
In *Shop Class as Soulcraft*, a book that might best be called biographical philosophy or philosophical biography, Matthew B. Crawford combines critical reflection on the “text” of his academic and work experiences with observations of contemporary society to produce a work that is part social criticism, part reflection on the nature of meaningful work, and part call to action. Crawford holds a Ph.D. in political philosophy from the University of Chicago and, prior to opening a motorcycle repair shop in Richmond, VA, worked both at an academic think tank and as a “knowledge worker” writing abstracts of scholarly articles. These experiences motivated him to turn his back, for the most part, on academia in search of more meaningful work (I say “for the most part” because he retains ties to the academic world as a fellow with the Institute for Advanced Studies in Culture at the University of Virginia).

Crawford opens the book with observations about ways that our culture has devalued manual labor. One symptom is that shop classes have largely disappeared from school curricula. Another is that “What ordinary people once made, they buy; what they once fixed for themselves, they replace entirely or hire an expert to repair, whose expert fix often involves replacing an entire system because some minute component has failed” (2). The result is that the workings of various artifacts become increasingly mysterious to us, making us more passive in relation to things and dependent upon others, ironically, at the same time that we champion our “freedom” and revel in our “autonomy.” In response, Crawford issues a call to develop “manual competence,” by which he means an authentic sense of intellectually-engaged agency. Crawford thinks that the basic cause of this situation is a separation of thinking from doing that manifested itself in American life early in the 20th Century with the advent of assembly-line work and so-called “scientific management” (28-41). Not only blue collar work has suffered from this problem, however, for this same separation of thinking from doing has now started to colonize white collar work. Crawford illustrates the effect on “knowledge work” with a story of a stint spent abstracting scholarly articles for an information service. He had to abstract twenty-eight articles a day, a task that could not be done with any integrity and for which he received little meaningful instruction from his supervisor. The job was mindless, he says, because it “required me to actively suppress my own ability to think” (134). Moreover, it required a moral reeducation so that he could suppress his sense of responsibility to the authors and users of the information service (134).

Higher education itself is not immune to this separation of thinking from doing, since it continues to socialize students for climbing the socio-economic ladder. Education must now prepare people for work, not on assembly lines as in decades past, but in large organizations where there are no objective standards by which to measure performance and where worth is measured by credentials (155-159). Higher education has therefore become more about sorting than teaching. Thus, instead of equipping students with more powerful minds by which to engage an increasingly complex world, Crawford argues that “college habituates young people to accept as the normal course of things a mismatch between form and substance, official representations and reality. This cannot be called cynicism if it is indispensable to survival in the contemporary office, as it was in the old Soviet Union” (147).

In the midst of this dire picture, Crawford draws upon his experiences of working as an electrician and repairing motorcycles to identify characteristics of meaningful work. Such work, for Crawford, develops...
one’s agency. Agency requires active engagement
with a reality that demands something arduous of us,
such as the discipline necessary for playing a musical
instrument (64). What has come to be substituted for
agency is autonomy, which increasingly means mostly
passive consumption based on choices that have
largely been predigested for us and have no basis other
than personal preference (69-70).

Meaningful work that engages us as agents
requires not a flight from external authority but submis-
sion to it. On Crawford’s account, we submit first to an
external reality that pushes back at us, as the electrician
does when he flips the switch and the light comes on
(or not, as the case may be). As Crawford notes, the
attitude that there is no established reality is one that
“is best not indulged around a table saw” (19). The fact
of a reality means that there are standards intrinsic to
the work that can be communally-shared, thus making
possible a “circle of mutual regard among those who
recognize one another as peers” (159). We submit, not
only to that reality, but also to teachers who help us to
see the particulars of what is there, not simply what we
think is there, a point effectively made when Crawford
tells about his efforts at drawing a human skeleton
without reducing it to Halloween icons (91-93). Good
work therefore allows for and invites growth and
progress in the exercise of personal judgment, since the
work cannot be reduced to rule-following, and the
justifications for those judgments cannot always be
articulated (167-169).

