Cultivating Connected Knowing in the Classroom

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ABSTRACT Key Words: connected knowing, Blythe Clinchy, indwelling, Michael Polanyi, pedagogy, covenant epistemology, subjectivism, active listening, noticing regard, epistemic responsibility.

After briefly summarizing Blythe Clinchy’s account of connected knowing as a knowing procedure distinguishable from separate knowing and subjectivism, I draw comparisons between it and certain features of Polanyi’s epistemology. Connected knowing and Polanyi’s indwelling have much in common. Polanyian destructive analysis compares favorably with separate knowing, and they concur in the detrimental restriction of knowledge to that procedure. Neither indwelling nor connected knowing should be gender-specific, though their de facto gender-specificity may be challenged along with all the other false dichotomies which are the fall-out of an overweening objectivist ideal. My own experience of drawing on Polanyi’s insights to shape my own teaching practices confirm and help to elucidate the implications of revised epistemology for the classroom. Also, my own work developing covenant epistemology underscores and develops the idea of connected knowing. I give practical examples of personal classroom practices. Finally, I offer further comments in response to Clinchy’s collection of quotations regarding the college classroom.

In her years of work as a developmental psychologist, Blythe Clinchy has developed the notion of connected knowing. Connected knowing is a knowing procedure that she believes ought to be distinguished from separate knowing on the one hand and subjectivism on the other, and affirmed as legitimate in its own right. Historically, she suggests, connected knowing has been dismissed as subjectivism, and associated with females.1 Separate knowing has become institutionalized in academic structures: in particular, it has shaped the expectations of both teacher and student with regard to the classroom. In the context of her recent exchange with the Polanyi Society, this is something that Clinchy means to challenge.

Separate knowing focuses on propositions, and is concerned with the soundness of positions. It involves an adversarial stance. Its mode of discourse is argument. Clinchy quotes someone who describes it aptly as “patriot missile epistemology”—testing potential claims by suspecting them and attacking them. It plays a doubting game. It requires self-extrication (eliminating the self of the knower from the equation of knowing) in the name of objectivity. It distinguishes absolutely between thinking and feeling.

Connected knowing, in contrast, plays a believing game: the knower refrains from doubting. It focuses, not on propositions so much as on ways of seeing. It concerns itself with the meaningfulness of the position of the knower, not, at least at first, with the soundness of the position. It tries to become the author. It attends both to the said and to the unsaid. It involves feeling inextricably with knowing.

Connected knowing is the deliberate, imaginative, extension of one’s understanding into positions that initially feel wrong or remote. Clinchy makes the very helpful point that as such connected knowing is neither easy nor natural. It involves a rummaging process, in search of a match for patterns evidenced.

Also immensely helpful is Clinchy’s distinction between connected knowing and subjectivism. In contrast to the effort to listen to and understand the other, subjectivism actually silences the voice of the other.
It is only apparently respectful in maintaining that everyone’s opinion is right for him or her. Clinchy makes the point that connected knowers do not necessarily, as a result of their empathetic listening to the other, finally agree with the other.

She addresses the fear of an aspiring connected knower, that connecting might lead to loss of self. I delighted in her response to this that characterized connected knowing as something like being pregnant with another person! Clinchy notes that connected knowing is a procedure aptly suited not merely to knowing persons but to knowing nonhuman objects of knowledge. As one source she cites argues, you have to “be the tumor”!

While women may historically be more adept at connected knowing, Clinchy notes that the difference between separate and connected knowing is not rooted in gender but in epistemology. She believes that both separate and connected knowing, as legitimate knowing procedures, should be employed. With regard to pedagogy, I take Blythe Clinchy’s central injunction to be that we need to cultivate connected knowing in the classroom, and that this will involve us in revising epistemic and pedagogical practices which have discredited and discouraged it.²

The point of the Polanyi Society’s recent symposium with Ms. Clinchy is to open what seems likely to be a mutually beneficial conversation between her work and that of Polanyi’s. To that end, in this essay I offer my take on the correspondence between the two. Additionally I suggest some of the directions in which my own Polanyian epistemology is taking me, which further confirm the resonance between Clinchy’s efforts and Polanyi’s. Finally, I offer a few comments in response to Clinchy’s research and its implications for the classroom.

