Reviews


Viewing art intelligently is a skilled performance that can be improved by coaching and by practice. Criticizing art is an art form in itself. Although the art that can be put into words is not the real art, and despite the fact that art always means more than we can say, the artist’s performance in creating the work is incomplete until it is matched by a sympathetic act of understanding on the part of viewers. These two books are eye-opening. Adams, an art historian and theologian long interested in Polanyi, shows how to look for the clues that unlock the deeper meanings in the visual arts that escape the untrained eye.

Adams’ primary concern in both works is to show how to link the visual arts with theological reflection: If our worship, preaching, and teaching remain largely verbal, they may as well be spoken in Latin for they will not be remembered by the majority of the population whose language is now the visual arts. If we communicate with the visual arts, then the Word will be remembered. In the words of Roethke, “Give us eyes that hear and ears that see.” (*ESW*, 107)

The open eye will “perceive not only connections but also transcendent relations which lead us to center beyond ourselves and to sense not only our time and our place but also other generations and the earth beyond our place and our time” (*THBA*, 148). Awareness of complexity and ambiguity in interpreting art should “aid us in learning to love our enemies and to live with diversity in community” (*ESW*, 1).

*Transcendence with the Human Body in Art* meditates on the sculpture of George Segal and Stephen De Staebler, the paintings and constructions of Jasper Johns, and the land/process art of Christo. Segal uses the human body directly (13-14); De Staebler presents it in fragments (51); Johns and Christo draw attention to the embodied condition of the viewer or participant in the work of art (97-8, 140). Black and white photographs are very well integrated into the text so that the reader need turn only a page or two to see what Adams is talking about.

Adams finds three kinds of transcendence expressed by these artists. In Segal’s work, he points to “the possibilities for ambiguity of interpretation and transcendence of any one viewpoint” (14). The more we indwell the work, the more we can break out of initial interpretations and find other meaningful patterns revealed. In De Staebler, transcendence means “a sense of the other beyond oneself” (45). In Johns and Christo, awareness of one’s own finitude opens the viewer to greater realities:

The shared vision of Johns, Polanyi, and Wittgenstein rejects both the “cult of objectivity,” which pretends that one may know things as they are in themselves, and the “cult of subjectivity,” which maintains that one may only know what one projects. They mutually affirm that what is real and what can be known are functions of one’s connections and interactions with the social and physical worlds in which one finds oneself. One lives on the boundary between subjectivity and objectivity.
One knows one’s view is limited and influenced by one’s own makeup. Yet one’s very awareness of these limitations constitutes a transcendence of them. (117)

From a theological point of view, Adams suggests that “realizing oneself to be a finite creature with limited capabilities is a corollary of acknowledging God to be Creator, and Christ to be Judge and Redeemer” (126).

_Eyes to See Wholeness_ is addressed to teachers who would like to incorporate the visual arts into catechesis or theological reflection. Each of the thirty-seven chapters concludes with “Teaching Tips.” It would not serve well as a textbook because Adams discloses the expected outcome of the various classroom exercises. Exposing students to these expectations would stunt the process of personal indwelling that leads to one’s own discoveries of new meanings in a work of art.

The book is very loosely organized around the key elements of the liturgical year: the first section is “Lent through Easter and Pentecost,” the second, “Ordinary Time,” and the third, “Advent through Epiphany.” Teachers will have to make judicious selections and rearrangements of Adams’ material if they want to prepare lesson plans for the four Sundays of Advent or for the forty days of Lent. Adams follows a thematic plan rather than a liturgical scheme, so that, for example, he treats of “Dancing Christmas Carols with Angels Worshipping God” (chapter 25) and “Nativity Affirms Diversity” (chapter 27) before meditating on “Expectant Madonna” (chapter 29). The same Advent section also contains essays on “Baptizing with Christ” (chapter 32), “Seeing Developmental Stages in Cole’s ‘Voyage of Life’” (chapter 33) and “Embracing the Prodigal in Each of Us” (chapter 35). Although there may be good theological reasons for associating this material with the celebration of the past and future Advent of the Christ, the symbolic and visual elements are pretty far removed from the conventional symbols of Advent and Christmas.