Good work is in the end inevitably moral and
political in the richest sense of those terms, for it evokes
virtues such as attentiveness to particulars and pat-
tterns (82), humility in view of the fact that we might be
wrong (99) honesty to admit when we are wrong (100),
and responsiveness to a web of fiduciary responsibili-
ties. Crawford discusses the latter in a serious yet
amusing reflection on the morality of writing a service
ticket, a task that requires balancing the mechanic’s
obligations to the motorcycle with his obligations to
the customer and honesty about how he, by his own
mistakes, may have created problems and thereby
prolonged the repair job, at a rate of $40/hour (112-125).

While Crawford cites Polanyi only once (with
a reference to the *Tacit Dimension* on 169), Polanyi’s
ideas permeate the book. The most salient points of
connection come with Crawford’s use of the term
personal knowledge, his emphasis on a progressively-
revealed reality that draws us out of ourselves as it
invites attempts to discover meaning, his discussion of
the uses and limits of rules, and his discussion of one’s
fiduciary responsibilities. At all these points, it is
apparent that Crawford has absorbed Polanyi and
interprets/extends his work faithfully.

Engaging and provocative, the book serves
as a model of the kind of critical reflection on the text of
life that higher education aspires to foster, at least in its
better days. It is therefore difficult to find much of
substance to criticize in *Shop Class*, although it is not
a perfect work. Crawford does sometimes romanticize
manual labor, despite his disclaimer that he does not
intend to offer a mystical account of “craftsmanship”
(5). His prophetic indictment of our economic and
educational institutions may be a bit one-sided, but we
would do well to heed much that he writes about the
power of our systems to form or deform us.

It is perhaps to Crawford’s credit that his
thought-provoking book leaves me wanting more ex-
plication and clarification; I mention three places here.
First, I would argue that good personal, practical judg-
ment underlies everything we in the university try to
promote, whether it is critical reading, clear writing,
research, or responsible citizenship. What would
Crawford suggest we change to improve what we now
do? Can/should a shop class-kind of mindset permeate
our teaching, regardless of subject matter? What
would an institution that resisted the market-place
morality of the broader culture look like?

In addition, I would like Crawford to offer a
synopsis of what he takes to be the general pattern of
human excellence. There are times when Crawford is
explicit about the good life toward which his book as a
whole points, but his examples do not connect with my
sense of authentic existence. For instance, he states, “I
like to fix motorcycles … because not only the fixing but
also the *riding* of motorcycles answers to certain intuitions I have about human excellence” (196, emphasis his). What are those intuitions? While I agree that motorcycle riding can indeed be fun and invigorating, surely there is more substance to a good life than this.

More seriously, I find myself ambivalent about his solution. Crawford suggests that we should respond to the problem of this separation of thinking from doing by giving readers two pieces of advice. The first is to seek out the cracks, those places, like a motorcycle shop, where life retains a local, human, and humane scale (189 and 210). His second is to develop and nurture a progressive republican disposition that envisions a world that better protects human dignity and potential (209). Again, I do not so much disagree with Crawford as I want to hear more of the particulars. His response is therefore unsatisfying in the way that Alasdair MacIntyre’s solution at the end of *After Virtue* is unsatisfying (there, MacIntyre wistfully longs for a new St. Benedict, someone who will ride in on a white horse to establish new forms of community that can preserve civilization through new dark ages). To be fair to Crawford, however, he does acknowledge that he is at his limits at this point and that others will need to refine his suggestions (209). Moreover, it may well be the case that how we respond is a matter that cannot be decided in the abstract in advance, but instead is a matter of our own judgment and agency, always in relationship with skilled others.

*Shop Class as Soulcraft* has sometimes been called the next *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance*. While it is too early to tell whether it will catch on as that book did, Crawford certainly raises appropriate alarms and points us in promising directions. That Polanyi is both explicitly and tacitly part of the conversation is heartening.


