
Revelation lies at the heart of Christian life and faith. This statement, in itself, is hardly the occasion for controversy. But the ongoing attempts of the Church to appropriate for itself (in the variety of cultural contexts in which it finds itself) renewed understandings of revelation is a task worthy of serious and sustained reflection. In *Processive Revelation*, Benjamin Reist seeks to reinterpret this foundational doctrine. Rather than understand revelation as God’s self-disclosure, first to Israel and then to the Church in Jesus (a disclosure unique and in some sense “finished”), Reist proposes a model that understands revelation as “the moving presence of the Ultimate One’s own becoming” (15). Thus, not only is the past opened, but the future as well: “the future is not yet decided for the living God, as well as for us” (43).

To develop his position, Reist relies not only on process thought but also on liberation and feminist theologies as well as insights from postmodern science. “Contextual theology,” Reist’s own description of his work, needs to be rooted in the present “agenda of reflection” which includes not only the struggles against oppression (racism, sexism, classism, etc.) but also the recent developments in modern science.

Most of *Processive Revelation* is given over to a discussion of three “ revelatory vectors” of God, meant to coincide loosely with the Trinity: “The Relating God” (Spirit), “The Liberating God” (Son) and “The Creating God” (Father). In the most interesting chapter of the book, Reist discusses the relating activity of God in light of Calvin’s and Barth’s doctrines of election. He draws particular attention to Barth’s emphasis that in “Jesus

Christ God relates to all humanity, not the good, not the elect, but humanity as whole....Fallen humanity is confronted from the beginning in Jesus Christ as electing God and elected humanity” (82). Intrinsic to the relating God is that all humanity is included in the relationship.

When Reist turns to the “Liberating God,” he relies most heavily on liberation theologians: Letty Russell, Juan Luis Segundo and James Cone among others. Yet at the same time he wishes to wed liberation theology with process thought; “orthopraxis” and liberating thinking need to acknowledge the open-ended reflection and relational thinking of process thought. An understanding of God in terms of “contextual creativity” (Delwin Brown) can add a new dimension to the liberation struggles.

Reist uses his discussion of “The Creating God” as an opportunity to explore the relationship between theology and the natural sciences, a relationship liberation theologians have ignored, but which Reist believes essential for contextual theology. It is in this final chapter that Reist relies most heavily on the thought of Michael Polanyi, who he describes as an example (along with Paul Ricoeur) of “heuristic theological reflection in action.” Reist uses the term heuristic theology to point to the cumulative, irreversible and communal character of genuine insights. As this is rooted in the tacit dimension, Reist endorses what he refers to as one of Polanyi’s deepest insights:

The admonition to look at the unknown really means that we should look at the known data, but not in themselves, rather as clues to the unknown; as pointers to it and parts of it. We should strive persistently to feel our way towards an understanding of the manner in which these known particulars hang
together, both mutually and with the unknown. (160)

According to Reist such heuristical reflection is central for processive revelation: “revelation ...is never capable of reaching completion because God is always on the move, always having more to say...” (50).

Reist’s willingness to cross traditional disciplinary boundaries of theology, philosophy and science is refreshing, as is his emphasis on creativity and dynamism. Unfortunately, however, Reist’s own creativity leaves him at points awash in a sea of theological problems which are left unacknowledged and thus unresolved. Chief of these is that the revelation of God in Jesus Christ is so creatively redefined that traditional Christological claims disappear. Although Reist states that “Chalcedon means nothing if it is not continually reinterpreted” (133), he also calls into question the “vigorou contention that the transcending God has actually come into our midst in Jesus the Christ.” Reist adds, “Though this is good news indeed, it begins to have the ring of a cryptic deism” (154). This seems to me not a reinterpretation of Chalcedon but a rejection. Such an approach causes Reist at times to slip into vague generalizations—for instance, “the witness of the resurrection is that whereas the risks of real crosses attend the only liberation we may know, these risks are not final, for they speak of ultimacy’s ultimate resolution” (134).