In this book, the illustrations are grouped together, which allows the use of a paper better suited to photographic reproductions but which also requires much more fumbling around to find the desired illustration while reading Adams’ essays. This slight disadvantage is offset by the generally high quality of the reproductions.

_Eyes to See Wholeness_ lacks the unity and coherence of _Transcendence with the Human Body in Art_. The thirty-seven essays in it are self-contained and almost completely isolated from each other, except for a very few cross-references and some material that is repeated almost verbatim in two or more locations. This perhaps makes it better suited to browsing or reading as needed in preparation for a class on a particular subject; very little, if anything, would be lost by taking up the various essays in an order dictated by the reader’s own taste and concerns.

Adams shows how an imagination awakened by the visual arts can enrich the biblical tradition. One of his students was assigned to visualize himself as one of the ten lepers healed by Jesus. After the exercise, he reported to the class:

As Jesus told me to do, I first went to show myself to the priests at the temple. Then I came back to thank Jesus but he was gone. In looking for Jesus, I finally ran into Peter and asked, “Where is Jesus?” Peter responded, “I don’t know any Jesus.” (ESW, 48)

This student’s response shows that spiritual realities, like any other realities, continue to reveal themselves in surprising and unexpected ways.

Although Adams is very good at revealing multiple layers of meaning in works of art, he tends to write at times as if there were only one religion and one theology. In his view, “orthodox Christian theology is characterized by the via negativa, the negative way, so as to avoid detailing beliefs which too often lead to a static certainty rather than a dynamic faith open to the movement of the Spirit” (ESW, 98). For Thomists and other schools within Roman Catholicism, the via negativa stands in a dialectical relationship with the via positiva. For some orthodox Christians, creeds are not the antithesis of mysticism, but
seeds of contemplation.

Adams also seems very uncomfortable with “a glorified image of Christ” (ESW, 15; THBA, 58-62), with people who have become “perfect in their faith” (ESW, 47), and with the idealization of human beauty in classical sculpture (ESW, 85; THBA, 51). The unstated principle seems to be that the existence of a perfect human being would bring condemnation rather than hope for salvation to those of us who are imperfect, broken and sinful. While our culture may need fresh reminders of our solidarity with all suffering human beings, as provided by De Staebler’s statuary, I think Christians also need to retain images of Jesus risen from the dead, ascended into Heaven, and reigning in glory, for these images tell us something not just about him, but about ourselves, too: “we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is” (1 Jn 3:2).

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Scott, a friend of Polanyi, presents a rare, engaging and lucid introduction to Polanyi’s thought that is now back in print, thanks to Eerdmons. Scott’s goal is “to introduce some of [Polanyi’s] main ideas as simply as possible so as to show their value and meaning in today’s world” (viii). She does this effectively and creatively by loosely structuring the bulk of the book around the medieval play, Everyman. This play provides Scott with an opportunity to explore the relationship between knowledge, good deeds, wit, beauty, fellowship and other personal qualities, and in so doing, to investigate Polanyi’s contributions to the subject. For example, five wits provides the entry into a discussion of tacit knowing. Beauty connects with Polanyi’s understanding of the process of discovery and Fellowship allows Scott to expound on the role of society/conviviality in Polanyi’s thought. Discretion leads into a discussion of Polanyi’s resolution to the mind-body problem. The picture that emerges from Scott’s discussion is that all forms of human knowing, as understood by Polanyi, are united with and dependent upon with these traits. Or, to put it in Scott’s words, “He has shown how our faith, imagination and personal judgment, so long paralyzed by the poison of skeptical doubt, in fact run right through all our knowledge” (197).

Introductory and concluding chapters frame this central section of the book. The first chapter provides some basic biographical information on Polanyi and identifies the question which occupied and drove his own investigations. Scott asks the question thusly: “How can it be that...in the most modern, democratic and humane societies, young men and women devote themselves to fanatical, cold-blooded brutality, with total contempt for human life and society?”(1). Polanyi locates the answer to the question in the cold-blooded ideal of scientific knowledge generated by modernity which seems to leave us with no choice other than radical skepticism. In the final chapter of the book, Scott examines Polanyi’s sometimes cryptic discussions of religion and suggests how his insights might play out today. In particular, she identifies several suggestive ways in which Polanyi’s epistemology illuminates the Gospels (195-197).

