
Langdon Gilkey, emeritus Professor of Theology at the University of Chicago’s Divinity School, here develops an understanding of nature, humanity and God that draws from both the sciences and religion. In a book that reads as partly history of western philosophy, partly history of religions, partly treatise on environmental ethics and partly philosophical theology, Gilkey engages many thinkers, most notably Emmanuel Kant, Michael Polanyi, Paul Tillich and Alfred North Whitehead. His most intriguing claim is that we should treat nature as an image of God.

Gilkey arrives at this point in three steps. In the first, Gilkey tackles the issue of epistemology. While not particularly groundbreaking, this part of the book offers a clear and accessible account of the significant issues. Gilkey skillfully and trenchantly attacks two different positivism. The first is that of creationism, which treats the opening chapters of Genesis as a divinely inspired “report” of events (11). The second, with which he spends the most time, is that of scientism, which believes that scientific inquiry of various sorts tells us “what is there, as it is there . . . [and] all that is there” (14, emphasis added). Scientism thus leads to naïve realism, the belief that the only things that are real are the things that the sciences can discover. Although views of both religious and scientific knowing have changed drastically in the aftermath of the Enlightenment (a process he chronicles in Ch. 2), Gilkey demonstrates that this naïve realism continues to be found in the work of most contemporary cosmologists, among them Heinz Pagels, Carl Sagan, Steven Weinberg and Richard Dawkins, as well as the work of John Barrow and Frank Tippler (Ch. 4). From Gilkey’s perspective, there are several serious difficulties with scientism. The first is that it fails to recognize that it cannot account for the existence of the subjects who engage in scientific enquiry (15). A second problem is that it fails to acknowledge that there are many other ways of knowing than scientific, such as artistic, literary, philosophical and religious (2). For Gilkey, these ways of knowing may differ in standards of intelligibility, in types of data or evidence used and in the kinds of explanations offered, but all decisively remain hermeneutical enterprises (75). A third difficulty with scientism is that it fails to acknowledge that scientific inquiry itself is an attempt by an observer/subject to construct knowledge using symbols (31) in response to our awareness of self, communities and the orderliness of life (37).

Human knowing then, on Gilkey’s account, is always theory-laden, participatory and historical. Put differently, what we call knowledge is an on-going construction that is responsive to reality (36). Thus Gilkey strongly reaffirms at least one conviction of Kant’s, i.e., that we cannot ever know *das Ding an sich*. Gilkey refuses, however, to give in to the temptations associated with this critical realism (i.e., relativism and skepticism). Even though our knowledge of reality is always “obscure at best and quite unknown at worst” (69), he argues, much like Polanyi, that the participatory nature of knowing allows us to have some confidence that what we know is analogous to what is there, even if it is not identical with reality (69-73).

With epistemology addressed, Gilkey devotes Part Two of the book to the question, “What can we then know about nature?” He begins by lamenting the loss of insights into nature held by primal religions, which shaped attitudes that are more respectful of nature than more modern attitudes (79-80). He also recognizes that nature is decidedly ambiguous with
regard to human beings. On the one hand, nature is the source, or ground of our powers. On the other hand, nature is a physical environment that stands over and against us (81-82).

Drawing from both physics and primal religions, Gilkey suggests that insights from each way of knowing help us understand nature in four ways, the first of which is power (Ch. 6). Physics, on Gilkey’s read, suggests that nature’s “awesome and terrible power, the mysterious union of matter and energy: the power of physical things to hold together, to be one, and so to be and to act” (91) is indeterminate, temporal (i.e., historical), dynamic and directional in the sense that the process “exhibits a steady accumulation of forms of greater and greater complexity of structure and of interaction” (90). In turning to primal religions, Gilkey argues that they understand all aspects of nature to be the vehicle for a larger power that waxes and wanes, creates and destroys (91-94).

Both the sciences and primal religions likewise associate nature with life. In reflecting on the findings of the biological sciences, Gilkey makes four summary points about nature as life (99-102). First, life is the presupposition, not the effect of mutations during the process of natural selection. Secondly, life is historical; human beings arise in the larger story of life (and Gilkey defends the right to talk this way, even if biology per se cannot discern any plot to the story). In addition, Gilkey argues that the biological sciences demonstrate that there is a dialectical interplay between life and death in which death leads to new life. Finally, the biological sciences show that life remakes its environment. Looking at nature as life from primal religions, Gilkey reprises Eliade to show how all natural beings can be symbols of life, including moon, water, earth and plants (102-107).

