences of Heidegger, Gadamer, Habermas, Rorty, and Polanyi. The key issues addressed is how to understand our pursuit of truth once the complexity of including historical context into epistemology is introduced. Echeverria tries to go further than Polanyi's notion of personal responsibility to the universal pole of truth by introducing a notion derived from a "normative dynamic of a comprehensive history." He finds this normative dynamic in what the Judeo-Christian heritage has "reverently called 'Creation.'" Hardly reducible to this brief account, Echeverria's work is valuable for both the problem and major philosophers that he considers.

Polanyi and liberation movements

Since the end of January, your PS editor and co-ordinator, is on sabbatical at Union Theological Seminary in New York City where there is a vital voice of the contemporary liberation theologies — Black, Asian, Latin American, and feminist. Against this background, I have been reminded of Polanyi's own distinctive and passionate concern for human rights. Below is an address from a meeting held in London, November, 1957, and published as part of a report, "Apartheid and the World's Universities," No. 10, February, 1958, in the Science and Freedom pamphlets of the Committee on Science and Freedom. The selections are photocopies to convey some of the historical nature of the document.

I found this particular report in the Library of Teachers College, Columbia University.
THE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND FREEDOM

... was established in July, 1954, under the auspices of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, a permanent organization with headquarters in Paris, to carry on the discussion of issues in the field of academic freedom which was begun at the Hamburg Congress of July, 1953. The Committee will seek to maintain contact with all who are interested in these issues and to prepare the way for a further Congress on Science and Freedom.

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THE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND FREEDOM AND APARTHEID

by

MICHAEL POLANYI

After the opening address by Dr. J. W. Cook, chairman of the meeting, who welcomed the participants and outlined the programme of speakers, Professor Michael Polanyi, chairman of the Committee on Science and Freedom, spoke on the background and activities of the Committee and showed how the apartheid issue fitted into the series of "campaigns" which the Committee has fought on behalf of academic freedom.

I should like to welcome, particularly, Professor Du Plessis, who has come at our invitation all the way from South Africa to convey to us the point of view of the South African government. His presence is a challenge both to our arguments and to our country. We take up both. We may not convince him, but we hope to impress him, and to do so without discourtesy or disrespect. I assure him that we will listen to him carefully and with interest.

The Committee on Science and Freedom is an international Committee which has been active for about three years. I will tell you a little about our campaign record and try to derive from it the principles for which we stand here to-day.

The first of the Committee's bulletins gives an account of our stirring point. It dealt with the Marxist control of ideologies, which of all such controls has ever been exercised, is the most cruel and the most brutal. It has the distinction of being the only form of government ever to have hounded a scientist to his death—a great scientist, surely for his scientific views.

In the second issue of the bulletin we turned to McCarthyism and its evils. You may find this concern to be out of proportion, since the terrors of Marxist ideological control are so much more fierce than anything that happened in America. But the settler surrounded by a wilderness is still interested in the weeds in his own garden; and surely Senator McCarthy was a poisonous weed.

In our third issue you find our reaction to a cry for help which came to us on the 26th May, 1955, from Germany, from the famous University of Gottingen, which felt itself endangered by the appointment to the office of Minister of Education of Lower Saxony of a
non-Nazi of doubtful character—Leonard Schlieker. We heard that the chief officers of the university had resigned in protest. Within a few hours we succeeded in getting our sponsors and members from all over the world to sign a telegram to the government of Lower Saxony, to which great publicity was given in the whole German Press. I think we contributed to the fact that Mr. Schlieker resigned eight days later.

Next we received a desperate call from a Professor in Tasmania (Australia)—at the other end of the world—who felt that the Council of the university was treating Professor in a high-handed manner which menaced their academic freedom. We intervened there, and I think that we contributed to the fact that the University of Tasmania now has a stronger academic opinion and a more balanced constitution.

I pass over the tragic incident of the rebellion of students in Spain to which we tried to devote some attention. I pass over, too, the contact which we made at an early stage with the Polish universities at the time when open connections with East European countries were not yet possible. This summer in Austria I met one of our correspondents, and it was with profound pride that I received his expression of gratitude for the comfort we offered him at that time.

This brings us to the 3d November, 1936, of which to-morrow will be the anniversary, when we received a telegram from a Hungarian university asking for our help. As you know, on the following day the Russian troops invaded Hungary. We could not do anything, no more than anybody else. But we did collect 1,200 signatures from university people all over the world for a statement of solidarity with the Hungarian universities, and this document, which was presented to the Soviet Embassy in London, subsequently reached our Hungarian colleagues. I trust it showed them that if they were abandoned, they were not forgotten.

And now this Apartheid. I will say about this here only what I have derived from our past experience. In every single case we were told two things. First, the issue had nothing to do with academic freedom; and second, that, if it did affect academic freedom, then academic freedom must yield to considerations of higher social interest. We are now told the same things again about apartheid. We are told that the separation of races does not infringe academic freedom; and that, in any case, it serves an overriding social interest, which good citizens must accept.

I would like to place before you, briefly, the principles on which weanswer these ever-recurring objections. Universities have obvious duties to society: they must train doctors and technicians and other specialists useful to the community. But these duties are trivial compared with the claims universities have on society. For we are the chief transmitters and interpreters of the intellectual heritage of modern man, and it is this heritage which defines the duties of man and sets up the standards that society is obliged to respect. Indeed, I suggest that our principal obligation to society, as universities, is to teach young people, and the future rulers of society in particular; and to teach them those ideas which it is the duty of society to maintain—the service of which is, in fact, the proper reason for the existence of society.

Our discussion of academic freedom, derived from our experience of threats which endanger it, is therefore, that we cannot tolerate within our walls any violation of the ideas which we teach.