While much is to be said for Reist’s attempt to develop a heuristic, “Polanyian” theology, I wonder if he has fully assimilated his own Polanyian insights, especially the communal character of theology. I say this because of his failure, as suggested above, to do justice to the sweep of Christian tradition, his stated intentions to the contrary. Thus Reist ends his book embracing the notion that God as mother bodies forth the world and that creation is therefore God’s body (Sallie McFague). Reist applauds this approach since it expresses the fact that the universe and God are not totally different. But surely the wider Christian tradition has wanted to maintain the distinctness of God from everything else as well as to distinguish itself from pantheism. Reist avoids addressing the more genuine difficulties his processive revelation entails.

Despite these failures, *Processive Revelation* is worth reading for its introduction to a wide variety of thinkers (Calvin, Troeltsch, Teilhard de Chardin, Birch, Peacocke, Ricoeur and others). It is also a thoughtful example of one person’s attempt to incorporate the wisdom of theology with the epistemological turns of modern science, an effort which challenges us all.

Elizabeth Newman
Dept. of Religious Studies
St. Mary’s College
Notre Dame, IN 46556


Having spent many years reflecting on Michael Polanyi’s theory of personal knowledge and its application to theology, I undertook to review Richard Allen’s book with considerable interest. Allen writes primarily a philosopher with an unquestioning commitment to “the Faith”, by which he means Christian theism, understood to include classical theism (God viewed as Necessary Being, creator and sustainer of the universe). This theological position stands in contrast to other ways of relating God to the universe, which fail to affirm either God’s transcendence or his immanence. Allen’s aim is to take Michael Polanyi’s philosophy “into the Church” (p.2) and to show how the theory of tacit integration helps us to understand how God can simultaneously be fully immanent in the world and transcendent of it.

I have not found this an easy book to review, since as a theologian, but not a trained philosopher, I have at times wanted to question Allen’s theological assumptions and have not always seen the relevance of the philosophical arguments he uses in arriving at theological conclusions. I am, however, in complete agreement with his general thesis, that Polanyi’s philosophy provides the ideal foundation for a theistic view of the God-world relation - a view which, I believe, will eventually come to
be widely appreciated. I have, therefore, tried to follow his arguments in the light of his own position and have attempted, for the purposes of this review, to “indwell” his theological thought framework, rather than my own.

In Part I, Allen examines how far Polanyi’s philosophy admits the possibility of a genuine metaphysics and theology and considers Polanyi’s own account of Christian theism. He sees the theory of tacit integration as the central feature of Polanyi’s philosophy, which views consciousness as a double act, integrating two modes of awareness. There is a good account of tacit knowing, except that Allen states that Polanyi “tended to equate the focal with the explicit and the subsidiary with the tacit” (p. 20). I believe this is incorrect. It is true that readers of Polanyi often mistakenly talk as though focal awareness means explicit knowledge and subsidiary awareness means tacit knowledge, but Polanyi himself never confused them. On the whole, however, Allen’s discussion of tacit integration, its ontology and the principle of dual control are extremely helpful. As Allen says, Polanyi’s aim is to help us conquer mistrust of our personal powers of judgment and to challenge critical rationalism to face up to its fiduciary foundations.

Chapter 1 introduces Polanyi’s philosophical position and includes an interesting discussion comparing Polanyi’s view of ultimate beliefs with R.G. Collingwood’s “absolute presuppositions.” In the next two chapters, Polanyi’s understanding of religion and Christian theology are discussed and assessed. For this, Allen relies largely on two passages in Personal Knowledge and I constantly found it necessary to go back to these passages in order to follow Allen’s argument. In chapter 3, Allen takes up the question of the “circle of faith” and how Polanyi deals with “logical gaps.” This leads to a consideration of the possibility of doing “natural theology” and suggestions as to how Polanyi’s philosophy can be used in practicing it.

I was impressed with this section. However, I was not happy about Allen’s handling of the method of natural theology. For example, he assumes that Barth dismisses natural theology as a “presumptuous exercise of autonomous human reason” (p. 55). This does less than justice to Barth. At one time, I was puzzled to know how T.F. Torrance could speak with enthusiasm about Karl Barth and Michael Polanyi in the same breath. This was because I believed that Barth rejected natural theology, whereas Polanyi’s theory of personal knowledge clearly supports the idea that our knowledge of the natural world points beyond itself to transcendent meanings. Later Torrance explained to me why he found them compatible. Barth does not reject natural theology, he said. On the contrary, he uses it all the time in his Church Dogmatics, but it is always used within the framework of the basic biblical revelation. In Polanyian terms, Barth sees Christ as providing the framework and key by which everything in the universe is to be interpreted. Natural theology is essential, but must always be undertaken within a framework of revealed theology.