Turning next to the topic of order in nature Gilkey develops an historical account of humanity’s attempt to posit an order of some sort (Ch. 8). Gilkey summarizes the various attempts of primal religions, eastern cultures, the ancient Greeks, medieval Christians and moderns to discern order in nature. In this summary, Gilkey avoids two mistakes that people often make in talking about order in nature. While he emphasizes the persistence or universality of this intuition of order in all human cultures across time, Gilkey carefully avoids claiming that all cultures say the same thing. In addition, Gilkey reminds us that particular accounts of natural order have lent themselves to “demonic and oppressive uses” in human history (130).

In exploring nature as a realm of meaning (Chapter 9), Gilkey highlights themes he has introduced earlier in the text, especially the ambiguity of nature to and for human beings, in order to emphasize the fragility of any meaning we derive from our understandings of nature. Not only are our attempts to find meaning fragile, but we find that nature itself is, too. In the next chapter, Gilkey explores “Nature and the Human Care of Nature.” Blaming both positivistic science and western religions for engendering attitudes and actions that are destructive of the natural world, he calls us to recognize that in harming nature we harm ourselves (144-150). In contrast to destructive attitudes toward nature, Gilkey suggests that we begin to think of nature as an image of God, i.e., a creature that has value and integrity of its own and mirrors (indeed is an instrument of) God’s own creative work (150-152).

Part III offers a constructive account of the human situation, nature and God in light of previous sections of the book. In his analysis of the human situation (Ch. 11), Gilkey argues that human beings are generated out of nature, as is the history in which we are immersed. As natural-historical creatures, our lives are characterized by both contingency and temporality, a situation we have typically tried to ameliorate, if not escape, through technology. Unfortunately, modern technology threatens to destroy as much as control, and so Gilkey calls for the development of the political will to resist this technological imperative (167-169).

His constructive account of nature returns to and develops the claim that nature is an image of God
it (Ch. 12) by discussing seven signs of the divine that can be found in nature. Nature discloses itself as power in process. This disclosure of nature’s power is accompanied, in religious consciousness, by the experience of demand or obligation. Nature exhibits an order, perceived differently in different cultures to be sure, but an order nonetheless. Order in nature is also accompanied by the perception of demand or obligation. The order of nature coexists with contingency. Thus, nature is, in some sense “prepared” for novelty and the unexpected. Finally, nature discloses the unity of life and death, such that new life always requires the death of the old. Gilkey concludes this chapter by suggesting that in nature, we discern that God is the God of power, and thus life and death, but also God of grace, life and eternity.

Gilkey concludes the book with the outline of a philosophically-rooted natural theology. He realizes that such a project “is not the vital center of Christian theology,” but defends it because “the deeper understanding of nature’s mystery and value in and for itself is very important and because the relation of God to natural processes is an essential part of our understanding, not only of nature, but of God and of ourselves” (195). Gilkey finishes with five brief statements about God (202-204). God is the name for the noncontingent source of contingent power. God is the name for the continuing ground of freedom in nature, human existence and history, God is the name for the source of order within novelty. God is the name for the organizing principle of human existence. Finally, God is redemptive love.

There is much to commend in this book. The themes Gilkey addresses remain important and timely. His work serves as a welcome ally for those who want to argue that there are many legitimate ways of knowing other than the scientific and that such a claim does not lead to a vacuous relativism or lazy skepticism. Gilkey reinforces themes found in the work of his former colleague at the University of Chicago, James M. Gustafson, when he recognizes the plurality of sciences (thus complicating our notions of the relationship between “religion” and “science”) and reminds us that nature does not necessarily serve the human good. Gilkey articulates in compelling fashion some of the philosophical implications of what the natural sciences discover.

Those who remain dubious about projects such as Gilkey’s will find reasons to remain so, however. Gilkey’s argument does not escape the usual problems of philosophical theologies. His claims about God remain abstract and therefore leave the reader wondering how they relate to the claims made in concrete religious traditions. Indeed, much of the book is written in generalizations. For example, Gilkey treats all primal or archaic religions as alike and while the generalizations seem fair, more detailed engagement with specific religions would strengthen the argument. Another part of the argument that could use greater development is the connection between the insights of the primal religions and the findings of the sciences. Most of the time Gilkey simply reports what the sciences say alongside what religions say and implies, rather than explicates, their coherence. Finally, more work needs to be done to develop the implications of this persistent impulse to find order in nature. If this persistent impulse never results in any thick agreement about the details of that order, then one questions whether the impulse is misguided. Despite its gaps, however, *Nature, Reality and the Sacred* offers suggestive ways of responding to the perpetual task of making sense of God, nature and self in relation to one another.