**Comparing Clinchy and Polanyi**

Connected knowing, I believe, compares favorably with Polanyi’s notion of indwelling. Indwelling involves getting inside what we are trying to understand. The term is appropriately applied to what the knower does with respect to the yet-to-be-known, as well as to what she/he does with respect to her/his own lived body as knowing mechanism, to the surrounding situation, and to any guiding maxims. Indwelling is how one embodies or relies on the potentially or actually subsidiary clues that anchor (as in a swamp—Drusilla Scott) a focal integrative pattern.

Polanyi never entertains that knowing could happen without indwelling. He does object to the objectivist model of knowledge (separate knowing?), and to the notion that this alone is what knowledge involves. Polanyi would not agree that separate knowing is a legitimate knowing procedure. Or perhaps it is better to say that in fact separate knowing, according to Polanyi, can never exist divorced from the connected knowing base in which it must be rooted. It is damaging, but ultimately impossible, to deny this. I call this the Polanyian trump card: no matter what you think you are doing when you know, what you are doing fundamentally confirms Polanyian epistemology. To use Clinchy’s terminology: connected knowing is the necessary epistemic preface and context for separate knowing, and never vice versa.³ Separate knowing is ultimately a kind of connected knowing. While knowing for humans never has occurred in the absence of such indwelling, even when the knower misconstrued her/his own epistemic procedure as objectivist, such misconstrual dangerously hampers and distorts any epistemic effort.
I believe that Polanyi would identify the legitimate practice of separate knowing with what he calls destructive analysis. Destructive analysis involves the knower in a temporary, artificial, focal attending to what he/she normally indwells (focuses from or through) as subsidiary clues. The problem of objectivism is that it mistakenly identifies “knowledge” exclusively with destructive analysis, disregarding the inevitable undergirding presence of functionally or logically unspecifiable subsidiary knowledge. At least part of what Clinchy rightly objects to about separate knowing is the wrongheaded epistemology it presumes. Polanyi gives us insight into how it is wrongheaded, as well as offering a substantive account of how knowing works.

Like Clinchy, Polanyi emphasizes the active, creative, imaginative component of all acts of coming to know. The intuition sets to the knower a hidden yet-to-be-known. Being guided by focal awareness of this, and gauging progress in light of it, the knower subsidiarily “scrabbles” to come up with an arrangement that bridges the gap between knower and known and discloses the known. While this scrabbling can with consistency include artificial and articulate testing procedures, these never can be appropriately understood as totally separate knowing. Indeed, one may argue that separate knowing, in the sense of a disembodied analysis and critique of propositions, is only possible in the wake of a discovery. Polanyi is notorious for having said, as a young doctoral candidate, that he arrived at his conclusions before he figured out what the premises were.

In my mind, connected knowing just is attentive, careful, empathetic understanding. One never earns the right to anything more separate or critical before this; and when the separate and critical is engaged, it is for the purpose of furthering connected knowing. Separate critical knowing is often a systematic search for things that need fixing to make the product better—much as a house is inspected critically prior to its purchase. Connected, not separate knowing, is more representative, normative and paradigmatic.

Polanyi never entertained that indwelling, or its denial, was in any way gender specific or stereotypic. Nor have most Polanyians, I don’t believe: we learned indwelling, healthy epistemological practice, from a male—Polanyi himself; and most Polanyians are males. We see indwelling as human, and as healthy. I view the gender stereotyping in epistemology as a false polarization that accompanies all the other false polarizations Polanyians reject, between “reason” and “knowledge” a là the false objectivist ideal, and the personal, the responsible, the tacit, the religious, the artistic, the valuational, the bodily, and the emotional, to name the major ones. We should expect healthy knowing to reintegrate what our defective epistemological heritage has typically divorced. However, as with all the other polarizations, including the institutionalizing of separate knowing, so with the male-female polarization: we are still needing to challenge its de facto stranglehold on many people and many ways of relating and thinking. Hence, we may not merely dismiss the association between “reason,” and “male,” and think we can be done with it. Polanyians would insist that the most important way to challenge any of the polarizations is to practice epistemological therapy.

**Polanyian Pedagogy**

First let me say that I am convinced that “Polanyi helps”—my bumper-sticker mantra—pedagogy. For many years of my teaching, I have felt that understanding Polanyian epistemology frees me as a teacher and helps me be a better one. Here are some of Polanyian dimensions of teaching that I have noted.