At one time, it was thought that religion could be studied by the method of “natural theology” without a fiduciary framework and it was assumed that reason and revelation were different modes of knowing. Polanyi’s epistemology affirms the unity of knowledge and shows that all our knowing is done within a framework of commitment. Allen knows this, but I would have been happier if, in his championship of natural theology, he had made the relation between reason and revelation clearer. In my view, it is not always obvious to the reader that Allen does not treat natural theology as a separate mode of knowing, a view which is largely discredited, even by theologians who have not read Polanyi. This is why I also wish reference to E.L. Mascall had been balanced by reference to other writers known to favor a more dialectical method of doing theology, that works “from above” as well as “from below.” John Macquarrie’s label for this method is “dialectical theism.” Part I ends with a discussion of the difference between “validation” and “verification,” based on passages in the book Meaning, co-authored by Harry Prosch, and an evaluation of the debate of the early 1980’s between Prosch and Richard Gelwick concerning Polanyi’s understanding of the reality of God.
In Part II, Allen discusses the Being of God and Polanyi’s account of language. This amount, he suggests, provides the ideal foundation for the doctrine of analogy, which explains how we can speak significantly about the transcendent God and affirm his ineffability. By tacit knowing, we can attend from the universe and particular events within it to God, both in his transcendence and his immanence. Allen first discusses the use of metaphor and analogy and its dependence on tacit comprehension and then goes on to deal with various problems that arise in applying the epistemology of tacit knowing to God. It would seem, for example, that we can only apply tacit knowing directly to awareness of God, if we view him as the Soul of the universe, wholly immanent in it, but not transcendent. A further problem which he raises is that, if God is transcendent, then, according to the epistemology of tacit knowing, he cannot be known “in glory,” for God has no lower levels, and so, no subsidiary particulars from which to attend. At this point, Allen points out that the traditional conception of the “Word” of God provides within God himself something analogous to a lower level, form which we may attend. This leads on to a consideration of the doctrine of the Trinity, which Allen sees as “an ultimate requirement of a Polanyian theology” (p. 99). He illustrates this with reference to Polanyi’s theory of language and the suggestion that the Trinity be viewed as “Speaker, Word and Meaning” (p. 131). In the last two chapters of Part II, Allen deals with possible pantheistic implications of Polanyi’s epistemology and ontology for our knowledge of God and for God’s knowledge of the universe, which would undermine the traditional theistic view of the God-world relation.

In Part III, Polanyi’s concept of “indwelling” is taken up and set in the context of the important doctrine of perichoresis, where it is used as a key concept to illuminate the doctrines of the Trinity, Grace, Providence, preparation for this theological section, but I must confess that I found these last chapters disappointing. Perhaps I hoped too much from a book of under two hundred pages. Perhaps Allen expects too much of his readers, if his final conclusions are to be seen as following clearly from earlier arguments. Despite this, the book as a whole has an important message and will, I hope, be read by many who are interested in exploring the implications of Polanyi’s thought for theological issues.
constitutive of the outer world and relegates the not so measurable ‘secondary qualities’ as subjectively constitutive of the inner world.

Obviously, myth cannot be about the outer world and no objective science or history of the outer world can include myth. As the Enlightenment relentlessly draws out entirely negative implications of the inner-outer dichotomy for myth, “myth [becomes] what it remains today in the popular imagination--namely, a cipher for all that is false” (11).