In a chance conversation with Susan Phillips before the volume being reviewed was published, she revealed that she had fallen under the influence of Michael Polanyi when she had read *Personal Knowledge* and that she returns to re-read it every year or so. Dr. Phillips is a spiritual director, sociologist, and Executive Director of New College Berkeley, an affiliate of Berkeley’s Graduate Theological Union. In *Candlelight* she addresses those who are puzzled by the term *spiritual direction* and who desire to know more about what goes on in a spiritual direction session. Her description of spiritual direction makes it clear why she finds Polanyi useful, for the spiritual director is one who helps a directee discover self-implicating spiritual truths. There is a striking similarity between Polanyi’s account of a scientist making a scientific discovery and Phillips’ account of a directee making a spiritual discovery.

In describing Christian spirituality as being self-implicating, Dr. Phillips refers to *Personal Knowledge* as a seminal work. “Even the physical sciences are shaped by the personal knowledge and appraisals of scientists and are guarded by their commitments to truth, accountability, practices, and communities” (*Candlelight*, p. 6). For the directee attending to personal experiences of faith, the listening director can represent the guiding significance of tradition. For both directee and director, “Our own knowledge is molded by what we encounter, and that personal knowledge is in corrective tension with the tradition and its communities” (6). That corrective tension and commitment to truth, accountability, practice, and communities takes place both in the director’s encouraging presence with the directee and in the peer review offered by other directors. This book is, among other things, Susan Phillips’ presentation for peer review, in which she discusses her approach to spiritual direction—her assumptions and her practice—and reveals how she is further shaped by her practice of spiritual direction.

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What she presents, Phillips states, is not a model for spiritual direction but is spiritual direction as she has practiced it, has grown in it and been changed by it. Although she does not give a succinct definition of spiritual direction, one might say that her whole book is a description of spiritual direction, beginning with a tantalizing picture of the listener at the ancient Hagar Qim temple on the island of Malta as being a practitioner of the world’s “second oldest profession” (2).

Although this reviewer finds herself much more at ease in “doing” spiritual direction than in defining it, here is a generally accepted brief description of the practice. In the practice of spiritual direction, the spiritual director listens for the movement of Spirit and then mirrors it back to the directee so that the directee can understand how Spirit is guiding him/her.

Susan Phillips writes from the perspective of a Protestant Christian in the Reformed tradition and assumes with John Calvin that “true and substantial wisdom consists principally of two parts: the knowledge of God and the knowledge of ourselves….The knowledge of ourselves, therefore, is not only an incitement to seek after God, but likewise a considerable assistance in finding him” (13). An implicit assumption for spiritual direction is a panentheistic view of God—God is not only external in all things but internal as well. In encouraging the directee to be alert to interior prompting of spiritual significance, the director is in effect suggesting that the tacit workings of the mind and the work of intuition as assisted by imagination can be agents of in-spiration.

Dr. Phillips adopts the role of storyteller and organizes her book by following nine directees through the three stages of a spiritual direction relationship—beginning, journeying, and fruition—and includes an introductory chapter for each stage. However, this is in no way a spiritual direction handbook. On the contrary, it exposes the reader who is being introduced to the art of spiritual direction in this volume to a master teacher from whom this art is “caught” rather than by whom it is “taught.” Polanyi asserts that one learns by imitative practice from “close personal association with the intimate views and practice of a distinguished master” (SFS 43). Whereas the practice of the art of teaching can be observed in the classroom setting of a master teacher, the practice of the art of spiritual direction does not lend itself to observation by a third party. The meeting of spiritual director and directee is private and confidential, and it is not appropriate for observation. One’s own experience of being in spiritual direction and the small group practicum experience during training shape one’s own practice. Although one learns how to use tools and techniques, one needs to be attentive to the “cues” of the Holy Spirit, the real director, as they are observed or intuited in the directee and in the spiritual director at varying levels of depth. The power of this practice is especially evident in Phillips’ description of accompanying a directee though a long-term illness and being present at the directee’s death.