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Bringing together between two covers the contents of his lectures and workshops, pianist William Westney shares his philosophy of learning, teaching, and performing. One could wish that a CD or
DVD were included in an envelope on the inside back cover so that the reader could hear/see the embodiment of that philosophy in performance.

No stranger to the thought world of Michael Polanyi, Westney, holder of two endowed faculty positions at Texas Tech University, presented a paper, *Tacit Knowing at the Piano Bench*, at the April 1991 conference at Kent State University, *From Polanyi to the 21st Century: A Centennial Celebration*. He later gave a performance at this conference. The concept of *tacit knowledge* is implicit in the current volume and not explicitly mentioned.

This reviewer, an independent studio teacher of piano and organ, has heard Mr. Westney lecture on *The Perils of Perfectionism*, observed a demonstration of his famous *Un-Master Class*, and heard him perform in recital at a conference of the Montana State Music Teachers Association at the University of Montana.

Westney begins by describing the freedom and vitality of the young child’s response to music. This freedom is imperiled by the advent of music lessons, which demand perfection and discourage that childlike sense of adventure, curiosity, intuition, free play, and body movement that Albert Einstein, for instance, described as being integral to his creative thinking.

He then moves to the dynamics of perfectionism in piano practice, the music lesson, and performance and asserts that “mistakes” (the juicier, the better!) are as necessary to learning in the practice room as they are in life. For Westney, practicing is not performing, and “mistakes” become an opportunity for experimentation and problem solving where real learning takes place. Lessons become less of a “perfection” test than a checkpoint in the learning process with the teacher more concerned with encouraging the student’s own impulses than controlling the student. The student then trusts herself more, enjoying and respecting what she already has inside.

A performer who has gone through the process summarized above is thus free to focus on communicating with the audience rather than on ego concerns.

Westney includes two chapters with very specific application. Chapter 4 is *Step by Step; A Guide to Healthy Practicing*, and, in Chapter 9, he describes the traditional master class, in which the student “performs” for a master teacher before a larger audience, usually of music teachers, and the master teacher then shows the audience how to “fix” the student’s performance. He then contrasts the traditional master class with the product of his experience and experimentation, *The Un-Master Class*, in which a group of performers, through a series of activities involving body movement, respond to music and develop physical communication skills. When members of the group actually perform, the other members of the group give physical and verbal feedback, which focuses on how they respond to the performance rather than on picayune musical matters.

After a chapter on the adult amateur, whose approach to learning most closely resembles that of a young child in its curiosity and sense of adventure, Westney summarizes those avenues of thought that have most influenced him. It is here that he references Polanyi as having gone “beyond the objective scientific method in which he was trained when he said that humans ‘know more than we can tell’: there are important truths which are personal and irreducible and which can never be analyzed or described” (p. 218). He then quotes from *Knowing and Being* (p. 126) where Polanyi uses the example of piano technique to illustrate the inadequacy of reductionist analysis and to focus on the essence of making music as an “act of integration.”

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Here is a hefty and solid volume that extols, extends, and critiques the philosophical work of Marjorie Grene. Her appearance in this volume of “the Library of Living Philosophers” (at age 92!) is no small honor because it means a board of highly esteemed American philosophers has deemed her ideas as of the same relative significance as the ideas of past honorees such as Dewey, Whitehead, Russell, Einstein, Buber, Popper, Sartre, Gadamer, and Davidson, to name a few. The volume is divided into three main sections. Part One is Grene’s intellectual autobiography, which is filled with many fascinating accounts of her philosophical peregrinations and interesting disclosures about her struggles as a woman in a discipline dominated by males. She notes that 1950 was “a special year in my vita: the year I met Michael Polanyi…” Polanyi invited her to assist him in his development of the Gifford Lectures, which more than six years later would be published as *Personal Knowledge*. She concludes this piece commenting that her earlier “guiding lights” were Polanyi, Merleau-Ponty, and Plessner, whose ideas are enriched and solidified when contextualized within Gibson’s ecological realism. For those who have read her *Philosophical Testament*, this will come as no surprise.