Scarborough next presents a very interesting explanation, comparison, and systematic classification of nineteenth and twentieth century theories about the nature of myth; he believes such theories about myth, as modern, will also reflect the modern inner-outer dichotomy that destroys myth. This critique of theories of myth (previously he has also commented on ancient theories of myth, viz., the euhemerist, Christian-apologetic, and allegorical theories) is a very useful part of the book. All modern theories agree that myths are analyzable, meaningful, nonliteral, and false, but explain myth in different ways. The primary distinction in Scarborough’s classification of these modern theories is “inside” and “outside;” the secondary distinction within both the inside and the outside is ‘up,’ ‘middle,’ and ‘down.’ I will not further explain this system, but among the authors considered are Max Mueller, E.B. Tyler, Andrew Lang, Sir James Frazer, Robert R. Marett, Robert Henry Codrington, Bronislaw Malinowski, C.S. Lewis, Ernst Cassirer, Claude Levi-Strauss, Rudolf Bultmann, Sigmund Freud, Carl Jung, Joseph Campbell, and Ira Progoff. These theorists “succeed in demonstrating, contrary to the thinkers of the Enlightenment, that myth makes a kind of sense and is worth serious study. ...On the other hand, consistent with their modern presuppositions, they view myth as associated with what is primitive, past, subjective, and untrue--namely, all the things that modernity hopes to outdistance” (30).

Scarborough believes that modernity is not only influenced by but grounded in myth; before arguing for the latter claim, he considers other theorists who support the former (these theories can also be categorized according to the above schema): Mircea Eliade, Taylor Stevenson, Michael Novak, Harvey Cox, Stephen Toulmin, Michael Foster, Langdon Gilkey, Edward Mazzarz, and Earl MacCormac. Again, Scarborough’s explanation and critique of all these theories of myth are quite interesting and useful. This last group of theories is found wanting because each accepts modernist assumptions and sees myth as inferior and subordinate to modernity. In contrast to all previous theorists, Scarborough wishes to show

(1) that myth does not lie outside or on the periphery of modernity but at its heart, (2) that myth’s effect is not confined to the past but is operative in the present, (3) that myth is not false but has a much more complicated relation to truth and falsity, (4) that myth is not to be identified per se with any isolated feature of modernity, (5) that myth is not simply a matter of subjective self-understanding, and (6) that myth is not metaphorical (46).

More simply, Scarborough’s theory of myth is not founded on the inside-outside dichotomy.

Scarborough argues that two creation myths--Plato’s Timaeus and the P-account in Genesis--are at the heart of modernity, “in the most sophisticated domains of the present. Their influence may be found within the walls of academia, where the theories of both science and philosophy, for example, are dependent on them” (48). In the Timaeus, the rational, intelligible pattern for the world is the eternal Forms, the source of stability, order, and necessity, and of objective knowledge, logic, and universality. The raw material for the world is eternal matter--earth, air, fire, and water--which have inherent powers and ceaselessly interact with each other in a disorderly and chaotic fashion. The active principle of the Demiurge, as an imitative craftsman, brings form and matter together to produce the world as we know it. In the P-account in Genesis (the seven day creation in Genesis 1:1-2:4a) viewed without neo-Platonic glasses--Yahweh creates the world from serious and thoughtful intentions, but
without blueprints. Matter may exist prior to Yahweh’s creative act (perhaps “waters” and an “abyss” are raw materials), but orthodox doctrine affirms creation out of nothing; in any case not much is said about the nature and status of matter. Here, the world is not composite, not fully intelligible, and has a beginning and an end; it is proclaimed to be good only after post-creation inspection (48-53).

Scarborough’s “contention is that these myths are not confined to a distant past, affecting the present by means of a series of intermediate historical causes; instead, they are alive in the present and exercise their authority directly” (66) on modern theory and methodology. He considers several theories and methodologies and their mythical sources: big bang theory (Genesis) versus steady state cosmology (Timaeus), essentialism (Timaeus) versus existentialism (Genesis), phenomenology of religion (Timaeus) versus history of religion (Genesis), and covering law (Timaeus) versus continuous series (Genesis) explanations in science (54-63).

How does myth directly influence modern thought? Scarborough answers this questions with the help of Michael Polanyi’s notion of tacit knowing; the “principal claim [here] is that scientific knowledge cannot be achieved by explicit inferences, deductive or inductive, but relies from start to finish on the tacit powers of the mind and its content (66). “First and foremost myth belongs to the tacit dimension” (68) and “in both the original formulation and subsequent modification of theories myths are tacitly animating the imaginative and creative processes underlying those reflections; ...we think with myths” (70).