The first is what I call “wearing a lecture.” Polanyi says that the student actually indwells the teacher in pursuit of understanding what the teacher is saying. My three-dimensional, embodied, proclamation invites
the student through indwelling to get an inside feel of the subsidiaries which breathe life into the sentences I utter. Rather than learning being about impersonal transfer of information, it is about modeling its embodied orientation. Truth, as Parker Palmer says, is lived. And what students remember, and ought to remember, is not what I said, but the passionate orientation that I am. Actually, it is not so much a remembering, but rather a becoming: good teaching’s best consequence is personal transformation of the learner.

This is actually very freeing for me as a teacher. I am comforted by knowing that successful communication is neither necessarily nor sufficiently related to my words. I have always felt apologetic about my very flawed verbal performance! While I do make sure I say key phrases I feel that, if the student learns to repeat, will guide him or her into understanding, then I do not need to feel that I am failing as a communicator when my oral performance invariably falls so far short of perfection.

Further, it has helped me to realize that articulation serves not so much, or at least not exclusively, to convey impersonally information that then becomes the student’s knowledge; it serves to evoke understanding, or precipitate it. And the sentences that evoke understanding are not working merely descriptively in that act. Just as the ballet teacher whose course I took (for the first time as a mother!) used sentences that made me feel what to do with my body, thus: “When you are balancing on your toes, pretend you are sucking yourself up through a straw…”! Even the most abstract subject matter needs such straw-sucking tips! Even when the sentences in question are as starkly explicit as a deductive proof, I feel that it is still proper to say that learning is evoked, not so much in the proof, as by means of it.

Another Polanyian insight that helps me is understanding that learning isn’t linear. The “Oh I see it moment,” as I call it, is retroactive, transformative, undeducable except in retrospect. It is sometimes triggered by an unlikely and unassuming factor. When you are teaching, you have to do your best to be linear in your presentation. But the learning isn’t linear. And where a particular student catches on is unpredictable. There is a lag time, also. But when the moment comes, even if it is later in the semester (or after!) than you might have hoped, it is retroactive. The stumbling, half-understood efforts that predated the insight do not go to waste. This gives me tremendous hope and patience both with my students and with myself.

I have also come to appreciate the complex relationship between articulate and inarticulate understanding: the one stimulates the other. This makes it a good idea to rock rhythmically from one to the other. As a teacher, I depend on tests not to gauge learning but to prompt it. I have no qualms about telling a student that he or she can write a test well and only half-way understand what he or she wrote. I tell them that that is OK. I also tell them that the very act of articulating it will consolidate their understanding and move it forward.

I am confident, both in light of Polanyi’s insights and in light of my experience, that what I the teacher bring to the learning equation is at most only half. The student’s portion is utterly essential. The student must consent, submit, trust, engage, own, the learning. This means that in my pedagogy, fostering this response on the part of the student is a primary aim. What inspires them, I know, will never be my prowess! I know, instead, that it will probably be my own excitement. Also, I cherish the word, engagement. I’m okay with a messy class, one with loose ends of discussion and unanswered questions, when students have rolled up their sleeves and thought deeply with me and with each other. If what I am doing is not a discussion but a lecture, still I want to do in a way that cajoles them into engagement, bullies them or laughs them out of a stupor and into active listening. This comes back to wearing my words.
Another key ingredient in evoking student response is a precious thing I have come to call “noticing regard.” For many years, after learning Henri Nouen’s definition of hospitality as creating a warm and welcoming space into which the strange may enter and become a friend, I have thought of my teaching as a kind of hospitality. Once however, in a discussion about hospitality with a young friend, he suggested that letting someone use your house when you are out of town is hospitality. I emphatically and instinctively disagreed. That made me realize that for it to be an act of hospitality, the host has to be there. On the other hand, there are some, well-meaning, I’m sure, people who fail at hospitality because they communicate something like, “Oh we have lots of people over…”—kind of a bland, expansive, failure to notice the individual! What makes for a good act of hospitality? I feel that the key ingredient, practiced within the welcoming space, is noticing regard. It can’t be a scrutinizing noticing. But it has to be a gracious conferring of dignity.