In Candlelight, Dr. Phillips provides that close personal association as she relates not only her practice but also intimate views on her practice of spiritual direction. She shares feelings that are common to and affirming of spiritual directors in practice, such as feelings of nervousness, bordering on panic, at meeting with a potential directee for the first time and wondering what she might have to offer that person, and feelings of gratitude for the gift of being a part of bringing to birth something new and wonderful in a directee’s life. Her account agrees with Polanyi’s description of the difficulties and rewards experienced by a scientist groping towards discovery. “We undertake the task of attaining the universal in spite of our admitted infirmity, which should render the task hopeless, because we hope to be visited by powers for which we cannot account in terms of our specific abilities. This hope is a clue to God” (PK 324). Reflecting on her practice of spiritual direction, Susan Phillips asserts that “spiritual direction is to be sacramental in bringing God’s truth and love into the world. The grace cultivated within it, ideally, spills out into the world, transforming relationships, inspiring charity, motivating worship, and, one hopes, aiding in the repair of the world” (242).

This volume consists of thirteen essays presented at an international conference devoted to the thought of Michael Polanyi held in Budapest in June 2008. Tihamér Margitay has organized the collection around two major themes in Polanyi’s thought, his epistemology and his efforts to sketch the contours of a non-reductive ontology. This accounts for a publishing decision to lift the book’s title from the collection of essays by Polanyi edited by Marjorie Grene some forty years ago. Although all the essays are related in some fashion to Polanyi’s thought, some engage his thinking, in my estimation at least, peripherally in order to indicate how it may be related to other philosophical traditions or questions. My aim here will be to offer brief observations on each essay in turn so that the variety and richness that Polanyi’s thought stimulated at this conference might be appreciated.

The first part, “Knowing,” begins with Phil Mullins’ analysis of the way Polanyi progressively transformed his use of Gestalt psychology in formulating his mature position on tacit knowing. He shows how Polanyi challenged proposals in support of the centralized planning of science in the 1930’s by appealing to Kohler’s notion of a “dynamical order” sustaining “two kinds of order” (12-15). Appreciating the way these dynamic orders function in society requires a post-critical way of knowing that acknowledges a second way of knowing, not only the wholly critical and explicit way. Polanyi’s creative adaptation of Gestalt insights led him to emphasize not only passive biological processes reaching equilibrium, but also a person’s active integrations constituting the act of knowing (20-22). Eventually his mature position emerges which describes the structure of tacit knowing where the person’s creative imagination risks daring new integrations (25-26).

The next essay by Iwo Zmyślony attempts to ask whether there is a basic concept or idea of tacit knowledge. By this Zmyślony claims to be asking a “metaphilosophical” question (31), one that examines the ways the term is used, including by other philosophers than Polanyi. In this he is being guided by the philosophical heritage deriving from Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, which he then uses to survey various attempts to discuss something like tacit knowing, ending with J. H. Newman’s illative sense (36). When he finally turns to the way it is used by Polanyi, Zmyślony presents the standard understanding well-known by students of Polanyi’s thought. The purpose of Zmyślony’s effort to clarify the notion of tacit knowing is to subsume it into some sort of traditional epistemological position regarding justified true belief (47). In this framework, he concludes that tacit knowing requires an externalist notion of knowledge combined with a behavioral attitude of belief. Perhaps so, but I believe aiming for such conceptual clarity falls short of Polanyi’s insistence on the personal participation of the knower which can never be rendered fully explicit.

Zhenhua Yu’s essay picks up on Polanyi’s remark in the preface of the Torchbook edition of Personal Knowledge that indwelling is akin to Heidegger’s being-in-the-world by establishing a dialogue between the phenomenological tradition and the “Polanyian tradition” (51). One example consists in explaining how practical action involves a kind of knowing Heidegger calls circumspection, which is grounded in a “knowing how to be” (54). This provides a kind of ontological grounding for tacit knowing. Further, Heidegger’s explications of being-in-the-world can strengthen both the critique of knowing as solely representational knowledge (59) and also the primordial character of our engagement with the world for sustaining our theoretical knowing (64-65). Yu concludes that incorporating such insights from the phenomenological tradition can support Polanyi’s claims regarding the primacy of tacit knowing.