Part Two is the largest portion of the volume, 535 pages devoted to descriptive and critical essays by her peers and Grene’s often feisty replies to them. This section divides into essays dealing with “persons and knowledge,” “philosophy of biology,” and “studies in the history of philosophy.” In a small review like this it will not be possible to comment on more than a few of these provocative essays, so I will merely mention most of the essays and what they’re about and discuss only those whose content importunes. The section on “persons and knowledge” begins with a large essay by TAD’s own Phil Mullins on Grene’s work and friendship with Polanyi. Mullins highlights the happy coincidence of these two academic mavericks’ first encounter at University of Chicago in 1950. Polanyi was there giving lectures as a Visiting Professor, and Grene, who was “relieved of her duties” as an instructor there several years earlier, managed to attend one of his lectures and speak to him afterwards. The rest is history. Mullins’ essay is a gold mine of interesting details about their work and 26 years of friendship. Mullins makes it clear that Polanyi held Grene’s philosophical prowess in high esteem and that Grene admired the broadness and general trajectory of Polanyi’s post-critical vision, despite her taking issue with Polanyi over, among other things, *Personal Knowledge*’s Christian overtones, and its “treacherous footnotes” betraying a “hopelessly anthropocentric evolutionism.” Mullins concludes the essay with a superb section on Polanyian themes in Grene’s philosophical thought, themes that Grene takes up most explicitly in her own ecological epistemology.

Other essays in this section include Jacquelyn Kegley’s probing of Grene’s contextual philosophical anthropology and its roots in Portmann and Plessner, Helen Longino’s enlightening discussion of Grene’s biologized naturalism and historicized Kantianism as it contrasts with Quine’s scientistic program for naturalization, and Richard Schacht’s fascinating essay on Grene’s philosophical anthropology and the future of human nature. Peter Machamer and Lisa Osbeck’s contribution argues that Gibson’s direct realism ought to eschew, not internal representations per se, but internal inferences; the former, they claim doesn’t offend against Gibson’s thesis of perception/conception continuity and is sometimes required to account for certain judgments and problem-solving behaviors. Michael Luntley’s essay explores “the restlessness of agency” and how “a tacit and direct sense of things” is essential to the individuation of the content of our beliefs and desires as well as our self-conception. Anthony N. Perovich Jr.’s paper questions Grene’s down-grading the role of consciousness in her nondualist yet non-reductionist conception of personhood. And finally, David M. Rosenthal’s essay agrees with Perovich Jr.’s claim that we must understand consciousness if we are to understand personhood, and
seeks to give specific theoretical content to the special, species-demarcating way that persons are conscious of their mental states.

The critical import of the essays in this section focuses on the centrality of the category of person in Grene’s anthropology, particularly as it comes to expression in her refusal to partake of the current crazes for consciousness. Perovich Jr. notes that Grene deploys Erwin Straus’s “physics refutes physicalism” trope, which is a kind of transcendental argument that physicalism undermines the conditions of the possibility of the science of physics, the very foundation upon which physicalism rests. He suggests, however, that this trope might carry more punch than Grene bargained for, in that Alan Donagan, someone who Grene has the utmost respect for, believes it actually should motivate an embrace of minds dualistically understood. Whether it does or doesn’t, Perovich Jr. believes the argument highlights the fact that consciousness, unlike other higher ontological levels of organized complexity, is a level apart in that it cannot be explained in terms of physical structure and function alone. And yet Grene situates the category of the person, the category she puts in place of consciousness, in ontological continuity with them. Perovich Jr. contends that notions integral to Grene’s concept of personhood, things such as responsible agency, intentionality, and others depend essentially upon the conceptually prior notion of consciousness, that what makes these capacities of personhood unique to humans is the mental content residing in their consciousness. Rosenthal takes this a step further with his theory of consciousness as higher order thoughts about mental states that are not themselves conscious (HOTS) and specifies the mental content which bestows this uniqueness on human personhood. Unlike Perovich Jr.’s, Rosenthal’s article is sympathetic with Grene’s rejection of Cartesian dualism, but seeks to account for personhood in terms of consciousness which, in turn, is to be accounted for in terms of HOTs. Armed with this understanding of consciousness as reflection on non-conscious mental states, he calls on a functionalist account of mind to explain the basic components of personhood. Grene’s response to these essays is predictable. She finds dualism “inconceivable,” abhors “consciousmongers,” and does not “remotely have the hots for HOTS!” For Grene, as for Merleau-Ponty, Plessner and Gibson, it is not what’s in our minds or consciousness that demarcates us from the rest of the animal world, but what we are in, a lifeworld of affordances that have personified our organism through enculturation.