Overall, Scott does an excellent job of drawing out and explicating the main themes from Polanyi’s corpus, adding to them many wonderful examples drawn from everyday life or her own experiences. The witty, informal style with which Scott writes will help make Polanyi’s work come alive to newcomers and brings clarity to many major philosophical discussions. The drawback to that style, however, is that she can oversimplify debates and caricature positions. While the style will not satisfy the most rigorous scholars, it serves well Scott’s own purposes. What disappoints most about the book is that it neither raises many
critical questions about Polanyi’s thought, nor situates it in later developments known as post-modernism. Still, the book should be required reading for introducing people to Polanyi; it also serves as a useful and appreciative secondary source for those more knowledgeable about him.

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Dr. Moss, a therapist affiliated with the former UK Polanyi group Convivium, died in the Spring of 1995, almost immediately after his book came out. This was not Moss’ first book (readers may be especially interested in *Seeing Man Whole: A New Model for Psychology* [reviewed by Joan Crewdson in TAD 17:1 & 2: 51-54] and *Growing Into Freedom: A Way to Make Sense of Ourselves*), but it was the first to make extensive use of Polanyi’s thought. I was corresponding with Moss just prior to his death and I know that he was quite interested in seeking reactions to his book from those who know Polanyi’s thought well. I have found myself reading, thinking about, and re-reading Moss’ book over the last year. On the whole, *The Grammar of Consciousness* is a deeply interesting, creative effort, but it is also an extraordinarily frustrating book. It tries to do far too much in a meager 150 pages. It is a very dense read; there are loose ends everywhere, yet Moss’s constructive thought is very intriguing. I hope that others will study this book; any who do will regret that Ted Moss shall develop no further some of the themes he begins to articulate here.

My comments below focus primarily on the constructive rather than the critical framework of Moss’s ideas. I acknowledge that I give only the briefest attention to some of the chapters I found obscure.

Moss was convinced that Polanyi’s outline of tacit knowing was a fundamentally sound account of central elements of human experience; Moss sought, in this book, to develop what he termed “a much more precise and elaborated account of the psychological and grammatical processes of consciousness than Polanyi himself ever offered” (12-13). Put in another way, Moss believed Polanyi did not thoroughly analyze the process through which the particulars of consciousness are integrated into a comprehensive entity. He believed he could complement Polanyi’s overly cognitive orientation by developing a theoretical model elaborating how personality bears on personal knowing, thus showing how “living beings establish their purposes, take their decisions and so act out the continual process of adaptation to the exigencies of life in the world” (13).

Moss argues that consciousness has a basic structure (or grammar) which language reflects and it is through this structure that human experience takes on its particular character. In the early chapters of his book, Moss sketches out this structure or grammar; he offers an extraordinarily complex but highly condensed account of the nature of mind and consciousness, an account which is folded into the theory of tacit knowing. The next three chapters turn to a comparison with the models of two other figures, Daniel Dennett, a philosopher using the digital computer to talk about mind, and Gerald Edelman, a neuroscientist who Moss finds less reductionistic. The final two chapters shift to a discussion of realism, especially as Rom Harre and John Puddefoot have framed the issues. Moss’ own realism emphasizes the “importance in all knowing of personal experience in the present moment.” (ix).

Here I can provide only a crude outline of the richly suggestive model of mind that Moss elaborates in his early chapters. Moss holds it is important to refine and extend Polanyi’s ideas about focal wholes or meaning; especially he thinks more needs to be said about the way the mind works in classification. Meaning, according to Moss, is a form or idea; he recognizes this is a philosophical giant step that Polanyi hesitated to make, and for good reasons, but Moss believes it possible to elaborate a theory of forms that appropriately clarifies the nature of
human experience. Moss distinguishes conceptual and perceptual forms; conceptual forms divide possibilities into two groups, instances and non-instances of a class, while the distinctive character of a perceptual form is “that it is a single, undivided value in a single undivided space, but a value which somehow unites other values that can be separately identified in each of the dimensions of the space...” (16). A form is, although we may not be aware of it, composed of subsidiary forms which Moss suggests build up the primary form as a whole. In fact, some elements of Moss’s expansion of Polanyi seem rather close to ideas about comprehensive entities which are developed in The Tacit Dimension, a Polanyian source which Moss did not make use of. In part, what Moss seemed concerned to develop is something like a Polanyian metaphysical scheme.