Another variant of the phenomenological tradition is found in Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutical theory. Chris Mulherin explores similarities between Gadamer’s seminal work, Truth and Method, and Polanyi’s Personal Knowledge with the conviction
that, even though these two authors were not familiar with each other’s work when they were first formulated at mid-century, they both proposed views of knowing that were remarkably congruent. Both, for example, were convinced that we could make universal claims to truth without recourse to appeals of “impersonal” criteria or detached objectivity (69). The cultural contexts within which they formulated their respective theories were quite different of course – Polanyi working out of the practice of physical chemistry and Gadamer in the area of historical understanding and textual criticism. Still, they both acknowledged intellectual modesty and the reliance on traditional authorities for preliminary guidance. For both thinkers this means not only that our consciousness is formed by our reliance on our heritage but that both it and we ourselves are existentially transformed when we make responsible claims based on this structure (75). All of this is guided by the anticipation of discovering new meanings in nature or the text (77). Given these similar patterns of thinking, Mulherin is convinced that their respective approaches may enlighten each other’s positions on how horizons contribute to the formation of tacit integrations and how possible outcomes of probing are judged worthy of pursuing. In this way, he believes, we may also understand how distinctive realms of knowing, such as the scientific and the humanistic, might form a continuum rather than a dichotomy – a claim I believe Polanyi’s work, particularly *The Study of Man*, would endorse.

The next essay, by Paul Lewis, extends Polanyi’s theory of knowing to consider how it might contribute to ethical reflection by helping us understand the process of formation of character. This essay attempts to relate Polanyi’s position to the recovery by ethicists of virtue and character in moral reflection. Yet analyses of practical reasoning are notoriously difficult, as Aristotle’s classic reflections on *phronesis* illustrate (82). Lewis hopes that by extending Polanyi’s ruminations on tacit knowing, particularly the feature of indwelling, we may use what he calls Polanyi’s notion of “dynamic orthodoxy” (in science or cultural frameworks) to assist us in understanding and perhaps even contributing to the formation of character among our students (86). Lewis contends that a presupposition of such reflection is a commitment to “moral truths” (88) – a steep hurdle in contemporary American society, at least, where most students are caught up in the emotivism, relativism, and consumerism of late capitalism. He claims that the use of appropriate case studies allows students to begin the process of engaging in intelligent moral reflection, even though they have the significant obstacle of not being able to formulate their own moral convictions. He concludes that, in spite of these difficulties, the Polyanian context for exposing students to case studies does offer a fresh way for assisting them in the formation of their own practical reasoning.

One of the consequences of the mid-century collapse of the modern cultural ideal of objectivity was that the recognition of the social conditioning of knowing raised the specter of relativism. David Rutledge explores how Polanyi’s theory of personal knowledge provides a basis for responsible claims of truth if not absolute certitude. Beginning with the embeddedness of all individuals’ acts of knowing (100), Rutledge explains how in Polanyi’s theory the extension of this tacit pattern into communal life grounds the universal intent of knowing (104). Rutledge explores how this “triadic” structure of a) responsible knowers relying on b) communities of inquiry that seek c) common objects (109) supports the quest for truth without succumbing to the universalizing tendency of critical rationality or irresponsible relativism (110).

In the last essay in the first part of this collection, Márta Fehér focuses on the moral features of Polanyi’s understanding of the pursuit of scientific truth. Her goal is to challenge what has become increasingly apparent in the practice of science over the last quarter century, its “post-academic” phase where profit and remuneration in the service of corporate expansion and government power control its agenda (123). This commendable effort leads her, unfortunately in my estimation, to present an overly narrow view of the moral commitment to the pursuit of truth that Polanyi held animated science. For Fehér, Polanyi’s “republic of science” is not a “real” republic,
but an ideal society that is autocratic, authoritarian (115) and with no obligation to or interests in the larger society (116). Science, in this view, possesses a transcendent status over the larger society (117) which allows it to serve as its spiritual center (118). She correctly affirms that scientific authority is crucial to Polanyi’s view of the authentic pursuit of science (120), but her emphasis neglects the important qualifications he included, such as between general and specific authorities. Still, her basic point that Polanyi’s claims that science involves the pursuit of rationality conjoined with morality offers a salutary correction to the transformation in the social context that science has undergone in the latter part of the twentieth century.