The second sub-section of part Two addresses Grene’s contributions to the philosophy of biology. Phillip R. Sloan’s essay examines the “species problem,” the problem of defining species in such a way that it accommodates all the data and practical concerns of the various biological theories into which the notion figures centrally. Sloan argues that Grene’s skill at bringing together disparate traditions in philosophy, her impressive grasp of the history of philosophy, and her Polanyian-influenced historical realism, give Grene a unique advantage in sorting this issue out without at the same time undermining a host of humanistic concerns. David Hull’s piece gives an overview of Grene’s contributions to evolutionary theory, e.g., her Aristotelian-influenced views of species, her antireductionism, her critique of the tautological treatments of natural selection, etc., and offers a few criticisms of his own regarding her antagonistic position on population thinking. David Depew’s essay investigates Grene’s naturalism as it comes to expression in her work on Aristotle and Darwin, and distinguishes it from the Quinian project of naturalization that attempts to extend the empirical sciences’ reach directly into philosophical territory. Niles Eldredge’s contribution demonstrates that Grene’s insight into evolution’s dependency on interactions across two kinds of hierarchy have paid rich dividends in evolutionary theory. Richard M. Burian, in his article, does a marvelous job elucidating Grene’s commitments to “historical realism” and “contextual objectivity” and how these influenced her analysis of the various gene concepts deployed in the biological sciences. Eugenie Gatens-Robinson’s essay explores Grene’s project of returning a robust notion of life to the biological sciences, but claims that Grene’s refusal to give sufficient place to teleological explanations in the phyloge-
netic context of evolution stymies her project’s realization. This essay receives some of the most scathing criticism found in Grene’s responses to the volume’s contributors. Hans-Jorg Rheinberger provides a piece on the various notions of time that figure into physics, history, biology, and our being-in-the-world, and John Beatty, in his article, discusses the place of contingency in Darwinian science. These are both interesting and illuminating essays, but they shed very little light on Grene’s work.

The final section of part Two is devoted to Grene’s contributions to studies in the history of philosophy. It kicks off with a long essay by Richard Glauser that probes the late-scholastic roots of Descartes’ notions of substance and of the real distinction between mind and body, and suggests that Suarez may figure into things more than Grene recognized. John Cottingham’s contribution seeks to mollify some of the contempt typically directed at Descartes’ mind-body dualism—something that is palpable in Grene’s work. Cottingham argues that Descartes’ view of sensation brought him to acknowledge, at least implicitly, a third kind of being, a being that brings mind and body into substantial unity, viz., human being. Taking the union of mind-body as a primitive allows Descartes to ascribe distinctive and irreducible properties to it, says Cottingham. Desmond M. Clarke’s article seeks to qualify Grene’s negative assessment of Descartes’ accomplishments by showing that Descartes’ framework of dualism was an honest response to the failures of 17th century science (including his own) to explain human consciousness, a response that highlighted the limitations of science and that refused to present mere re-description of phenomena as a form of final explanation like his Aristotelian contemporaries were wont to do. Kathleen Blamey offers, in her piece, a Cartesian counter-point in Pascal, persuasively arguing that the four errors of Descartes that Grene identified in her *Knower and the Known*, viz., indubitability, self-evidence, unity of science, and dualism, are dealt with by Pascal in a manner that is in keeping with Grene’s own views on knowledge and the human person. Helen Hattab’s contribution questions Grene’s contextualist approach to the history of philosophy, suggesting that there is an unrelieved tension in Grene’s historicism and her attempt to derive normative import for current philosophizing from the philosophy of the past. Charles M. Sherover’s article on Grene’s presentation of Heidegger in *Dreadful Freedom* (1948) and *Heidegger* (1957) takes her to task on, among other things, pitching existentialism as fundamentally an atheistic philosophy, failing to adequately appreciate both how far apart philosophically Heidegger and Sartre are, and misunderstanding the reasons underlying Heidegger’s obscure language. The final essay is David Detmer’s. He applauds Grene for her fair-minded criticism of Sartre, which helped to establish Sartre’s reputation as a genuine philosopher in the Anglophone world—even while she had little sympathy for his views. However, Detmer challenges Grene to recognize the ethical possibilities that lie largely latent in Sartre’s writings.