Moss contends that both perceptual and conceptual forms are always linked to a context. Perceptual forms are situated in some type of space-time framework, but conceptual forms have a context that is “metaphorical, quasi-topological, and entirely non-perceptual, so that within it any particular form can express a range of potentiality rather than a clear-cut actuality” (17).

Moss argues that conceptual thought arises because the mind has tacit, spontaneous powers to generalize and to recognize similarity. Powers to recognize similarity allow us to work out logical relationships among ideas apart from spatio-temporal relationships. We use words and symbols to label, remember, retrieve, exchange and remodel our generalizations; this is what Polanyi’s discussion of articulation points out.

Perception, according to Moss, is always inextricably bound up with conception or thinking, and thus conscious experience is a process in which the “space of perception is projected upon the quasi-topological space of thought” (18): “My argument is that in true perception, where consciousness is involved, an ad hoc range of possibility established by a conceptual form is resolved into actuality by the perceptual forms, qualities and intensities which are projected upon it and so resolve its ambiguity” (18).

According to this model, we always anticipate the future and it comes towards us as a range of potentiality which is constantly revised into actuality and passes ultimately into history. Conceptual matrices are ready and waiting for interpretation of perceptual experiences, but these schemata are themselves modified by ongoing perceptual experience. Certainly, there is something like this at least implicit in Polanyi’s scheme and Moss’s discussion interestingly and artfully fleshes it out. But one might ask were there not good reasons that Polanyi avoided a framework so strictly focused around a perception/conception duality?

Moss thinks that Polanyi’s work did not say enough about what might be dubbed the internal dynamics of making meaning. He proposes a distinction between the “stored idea complex” which is embedded in the “mind-manifold” and the “evoked idea” which comes forth in present consciousness (22). Memory is highly organized and ideas are evoked from stored idea complexes by a process in which “forms recognized in the immediate Here Now resonate with similar forms across the manifold” (23). There is a complex process of selection and ordering of that which is evoked in resonance across the mind manifold. This process is tacit integration and its orderly operation constitutes the “grammar of consciousness” (24) or the rules structuring consciousness. What Moss suggests is that consciousness is of things or ideas in relation. There are spatio-temporal relation and logical relation but there is also another class of relationship which he discusses as “grammatical.” Grammatical relationships “are those which we superimpose on the other relationships in the process of selecting and ordering...” as well as “certain roles which help to determine how they are to be fitted together syntactically” (26). Although Moss’ notion of a “grammar of consciousness” and “grammatical relationships” seems a bit odd at first, it is clear that he is attempting to work out a way in which to discuss how meaning is always engaged or existential in the sense that it concerns a historical person’s application of information to particular purposes.
Moss contends that consciousness is a stream but it seems to flow in units or steps: “... after we have taken in a brief span of conscious experience in one transition (or ‘predication’ as I will call it) our position has to be shifted down the wall to the next Now for the next predication. This I call the walking motion of consciousness” (27). A “predication” is a “unit of understanding” (41) and we can build up forms in a process of generalization by combining successive predications. What Moss is preoccupied with working out in some detail here is what in Polanyi simply is noted as the fact that we are creatures of attention who discover meaning. We can attend to this or to that but we do so in succession and we do so in ways that generate progressively more encompassing coherence. Moss’ theory refines this view to suggest that consciousness builds up forms (which are always deeply colored by emotional qualities and intensities), and moves from one form to another:

All consciousness involves a process of selection and focussing both from the immensely rich input of our sense receptors and from the unceasing resonance of conceptual forms evoked as associations from the memory structures of the mind-manifold. This occurs in such a way that transitory predicative systems of relationships are created, in which subject complexes are linked over a step of time to predicate complexes, building up forms-as-a-whole; and these are recognized one by one at the focus of consciousness before sliding into the past as new predications follow them (36).