Using Polanyi’s work, Scarborough demonstrates the pervasiveness of myth in modernity. In order to overcome modernity’s inner-outer dichotomy and move toward a postcritical understanding of myth--“that all knowledge has a tacit component is the meaning of ‘postcritical’” (132)--he considers twentieth-century physics and existential phenomenology, especially Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s work. The former subverts the ontological and epistemological foundations of modernity, i.e., the distinction between primary and secondary qualities and the consequent inner-outer dichotomy (76-79). The latter shows us, with the notion of “intentionality,” that consciousness and its objects do not exist separately, but are primordially and constitutionally together (79). Further, Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the “body-subject” and its “operative intentionality” as “a prereflective, preconscious, system of ‘anonymous’ powers” that “intends or is directed toward a world...which is always ‘already there’ before reflection begins--as an inalienable presence,” displays “the integration of mind, body and world” (80-83). Thus, Scarborough establishes an anthropology and epistemology of finitude.

From these foundations, Scarborough develops his notion of the nature of myth; he claims that myth is (1) a form of intentionality, which (2) provides an orientation for existence; (3) that this orientation is comprehensive of the life-world; (4) that it expresses itself in language; (5) that this language is highly condensed; (6) that it takes the form of a story; (7) that its language is neither literal nor metaphorical; (8) that myth is a special kind of apriori condition of theoretical thinking; (9) that myth’s proper home is in the background of human existence, and (10) that it is part of the body (84). Myth cannot be judged true or false in any theoretical sense, because it functions in our life-world--“the life-world embraces what reflection distinguishes as self, society, and nature” (86)--where it grounds, i.e., generates and lends credibility to, theories and criteria of truth (106-109). Rather than being true or false, myth is “viable or not viable for the tasks (both theoretical and otherwise) which confront us...in the very process of living. ...Viability is ‘assessed’ in the course of tacit reliance upon clues which emerge from one’s living in the world in accordance with the myth” (110).

Interestingly, Scarborough argues that his postcritical reflections on myth take us beyond, not only
modernity, but postmodernism, “at least Derrida’s brand of it, [which] is simultaneously committed to the Timaeus in terms of its parasitic dependence upon ontological and epistemological dualism and to Genesis in terms of its critique of that commitment. Because Timaeus is given priority, however, postmodernism tends to skepticism and relativism” (106).

Scarborough recommends Abraham as the guiding image for the emerging postcritical era, as the nomad who leaves Ur of the Chaldees—not knowing where he is going—because of a vague promise of a land flowing with milk and honey and numberless descendants; the Abraham story is an “epistemological allegory” homologous with the P-account of creation in Genesis. His journey takes place in the Land of Learning between the Greek epistemic extremes of complete knowledge and complete ignorance where he will find what he is promised “only as he is transformed by the journey itself and only as he is able to create from some merely suitable place something more” (128). Such “knowledge-in-process” is a finite model of knowledge, the meaning of which can be explored by comparing two Jewish thinkers, Derrida and Polanyi (129-131).

Derrida asserts—with his doctrine of undecidability—that meaning in language is “dispersed,” “disseminated,” or “deferred,” as continually postponed; this leaves us with an absence or emptiness of presence. Polanyi asserts—with his analogous doctrine of unspecificity—that the grounds of any knowledge claim cannot be completely or exhaustively specified; the qualification is important because it makes clear that there can be a positive increase in the probability of satisfactory knowledge, that the process of perception or knowledge—as “a collecting, a gathering together, an integration of tacit clues in a vectorial from—toward a relatively more explicit foreground of meaning” (130)—embraces neither presence nor absence, but leads away from dissemination. Scarborough claims that Derrida’s rhetoric indicates that a critique (deconstruction) of the past is more important to him than moving beyond past options (construction); he is still caught in modernity’s epistemic dualisms. Polanyi’s finite model of knowledge, like Abraham’s search, “delivers us from both the...absolutism and omniscience of the Western philosophical tradition...and the skepticism and relativism of much of Postmodernism” (133). Scarborough journeys with Abraham, Polanyi, and Merleau-Ponty journey—with a finite model of knowledge--through a world informed by the Genesis myth.