Such an act can take just about any form. Last week I responded to the playful invitation of a student to hop on the back of his little red motor scooter and ride the one block from the Commons to Old Main. I made his day. (He made mine!). I sensed that he will henceforth hear everything I say, and it will perhaps even change how he thinks about himself and engages the world. If in pedagogy I am gambling for higher stakes than the communication of information—if I am gambling for hearts, for personal transformation—riding little red motor scooters count as pedagogical devices.

Noticing regard is like the burning match that starts the kerosene lamp’s steady inner glow. It takes the face, the gaze, of a person, to accomplish this. I need only ask you, to prove my point, to think: Who noticed you?

**Connected Knowing and Covenant Epistemology**

In my own work, I am formulating what I am calling covenant epistemology, an epistemological vision of knowing as paradigmatically an interpersonal, covenantally-shaped relationship. This vision takes its jumping off from Polanyi’s idea of reality as that which may yet manifest itself indeterminately. Reality responds to our self-binding overtures with its own gracious self-disclosure.

By *covenantal* I have in mind the things a knower must do in order to invite the real. These involve practicing an “epistemological etiquette”—in effect, the knower must compose and behave her- or himself. This involves love, respect, humility, patience, commitment to the existence and value of the as yet undiscovered reality, attentiveness, indwelling, listening beyond preconceived categories. It involves carefully and understandingly positioning ourselves to receive the anticipated disclosure. I feel confident that the way it is supposed to be is that this reciprocity, this dance of knower and known moving toward mutuality in understanding, will issue in an event that is mutually transforming and therapeutic.

I believe that covenant epistemology comports favorably with and further undergirds Clinchy’s connected knowing. This means that the discussion of connected knowing is not simply a professional exercise in isolating a hitherto overlooked curious epistemological phenomenon. It is about nothing less than engaging and understanding the world. It alone is the way forward. Separate knowing is at best a piece of the larger engagement, at worst a vicious and dangerous hindrance to it.
I heartily concur with Ms. Clinchy that understanding the fundamental status of connected knowing has huge implications for pedagogy. As teachers we must model covenantal inviting of the real. We must inspire it. And we must do so with the extra intentionality it takes to overcome the reigning, self-deluded paradigm of separate knowing. What is at stake is nothing less than the students, ourselves the teachers, and the world.

**Additional Comments in Response to “Beyond Subjectivism”**

Clinchy’s essay, Beyond Subjectivism,” primarily showcases a host of quotations from students and other commentators regarding learning in the classroom. I do not discern any evolution of Clinchy’s position beyond that published in 1996. I note also that a lot of her sources in this work predate 1996. One question I have is whether more current research indicates a shift in classroom experience. In my classes currently, women, not men, are comfortable both with connected and separate knowing, and men as well as women, left to themselves, can practice a default subjectivist thinking. I don’t know how much if any this has to do with the gender of the professor.

I feel that Clinchy’s theses would be helped by adding to her many quoted student comments the identification and analysis of an array of factors. For example, a couple things may be said helpfully about subjectivism. I believe that the practice of subjectivism is enforced from a moral maxim powerfully present in our prevailing zeitgeist: an individual is only entitled to his/her own opinion, and that opinion is valid only for that individual; to move beyond this is to invalidate others’ rights and inappropriately impose your opinions on another. Thus, in a college classroom—the setting Clinchy never stipulates but from which all her examples are drawn—teachers should expect that uninitiated students feel morally obligated to practice subjectivism toward the professor, toward the subject matter, and toward classmates. We should expect them to begin as subjectivists. If we want students to develop another approach, we have to address this specifically, seeking to reshape attitudes to something that stands up to the zeitgeist. In light of this, it may be a bit too grand to elevate subjectivism to a chosen knowing procedure; it’s a Zeitgeist-driven default setting.

I believe that subjectivist thinking itself displays an unhealthy epistemological betrayal and disillusionment, the sad fallout of our Western epistemological heritage. It does not characterize a young child, who is, by contrast, full of wonder and confidence that the world will reciprocate to respectfully exuberant explorations. Children, I think it can be said, naturally practice connected knowing. Subjectivism should never have come to be the default setting of these college students. We may thus view our efforts to reshape their knowing procedures as restoring to themselves and to the world.