Moss not only discusses the grammatical process (i.e., integration) but also the purposive nature of thinking. Polanyi describes the purposive tension in animals as they try to develop self control as akin to human problem solving; Moss translates this more generally into what he terms the “purposive cycle”: “... all consciousness involves predication, and every predication forms part of a purposive cycle”(44). There are five stages to this cycle: exploring/orientation, model building, decision, actualization and readjustment. Every predication fits into one of these stages and the mind always has many purposive cycles in play and we switch among such cycles. Humans are, for Moss, purposive creatures and forms which we grasp always fit into some purposive scheme; meaning is contextual.

Moss discusses four types or categories of meaning: there are not only forms, but also qualities, intensities and relationship. While these latter three types of meaning can become explicit ideas, they operate primarily at the tacit level and color the process of integration as indeterminate particulars. Certainly this discussion of meaning is one of the more intricate and interesting aspects of Moss’ complicated speculative model which attempts “to suggest a broad psychological underpinning for Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing.” (53). He outlines the way in which he believes qualities, intensities and relationships are generalized and mapped in terms of what he terms “paradigm images” (51):

We have a few basic paradigms for emotion, reflected in a few basic and vaguely defined words like anger, sadness, fear, envy, anxiety or joy. But the words and the vague images of emotion which accompany them are essentially means of establishing broad classifications, broad ranges of possibility, within which subtle particularities of quality and gradations of intensity can be located and identified. In other words their function is to enable us to focus down within the very wide area of sensibility represented by the category of emotion (as also the various categories of the senses), in such a way that we proceed to locate subcategories, and then ad hoc registers, on which actual instances of experience can be projected and assimilated (52).

Moss points out that some types of human endeavor aim to produce meaning in as fully a formalized and quantifiable a fashion as possible (science) while other types of human endeavor aim at producing meaning richly imbued by qualities, intensities and relationships: “Indeed the value of the communications of art, concerned as they are with resonances as much as with forms, does not seem to depend on producing the same effect on each recipient; great art has a certain inexhaustibility, a value
which is renewed in a different fashion in every generation
and in every person who is able to receive its communica-
tion creatively” (49). Although Moss doesn’t say so, his
discussion of meaning at some points resembles the
discussion of the two basic types of integrations, those
in art, myth, and religion and those of science, in *Meaning*.

As noted above, the last half of Moss’ book
turns from the elaboration of his speculative model ex-
panding Polanyi’s ideas about tacit integration to com-
parisons between his model and ideas of Daniel Dennett
and Gerald Edelman. Dennett is a materialist and a reduc-
tionist who offers a computer based model of mind in
*Consciousness Explained*. Moss’ account of Dennett is
difficult to follow, but it is clear that his major critique of
Dennett concerns Dennett’s failure to grasp Polanyi’s
ideas about levels of control. Moss does find Dennett
almost promising at some points however. He elaborates
his own interesting theory of the self in relation to Dennett’s
ideas about narrative:

> If all our decisions were taken independently, great
> confusions could follow, so the mind builds to-
> gether all of its plans which could still constrain
> future decisions into a more or less coherent struc-
> ture—an idea complex within the greater idea com-
> plex of the self—which I call the ‘anticipating self.
> This is a sort of bundle of stories fraying out into
> the future, but a bundle which is ordered in the
> sense that broadly the shorter term stories are
> fitted within the existing longer term stories (and
> excluded if they do not fit), and similarly the more
> particularized stories are fitted within the more
> generalized. The function of this structure, is to
> ensure that whenever a decision comes to be made,
> the temporary responding self of the occasion
> takes account of past decisions that may affect
> it(73).