The second part of the volume begins with Tihamér Margitay’s essay on what he terms Polanyi’s “argument” for “layers” in reality. For Polanyi, knowing something involves integrating particulars into a focal whole. If the reality we know is a comprehensive entity, this involves integrating particulars subject to a lower level of control into their joint meaning which functions at a higher level of reality, yielding a hierarchical conception of reality. Margitay then asks what precisely is the relationship between the structure of knowing and the structure of an entity? Quoting Polanyi, he formulates what he terms the “Correspondence Thesis” (130-31) which affirms that the structure of an entity follows from the way we know it (see TD 33-34). This is a strong claim made on behalf of Polanyi’s theory which, I must admit, I had never entertained previously. I understood Polanyi to be arguing by indirection, presenting an accumulation of evidence which called forth a shift in perspective in favor of a non-reductive ontology. Still pushing the strong sense of the Correspondence Thesis, Margitay shows how this holds only for ontological levels of knowing certain kinds of realities (like scientific theories), but not for reality in general (133). In order to push his case further that an argument is required for upholding the parallelism between epistemological and ontological levels in general, he attempts to show how Polanyi’s argument for dual control of natural objects also fails because, say, we know a comprehensive entity like the solar system as a reality without needing to distinguish its laws from the laws governing its parts (the planets, the stars, the gasses, etc.). Both the whole and its parts are governed by the laws of physics and chemistry (135); there are not unique boundary conditions imposed by the solar system on its parts, even though there are necessarily two levels involved (subsidiaries and focus) in recognizing and knowing the solar system as a comprehensive entity. For reasons too complex to address here, I believe this argument does not hold. Still, if we accept Margitay’s critique what is the consequence? He points out the remarkable fact that, even with his stringent interpretation, Polanyi’s theory is successful in demonstrating the reality of persons and realities associated with knowing, such as truth and discovery (139). And this, Margitay states, is indeed quite an accomplishment.

An alternative analysis of Polanyi’s non-reductive ontology is offered by Márton Dinnyei, who examines Jaegwon Kim’s moderate reductionism in light of Polanyi’s position. Kim held that if the material conditions for some mental state were necessary and sufficient to cause it, then there would be no need to posit mental events causing other mental events independent of material conditions, with the result that the mental event turns out to be an epiphenomenon from the point of view of material causality (143). Dinnyei cleverly explains how Polanyi’s understanding of higher level principles depending upon boundary conditions left undetermined by the lower level principles implies that there is no causation operating to control the emergent level of reality; hence any causation has to occur at the higher level (of, say, a machine) (146). In such an understanding of dual control of levels of reality, Kim’s problem of downward causation does not occur since he assumes that the semantic contents of the levels have to be able to be expressed fully at the lower level (149). But on Polanyi’s view, the higher level operational principles can function only on their own real level, something recognized by tacit knowing.

Another implication of Polanyi’s non-reductive ontology has implications for certain standard assumptions in contemporary biology, according to Daniel Paksi. Given Polanyi’s position on emergence
of higher levels and dual control of comprehensive entities, biologists make two complementary mistakes: they assume that features of life can be explained by physical and chemical laws, and that when they explain biological functions on analogy with machines, they are accomplishing the former (159). This implies that the mechanism of natural selection cannot account for the phenomenon of evolution itself, since random events may release or sustain functions of an ordering principle, but they do not account for the action of generating the novel ordering principles (163). According to Paksi, Polanyi requires not some sort of vital force to account for this teleological feature of evolution (171) but rather only a stable, open system ordering the process. Such a system-based theoretical approach provides a rationale for the genuine emergence required by evolution.