A corollary implicit in the zeitgeist is that understanding someone else’s position mandates, or presupposes, agreeing with that position. It is often voiced that if you have not shared my experience, you can’t possibly understand. Or, if you don’t agree, you haven’t understood. Clinchy addressed this nicely in her first essay, distinguishing as she did between connected knowing and agreement. Personally, I believe that the confusion arises out of defective, sub-personal interpersonal relationship of emotional fusion, a personality propensity very common in our times. However, my point here is that it is important that the teacher not expect otherwise of academic initiates and specifically reshape this mistaken assumption of good pedagogy. Given the prevailing Zeitgeist default settings, connected knowing must be intentionally cultivated.

Another thing I think it would be helpful for us to identify and think about are relational
responsibilities in the context of which any knowing event occurs and which inevitably shape it; thus these also ought to shape our classroom pedagogy. Having recently worked through Lorraine Code’s proposals concerning epistemic responsibility, I have in mind her formulations when I say that into the knowing event should be factored matters of responsibility—to the world, to oneself, and to the epistemic community.11

One application pertains to cultivating connected knowing in the classroom. College students find discussion threatening, I think, because they rightly feel they are being asked to violate obligations to their classmates. This is partly because of the subjectivistic mandate just discussed; it is also because students in a classroom often haven’t been introduced to each other or hitherto had the privilege of building natural social connection. From my teacher’s perspective I tend to view them as a unit, but they are far from actually being a unit at that point. Teachers can forget that, just as guests in our home may be new to each other and need to be helped to get acquainted before good conversation can occur, students in a classroom require this. It is the teacher’s obligation and privilege and good pedagogical practice to perform this service of human decency. Clinchy’s variegated quotations implicitly indicate this: out-of-class friendship and interaction both enabled and generated confident and respectful disagreement and exploration toward a common understanding—what might look more like separate knowing.12

The practices of both separate knowing and of connected knowing are only appropriate once a context of epistemic community has been established and its participants feel comfortably oriented within it. In that context, even what might be termed “shooting down” a person’s position can be taken as part of the fun of jointly exploring and establishing understanding. Apart from the context, “shooting down” is rude and disrespectful. Disagreement must always be respectful and with a view to understanding developing a community. Scholars practicing their profession understand this (—or ought to understand this!).13 Initial understanding of this should not be expected of novices in the college classroom. Teachers in that context need to understand that part of their job is to secure the learning environment and set and model the expectation of joint pursuit of deep understanding.

I think the discussion of separate and connected knowing and the classroom would be helped by distinguishing legitimate and illegitimate separate knowing. Illegitimate separate knowing should never be countenanced. Illegitimate separate knowing consists of criticism that shows disrespect for the proponent as a person, or that too quickly and disrespectfully dismisses the position rather than taking it seriously.14 I think people who fear separate knowing may have only known it in its abusive forms, or they fear it because they perceive it so out of their own insecurity. Here the ethical behavior implicit in connected knowing is truer to the mark of responsible human epistemic behavior. Just in general, because of our Western philosophical tradition, not to mention our propensity to selfishness, we all need the constant reminder that all ideas we consider and connect with and criticize are always somebody’s: there is always a person or persons behind them, persons whose dignity is both priceless and fragile. This is a way that our zeitgeist has actually offered a healthy corrective to Western philosophy: all truth is somebody’s truth.

Quotations from students that Clinchy records indicate another key factor that helpfully could be considered: the diversity of appropriate pedagogical situations. What is appropriate knowing in one situation would be inappropriate in another. In some situations, first-hand experience is always valuable and thus should be welcomed; in others, it would be entirely inappropriate. The radiology teacher would not be too interested in how I felt about x-rays, for example, until I have become proficient in reading them. Even then, he/she might reasonably be less interested in how x-rays impact my sense of my human worth. It would be a whole different story in my humanities discussion class. Artistic work invites the passionate participative response and
transformation of its viewers/hearers/readers. Even at that, literature professors, like radiologists, believe that their discipline requires its participants to be trained.

Another variation in pedagogical setting properly and critically characterizes the college experience: what is expected of first-years and what is expected of seniors should be dramatically different. There is a real sense in which I am not interested in the opinions and personal experience of the first-years; they need to practice active listening (connected knowing) as they learn the subject and its practices. The way I treat upper-class philosophy majors is by contrast much more egalitarian and interactive, for they have been learned the practice. They are also very comfortable both socially and professionally in a way that first-years cannot possibly be. I feel that the American Zeitgeist overly democratizes personal contribution to discussion. Personal contribution should not be considered a good without qualification. Every student’s learning experience is helped, I believe, by prompting student engagement; I wish to dispute that discussion unqualifiedly is the sole means of achieving that engagement.