Moss finds much more congenial than Dennett
the ideas about mind of Gerald Edelman, a biologist,
neuroscientist and Nobel laureate. He offers a highly
condensed explication of and dialog with the views Edelman
articulated in *Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of
Mind*. Edelman is not a reductionist and he develops a
“bottom up” theory of brain function which Moss finds
largely complements his own model; he sharply contrasts
the Edelman and Dennett approaches:

> Perhaps the crucial difference between Edelman’s
> approach and Dennett’s is that Edelman uses the
> analogy of the selectional mechanism of the im-
> mune system as the basic for his description of the
> operation of the brain, whereas Dennett uses the
> rule-following mechanism of the digital computer
> (89).

The final two chapters of Moss’ book are a dis-
appointment because they are really the most cryptic of his
discussions and they draw into their net a bewildering
array of thinkers. Only his occasional comments about his
own model are truly illuminating:

> My argument has been that all knowing takes place
> through the predicative steps of consciousness, it
> is a recognition of wholes built up through a
> process of tacit integration. The unit of conscious-
> ness is the whole predication. . . .
> The corollary of this argument is that our contact
> with reality can only be through the irremediable
> complexity of the predicative process. What this
> process subserves is the realization of a compre-
> hensive entity which is ultimately unspecifiable, to
> use Polanyi’s word” (124).

Moss’ conclusions about consciousness lead
him to a painfully abbreviated set of discussions about
reality and realism. He contends John Puddefoot’s discus-
sions of “resonance realism” (*TAD* 20:3: 29-39)are a prom-
ising way to approach questions about reality. But Moss
offers so little about Puddefoot’s thinking that it is hardly
clear what he finds promising. There follows a discussion
of Rom Harre’s ideas about “referential realism;” Moss
sees Harre as drawing on and updating Polanyi, but it is
far from clear how this is the case. He includes also
comments on George Steiner and Thomas Torrance and a
critique of deconstruction. Clearly, Moss wants to raise
the banner of realism against what he takes to be the
relativism of postmodernism, but he is far too ready to
make all of these players congenial bedfellows. Not all realists, even Polanyian realists, are the same. In sum, Moss’s book ends on obscure notes and, sadly, he will not be able to illumine these enigmatic hints. Nevertheless, his book is certainly worth serious consideration; the speculative model of mind which he sketches in the opening four chapters is clearly a rich and imaginative edifice constructed on a Polanyian foundation.

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If one is interested in studying the social milieu out of which the young Michael Polanyi’s social and philosophical thought began to grow, *Exile and Social Thought* is highly recommended as a source. Lee Congdon focuses his attention on Hungarians who went into exile after Admiral Horthy’s repressive counterrevolutionary government came into power in 1919. He refers to an impressively broad array of Hungarian, German, and English language sources in his exposition; this is a rich feast of a book.

After providing an introductory chapter highlighting events transpiring in Hungary during World War I, Congdon organizes his study of these intellectuals into three parts, corresponding to three basic intellectual groupings which emerged during this period: the communists, the avant-garde, and the liberals. Two individuals are featured as the key representatives of each of these traditions, but the ideas of a multitude of others are woven into the text. Georg Lukacs and Bela Balazs are taken by Congdon as emblematic figures among the communists, Lajos Kassak and Laszlo Moholy-Nagy are the primary avant-gardists, and Aurel Kolnai and Karl Mannheim are the liberals examined in most detail.

Michael Polanyi himself is a marginal character in this historical account. After all, during the period under consideration he was a scientist with a medical background, not primarily a social thinker. But he did participate in the Galileo Circle and, to a much lesser degree, in the Sunday Circle organized by Lukacs. Active in these groups were such influential luminaries as the Marxist philosopher Lukacs, the art historian Arnold Hauser, the composer Bela Bartok, the psychologist Rene Spitz, the economist Karl Polanyi, and the sociologist Mannheim. Although Karl Polanyi is not one of the two figures featured in the chapters on liberalism, his thought is accorded almost as much attention as that of Kolnai, and on occasion Michael Polanyi’s correspondence with him is cited.