Paul Richard Blum’s essay struck me as daring and innovative. He claims that Polanyi’s reflections on the fact that knowing a machine requires recognizing the operational principles which define the purpose of a machine served as a proof for the immortality of the soul (173). Aside from the fact that I was quite ignorant of any published writings by Polanyi that discussed the immortality of the soul, much less attempting to prove it, I was puzzled how Blum made such a connection to Polanyi’s thought. It turns on a discussion which Alan Turing presented at Manchester in 1949, where Polanyi objected to Turing’s reduction of unspecifiability to routine patterns (177-79). Blum explores this in light of the medieval and renaissance distinction between passive and active intellect. He claims that a mechanistic interpretation of soul presumes the former (182); once an unspecifiable element of intellect is acknowledged, as in an active intellect, the soul cannot be reduced in any fashion, and, according to the early modern philosophical tradition, it entailed immortality (183). If Blum is correct, we have an amazing instance where an implication of the reality of the personal has revealed itself in novel ways.

In the next essay R. T. Allen explores how emotion sustains a proper understanding of knowing and intelligence. A strict autonomy is self-destructive, as is a failure to acknowledge we understand our surroundings in light of our commitments. He concludes in a completely Polanyian manner that our emotions play a constitutive role in all knowing and meaningful action (191), provided we accept our calling within a fallible, but developing, tradition.

The final essay in the volume offers a reconciling interpretation of the Polanyi brothers’ social thought. A stereotypical view paints Karl as an old-fashioned socialist and Michael as a free-market capitalist, but Walter Gulick believes that this is an unnecessarily disjunctive reading of their ideas. Gulick suggests that there are compatibilities between their ideas that are worth exploring insofar as they contribute to the realization of the social values of peace, justice, and sustainability (193). Gulick refers to Endre Nagy’s presentation of their relationship as comprising an early golden age up until 1934 when disagreements between the brothers on the implementation of socialist policies in Russia led to an estrangement (194). Certainly Karl’s refusal to recognize profound difficulties with Soviet communism contributed to the rift. But Gulick attempts to explain how the brothers developed different world-views about the situation in Europe well before 1934. Early on, Karl saw social institutions as playing an important role in promoting the common good and peace, while Michael placed much more trust in an appeal to properly structured individual interests (197). This is reflected in their different accounts of the causes of the first World War: for Karl, it was an institutional collapse of an illusory self-adjusting free market economy while for Michael it was moral inversion in the form of the corrosive power of malformed ideas employed by individuals. These significant differences in orientation did not lead to any early disputes between the brothers because prior to 1935 their lives had little intersection in the way of professional interests (198). Gulick next explores the positions of the brothers on social matters during the subsequent period, concluding with strengths and weaknesses of both (201). He furthers this comparison of their positions in the context of scarcity and recent global market failures, again pointing to their relative
strengths and weaknesses in light of the values of peace, justice, and sustainability. With regard to the deleterious side-effects of market swings, Gulick argues that both brothers probably would hold that too great a concentration of power today resides in corporations (206). Gulick additionally explores how the brothers grew together in terms of the notion of what Michael called public liberty, and how both affirmed that a commitment to transcendent values was grounded in overarching cultural meaning provided by religion. Gulick concludes that, even with their differing worldviews, their social theories have many points in common, particularly at the fundamental level where Karl’s emphasis on love and Michael’s on transcendent values actually reinforce each other (213). And such mutual enrichment from both their positions on social patterns might helpfully contribute to the formulation of policies that contribute to peace, justice, and sustainability.

My aim here has been to provide an introductory overview to the essays collected in this volume. The breadth of issues addressed, sometimes in contradiction with each other, testifies to the continuing fruitfulness of Polanyi’s thinking. My hope is that anyone who found the topics intriguing would be stimulated to turn to the original essay to examine the author’s presentation first hand. All students of Polanyi’s thought are indebted to those who organized this conference and to Tihamér Margitay for seeing to the publication of the essays presented there.

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