Part Three, the final section of this book, contains a bibliography of Grene’s writings. All told (thus far): thirteen books, ten edited books, one hundred and thirty seven articles and reviews, and five translations!

This book is a wonderful example of the breadth and depth of Grene’s thought and its influences in the world of philosophy. Despite the fact that a few of the essays may have been better left out of the volume, this does not detract from the overall wealth of insight the volume brings to our understanding of Grene and the fertility of her philosophical meanderings.

I have largely passed over in silence Grene’s responses to these provocative essays. The pleasure of their spice, humor, vitriol, and deep wisdom must await your reading.

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Upcoming Changes in Polanyi Society
Electronic Discussion List

For several years, the Polanyi Society has sponsored an electronic discussion list. Like most electronic lists, discussion has waxed and waned. Sometimes there were introductory questions about Polanyi’s thought. The list served an important educational function. Sometimes the list was used to help someone track down some of Polanyi’s writings, some historical fact about Polanyi or his compatriots, or a term, concept, or quotation of interest. At other times, there were intricate questions of interpretation debated by those who have worked on Polanyi for many years. The first list was located at St. Bonaventure University and was moderated by John Apczynski. For the last few years, Struan Jacobs has moderated and his school, Deakin University, served as host. Thanks are due to both Apczynski and Jacobs for their service in sponsoring the Polanyi list. Recently, some technical problems have emerged that are going to require that the list be moved from the Deakin host computer. The Society is currently looking for a new moderator and a new host computer. Some possibilities have already come forth (and are being explored) but if you are willing to take on this role and have a server that can handle a moderated list, please send an e-mail to Marty Moleski (moleski@canisus.edu) and Phil Mullins (mullins@mwsc.edu).

At least for the short run, the Polanyi Society list will probably be moved to a Yahoo site. Some members of the list at Deakin were notified and have already signed up for the Polanyi list at the Yahoo address. Given our current technical difficulties, it seems likely that many people formerly on the discussion list have not been notified about the move. If you were on the former list at Deakin, you may soon receive an individual e-mail invitation to join (or have your name added) to the new list at Yahoo. If you are interested in joining, whether or not you were on the former list, you can send requests to Mullins and Moleski.

Polanyi Society Summer Program Survey

Polanyi Society member Dale Cannon has been working in the past year to see if the Society can put together some sort of summer Polanyi program. In the past, the Society has sponsored some small conferences and working group meetings in the summer. Cannon constructed a survey to try to solicit information about the level and kinds of interest that Society members (or others) might have in a summer event. The article above describes technical difficulties that disrupted the operation of the Polanyi Society discussion list. Unfortunately, these problems commenced at about the time the survey about summer program options was e-mailed to subscribers of the Polanyi list. There were a few people who received the survey and responded. But it seems likely that many did not receive the survey. Whether you subscribe to the Polanyi electronic discussion list or not, the survey may be of interest. Below are described the ways you can get a copy of the survey.

You can download the survey in pdf format by going to the Polanyi Society web site (http://www.mwsc.edu/orgs/polanyi/). Simply scroll down until you see the link for Summer Polanyi Program Survey. After completing the survey, mail it back to Dale Cannon, Philosophy and Religious Studies, Western Oregon University, Monmouth, OR 97361 USA. You can fax the survey to Cannon at 503-838-8056. If you prefer to write Cannon e-mail (cannodw@wou.edu), he can send you the survey as an attachment that you can complete and return by e-mail. When the Polanyi Society discussion list is again operating, the survey may be circulated there for a second time.
WWW Polanyi Resources

The Polanyi Society has a World Wide Web site at http://www.mwsc.edu/orgs/polanyi/. In addition to information about Polanyi Society membership and meetings, the site contains the following: (1) the history of Polanyi Society publications, including a listing of issues by date and volume with a table of contents for recent issues of *Tradition and Discovery*; (2) a comprehensive listing of *Tradition and Discovery* authors, reviews and reviewers; (3) information on locating early publications; (4) information on *Appraisal* and *Polanyiana*, two sister journals with special interest in Polanyi's thought; (5) the “Guide to the Papers of Michael Polanyi” which provides an orientation to archival material housed in the Department of Special Collections of the University of Chicago Library; (6) photographs of Polanyi; (7) five essays by Polanyi.