Even though not explicitly dealt with very much, Michael Polanyi certainly shares in the sort of background and experience characteristic of the exiles studied in most detail. They are all examples of the “free-floating, unattached intellectual” Mannheim speaks of in his widely cited *Ideology and Utopia*. Most of these exiles were Jewish in origin, but secular Jews well assimilated into Hungarian society in the second half of the 19th century. Nevertheless, their perspective was more cosmopolitan than that of the typical Hungarian; they were particularly attuned to German cultural developments. The parents of the exiles tended to be patriotic economic liberals deeply embedded in the capitalistic and cultural expansion of the time. Jews from Poland, the Ukraine, and Russia were attracted to Budapest because of the healthy, growing Jewish community there. By 1910, almost a quarter of the city’s population was Jewish in origin (hence leading to the derisive term “Judapest” among Austrian anti-Semites).

Congdon shows how Budapest’s development led to an ominous backlash in Hungarian society as a whole.

This rapid growth produced an urban culture at odds with that rooted in the nobility’s country life. It centered in editorial offices and coffeehouses, and framed a liberalism tinged with socialism that chal-
lenged the official version. . . .The young Jews in the forefront of the new culture did not hesitate to break with their fathers’ social and political conformism. . . .As the new century opened, however, growing numbers of non-Jewish Magyars, bursting with Millenial pride, came to regard any publicly-voiced dissent from official optimism as “un-Magyar.” Patriotism rapidly degenerated into nationalism and stirred the flickering embers of anti-Semitism. (p. xii)

World War I was a disaster for Hungary. Not only were many Hungarians killed, but the alliance with Austria which afforded a small country like Hungary a place among world powers came to an end, and much Hungarian territory was lost as a result of the Trianon treaty at the war’s end. After successive governments led by Karolyi (democratic) and Kun (Communist) failed to protect Hungarian interests at the end of the war, it was no longer safe for avant-garde or especially communist sympathizers to remain in Hungary once Regent Horthy assumed control with a “Christian” and “National” government. Therefore, many of the intellectuals fled Hungary, and, as it became clear that new Hungary was not a friendly place for free intellectual speculation, others joined them. Michael and Karl Polanyi were among the exiles, even though their deepest sympathies were with the less threatened liberal tradition (for a fuller exploration of this theme, see Congdon’s “The Origins of Polanyi’s Neo-Liberalism” in Polanyiana, 1-2 [1992], 99ff.).

Given their status as exiles, it is not surprising that a recurrent theme among these intellectuals was alienation and the search for authentic community. Not that it took the war and exile to highlight these themes, which, after all, were major concerns of the young Marx. The Sunday Circle talked incessantly about alienation and isolation before the war. Mary Gluck writes that “alienation did indeed constitute the central dilemma of their lives” (Georg Lukacs and His Generation, 1900-1918, p. 21 — this 1985 book nicely complements the work under review).

As an aside which illustrates the interconnectedness of these thinkers, the person who first gave Lukacs a glimpse of what it may mean to overcome alienation is Irma Seidler, a cousin of Karl and Michael Polanyi. Lukacs met her in 1907 at one of Cecile Mama’s literary soirees. A deep relationship soon unfolded, capped by a joint holiday in Italy in 1908. Then Irma broke off the relationship, and for a while Lukacs contemplated suicide. But in an essay on Kierkegaard in his Soul and Forms (1910), Lukacs suggests a parallel between his relationship with Irma and SK’s relationship to Regine. He came to see his writing career as his true marriage (and hence his personal means of overcoming alienation), and he convinced himself he had to reject her. “The ultimate fear behind Lukacs’ rejection of Irma was that conventional happiness, the emotional fulfillment of normal, everyday existence, would jeopardize his creativity” (Gluck, p. 125). Still, Irma’s suicide in 1911 after a brief unhappy marriage and a briefer fling with Balazs hit Lukacs hard and confirmed in his thought the problematic nature of human relations in capitalistic society. Seven years later he became a leading communist intellectual.