To exclude black students from a university is an insult to their human dignity; it is inhuman. To force them into native reserve, under the supervision of white authorities is oppressive. To pretend that this is done in order to preserve their native culture is intellectually dishonest. To demand the participation of universities in a programme of inhumanity, oppression and intellectual dishonesty is a violation of academic freedom.

WALTER R. THORSEN, Professor of Theoretical Chemistry at the University of Alberta in Edmonton, Canada; Adjunct Professor of the Philosophy of Science, Regent College, Vancouver, B.C.; and lay theologian has three addresses to the American Scientific Affiliation published in their journal that deal extensively with the thought of Polanyi. The American Scientific Affiliation is an evangelical organization of scientists, but it is not denominational nor closed. Thorson's addresses are clearly written and well grounded in science, philosophy, and theology. The addresses are published as follows: "Reflections on the Practice of Overtired Creeds," March, 1981; "Science as the Natural Philosophy of a Christian," June, 1981; and "The Biblical Insights of Michael Polanyi," September, 1981—all in Journal of the American Scientific Affiliation, Vol. 33, Nos. 1, 2, 3, respectively.

Durwood Foster, Professor of Systematic Theology, Pacific School of Religion and the Graduate Theological Union and Ian Barbour, Professor of Religion and Physics, Carleton College are members of the founding board of directors of The Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences in Berkeley. Both Foster and Barbour have been participants in AAR Polanyi consultations. The purpose of the Center is to sponsor and conduct research and teaching in the interdisciplinary field of theology and the natural sciences. Further information may be obtained by writing: Dr. Robert J. Russell, Executive Director, The Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, c/o The Graduate Theological Union, 2465 La Conte Ave., Berkeley, CA 94709.
Robert Brownhill has an article in the New Universities Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 3, Summer 1981, on "Objectivity and Subjectivity in Polanyi's Personal Knowledge." The article intends to defend Polanyi against the charge of subjectivism. In a review of the Brownhill argument, Brasilia Scott says that Brownhill has reduced "the richness and originality of Polanyi's thought to make it more respectable at the cost of making it hardly worth defending." Scott's review is in Convivium, Newsletter No. 13, October 1981.

After seven years of special programs on Polanyi at the American Academy of Religion's annual meeting, we regret to announce that Phil Mullins, our coordinator of Religious Studies, has been informed by the AAR Program Committee that we will not be allowed a program at the next meeting in New York in December 1981. Instead of a Polanyi program, the AAR Committee asks that the various Polanyi papers be submitted to the other sections. This decision is supposedly a part of a larger new policy to end groups and programs that are focused on a single figure. While we may find some value in entering into the other sections as a way of sharing Polanyi scholarship, we will lose the quality of informed criticism and discussion that have been possible in our own sessions. In our view, the AAR decision is illegitimate, contrary to the organization's by-laws, and an infringement of academic freedom. We will be protesting this new policy which was not made by the membership of AAR.

James A. Hall, M.D., has published two papers of interest to Polanyi scholars, especially those interested in psychological sciences and religion. The first paper, "Psychology and Religion: A Review and a Projection of Future Needs," in American Psychologist, LXIII (No. 4, October, 1981), concludes that while there is much writing in this area there is an insufficient theoretical and experimental foundation for dealing with it; that the limits of our understanding of religion and as a suggestion about next steps, the article will be valuable. The second paper, "Jung and Polanyi: Scientific Intuition of a Natural Religious Function in the Context of Religion," Proceedings, Association for the Scientific Study of Religion, Southeast, 1982, shows a significant number of parallel or converging points in Polanyi and Jung and asserts that both suggest that "there is a natural religious function in the psyche and therefore in the universe as we are permitted to know it."

**DRUCKER'S ERRORS**

Peter Drucker's recent autobiography has a lively chapter on the Polanyi family, while it is probably accurate on Drucker's relatively recent memories of Karl, it is grossly in error on a number of facts about the family. Let any of our readers be tempted to utilize this chapter as source material, I give here these errors I am in a position to correct. Drucker's opinions about the "failure" of the brilliant Polanyi will, I am sure, be criticized severely, but history will have to be the ultimate judge.

We, T. Scott

Peter Drucker's errors in the chapter "The Polanys" of his autobiography Adventures of a Jovibander (Harper & Row, N.Y., 1978), pp. 123-140:

1. Page 128. Karl was the 3rd of 6 children, not the 4th of 5: Laura (1892), Adolf (1883), Karl (1886), Sophie (1888), Michael (1891), Paul (birth date unknown, recorded, died before 1920).

2. Pages 127, 140. Michael's aim for society was "liberal" and heavily dependent on economics. His view of an adequate, bearable, but free society was close to that described by Drucker.

3. Pages 127, 140. Tauber Polanyi was born in 1850; the story of his participation in the 1848 revolution, etc., is fabricated. His railway operations were more or less as described; he died in 1905, not 1900. He married Cecilia Noh in 1881, not 1886. She was not a Russian countess but the daughter of a rabbi. They met in Vienna, not Zurich.

**AN APPEAL FOR SCOTT**

Bill Scott's work is proceeding on the Polanyi biography, but his grant support calls for making funds which are becoming increasingly hard to get. If any reader knows of a philanthropic organization or a person of means who might be persuaded to contribute to this project, please pass on the information that checks should be made out to the Board of Regents, UNR, and earmarked on the check or in an accompanying letter "for matching the NIH offer and to be used for the Polanyi biography." They should be sent to Prof. Wm. T. Scott, Dept. of Physics, University of Nevada, Reno, NV, 89557. The National Endowment for the Humanities will then add an equal amount to the grant total. Most needed are funds to support two year's part time work of Professor Scott's biographical assistant Monika Yohin.