A little more about active listening: active listening, humbly seeking to hear a text, an author, a thinker, is a kind of connected knowing that I believe professors need to model for their students. If we require them prematurely to discuss or respond to a text, we never model the kind of patient attention that is comfortable with the discomfort of not knowing, of refusing to jump to pat conclusions and thereby blocking true understanding. This, I believe, is the proper stance of both scholar and student in long-suffering pursuit of the yet-to-be-known. Active listening, I believe, is just what Clinchy has in mind by connected knowing. It may take special courage on the part of both teacher and student in the classroom, to buck the conventions and practice listening.

Finally, reading between the lines of Clinchy’s quotations from students, connected knowing requires something healthy of the self, an openness and self-disclosure that is qualitatively distinct from and superior to subjectivism. Employing the terminology of James Loder’s Kierkegaardian account of humanness, it is not the two-dimensional self-reflection but the three-dimensional self-in-relation or the four-dimensional love in response to the Holy that equips the knower to invite and sustain connected knowing. Simply put, the learner is a better learner, if she or he is “okay” with her- or himself. It takes, we might say, subjective maturity to be truly objective in the way that connected knowing entails. This sort of thing is part of what I am getting at when in my own work I expound on the maturity in personhood requisite for healthy knowing. Teachers, and especially parents, have the nurture of this as their obligation and their privilege.

In sum: teachers teach both content and skill. They speak and they wear their words. Teachers shape and secure the setting and invite students into it. Where these have not been dealt into pedagogy, learning, which is primarily connected knowing to the end of proficiency in understanding and practice, is sadly thwarted. Students are warranted in fearing both connected and legitimate separate knowing where these are not occurring. And connected knowing, truthful as it is to knower and known, is something we must cultivate in the classroom even as we seek it continually in our own work.

Endnotes

2 I find Clinchy’s examples on pages 17-18 of “Beyond Subjectivism” especially exemplary of the connected knowing procedure.


5 Two comments here. First: the night of our discussion with Ms. Clinchy at the Polanyi Society, she and I were the only females in a room of thirty or so! Second: It has been suggested to me that Polanyi’s more wholistic understanding of knowing can be associated with his Jewish heritage. I am not in a position to offer an historical justification of this continuity, nor an in-depth exegesis of the terms in the biblical text. However, “know,” in the Hebrew Scriptures, is so intertwined with covenant love that it is used to refer to sexual intimacy—Adam knew his wife, Eve, and they conceived and gave birth to a child! There are so many stellar Jewish thinkers characterized by their more-than-conventional breaching of conventional categories and disciplines to speak profoundly: Heschel, Arendt, Weil, Riesmann…

6 Palmer, *To Know As We Are Known*, pp. 48ff.

7 Esther Lightcap Meek, *Longing to Know: The Philosophy of Knowledge for Ordinary People* (Brazos, 2003), Chapter 6.

8 Actually, I believe that a lecture or talk must both be linear and be something else. It must make the student feel what is being said; it must engage the student and evoke understanding; and it can also take liberties with linearity in order to prompt insight to occur earlier. See the discussion below.

9 This position has dubious logical integrity. But historically logical flaws have never seemed to prevent an idea from being culturally powerful; thus, it may not on these grounds be dismissed by those who want to listen and understand.

10 I will touch on this again a little later in this essay.


12 “Beyond Subjectivism,” pp. 23f, 25f.

13 Given the dominance of the separate knowing paradigm, too often scholarly work has been viewed, not as communal pursuit of common understanding, but rather as something much more like patriot missile epistemology. Faculties often somewhat wistfully discuss the ideal of a community of learner and bemoan the fact that the ideal rarely is actualized. I suppose the point here is that teachers must themselves learn connected knowing—Physician, heal thyself!—especially if they mean to model it in the classroom!

14 There are of course other factors by which the level of engagement of an opponent’s position must be gauged, such as amount of time available, relevance to the topic under discussion, professional expertise and personal calling within the epistemic community, and public and personal urgency of the subject matter.