After the war, Karl Polanyi and Karl Mannheim each continued to develop theories of social organization which might overcome alienation, and these two thinkers were the closest to Michael Polanyi of the major exiles discussed by Congdon. The brothers Polanyi corresponded extensively on social themes, and in England Polanyi worked closely with Mannheim, who indeed introduced him to the Moot. Michael Polanyi in Science, Faith, and Society, The Logic of Liberty, and the chapter on conviviality in PK shows the influence of ideas developed in the liberal tradition by exiles (including himself) before and after the rise of Hitler to power. But perhaps the ultimate source of Polanyi’s consistent emphasis on the role of morality and self-set standards in society is to be sought beyond any intellectual tradition. Congdon claims that Karl Polanyi learned the meaning of responsibility from his father (see p. 219), and it may be that Michael’s moral emphases are ultimately attributable to the same parental source. In any case, Michael Polanyi follows his brother and Mannheim in arguing for the gradual amelioration of society rather than for any form of revolution.
“Unjust privileges prevailing in a free society,” he writes, “can be reduced only by carefully graded stages; those who would demolish them overnight [e.g. Lukacs] would erect greater injustices in their place” (PK, p. 245).

I am not sufficiently versed in the exiles’ thought world to render any reliable judgment concerning the insightfulness of Congdon’s analysis and interpretation. I can only say that I find the book to be fascinating reading, a voyage of discovery. Congdon concentrates on the thought of his subjects, so there is an abstract quality to the narrative. The initial chapter dealing with historical and intellectual events related to Hungary during World War I is particularly dense with unfamiliar names. But Congdon is to be congratulated on his mastery of the details of such a complicated world. Polanyian scholars can learn much from Exile and Social Thought.

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Notes on Contributors

Paul Lewis is an independent scholar living in High Point, NC, currently serving as an adjunct professor at nearby Elon College. A graduate of Duke University, he taught previously at St. Olaf College in Northfield, MN and The College of Wooster in Wooster, OH, both as a Visiting Assistant Professor. He has published several articles and book reviews.

Aaron Milavec is an independent scholar living in Cincinnati, Ohio. He formerly taught at The Athenaeum of Ohio. Among other publications, Milavec has written Exploring Scriptural Sources and has put together the innovative Christian education hypertext Soul Journals for Inquiring Adults. Both were reviewed in TAD 21:3. More recently, Milavec’s software Scripture Sleuth: Rediscovering the Early Church has been published by Liguori Faithware.
Electronic Discussion Group

The Polanyi Society supports an electronic discussion group exploring implications of the thought of Michael Polanyi. For those with access to the INTERNET, send a message to “owner-polanyi@sbu.edu” to join the list or to request further information. Communications about the electronic discussion group may also be directed to John V. Apczynski, Department of Theology, St. Bonaventure University, St. Bonaventure, NY 14778-0012 PHONE: (716) 375-2298 FAX: (716) 375-2389.

Polanyi Society Membership

*Tradition and Discovery* is distributed to members of the Polanyi Society. This periodical supercedes a newsletter and earlier mini-journal published (with some gaps) by the Polanyi Society since the mid seventies. The Polanyi Society has members in thirteen different countries though most live in North America and the United Kingdom. The Society includes those formerly affiliated with the Polanyi group centered in the United Kingdom which published *Convivium: The United Kingdom Review of Post-critical Thought*. There are normally two or three issues of *TAD* each year.

The regular annual membership rate for the Polanyi Society is $20; the student rate is $12. The membership cycle follows the academic year; subscriptions are due September 1 to Phil Mullins, Humanities, Missouri Western State College, St. Joseph, MO 64507,. Please make checks payable to the Polanyi Society. Dues can be paid by credit card by providing the following information: subscriber's name as it appears on the card, the card name, and the card number and expiration date. Changes of address and inquiries should be mailed, faxed or e-mailed to Mullins (e-mail: mullins@griffon.mwsc.edu; fax: USA 816-271-5987).

New members must provide the following subscription information: complete mailing address, telephone (work and home), institutional relationship, and e-mail address and/or fax number (if available). Institutional members should identify a department to contact for billing.

The Polanyi Society attempts to maintain a data base identifying persons interested in or working with Polanyi's philosophical writing. New members can contribute to this effort by writing a short description of their particular interests in Polanyi's work and any publications and/or theses/dissertations related to Polanyi's thought. Please provide complete bibliographic information. Those renewing membership are invited to include information on recent work.