Scarborough argues admirably for his position and his book is most useful for exploring the nature of myth and its relationship to modernity. There are, however, some questions that arise—questions that are important for Scarborough’s project. One set of such questions concerns what a feminist critique of myth and modernity—and of the Timaeus and Genesis—would reveal concerning, not only ontology and epistemology, but perhaps more importantly, ethics, politics, and economics. Since both of Scarborough’s grounding myths are part of patriarchal conceptual frameworks, how do they both contribute to oppression, to sexism, racism, classism, and environmental destruction? How do they differ from myths and understandings of deity that liberate the feminine; and how are these other myths part of our collective consciousness? Another set of questions concerns whether we can function unaffected by myth and what sort of awareness arises if we do. What, if anything, is human consciousness before it is influenced by myth and how might we experience such a state? We can fruitfully explore these and other, further kinds of questions about myth and modernity, because Scarborough has given us such a comprehensive guidebook for the terrain.

Ted Mehl
Missouri Western State College
St. Joseph, MO 64507
Contributors To This Issue

Barbara Bennett Baumgarten is a visual artist and scholar who approaches Polanyi's thought from this dual sensitivity. She holds a Ph.D. from the Graduate Theological Union at Berkeley in Theology/Religion and the Arts and until recently was teaching Anglical Liturgics at the Episcopal Theological School at Claremont. Her new book, *Visual Arts as Theology*, is based on Polanyi's epistemology.

Un-chol Shin is Professor of Humanities at Eastern Kentucky University. Polanyi’s theory of knowledge describes how subsidiaries are integrated into a focal object and this provides, Shin believes, an epistemological foundation for integrative studies. In addition to his article on this topic in this issue, readers may wish to see Shin's related article “Panofsky, Polanyi, and Intrinsic Meaning” which deals with artistic expressions based on Polanyi’s theory of knowledge and appeared in 1990 in the *The Journal of Aesthetic Education* (24:4).

Gabriella Ujlaki was a promising young scholar and active leader in the Michael Polanyi Liberal Philosophical Association centered in Budapest. She died unexpectedly in the Spring of 1994. See pages 6 and 7 for reflections on Ujlaki's life and work by Richard Gelwick and Walter Gulick. Ujlaki’s essay in this issue was originally a paper at the August, 1991 Centennial Commemorative Conference on Michael Polanyi held in Budapest; it later appeared in *Polanyiana* (2:1/2 [1992]: 127-129).
Electronic Discussion Group

The Polanyi Society supports an electronic discussion group exploring implications of the thought of Michael Polanyi. For those with access to the INTERNET, send a message to “owner-polanyi@sbu.edu” to join the list or to request further information. Communications about the electronic discussion group may also be directed to John V. Apczynski, Department of Theology, St. Bonaventure University, St. Bonaventure, NY 14778-0012 PHONE: (716)375-2298 FAX: (716)375-2389.

Submissions for Publication

Articles, meeting notices and notes likely to be of interest to persons interested in the thought of Michael Polanyi are welcomed. Review suggestions and book reviews should be sent to Walter Gulick (see addresses listed below). Manuscripts, notices and notes should be sent to Phil Mullins. Manuscripts should be doublespaced type with notes at the end; writers are encouraged to employ simple citations within the text when possible. Use MLA or APA style. Abbreviate frequently cited book titles, particularly books by Polanyi (e.g., *Personal Knowledge* becomes *PK*). Shorter articles (10-15 pages) are preferred, although longer manuscripts (20-24 pages) will be considered.

Manuscripts should include the author’s name on a separate page since submissions normally will be sent out for blind review. In addition to the typescript of a manuscript to be reviewed, authors are expected to provide an electronic copy (on either a 5.25" or 3.5" disk) of accepted articles; it is helpful if original submissions are accompanied by a disk. ASCII text as well as most popular IBM word processors are acceptable; MAC text can usually be translated to ASCII. Be sure that disks include all relevant information which may help converting files to Word Perfect or ASCII. Persons with questions or problems associated with producing an electronic copy of manuscripts should phone or write Phil Mullins (816-271-4386). Insofar as possible, *TAD* is willing to work with authors who have special problems producing electronic materials.

Phil Mullins
Missouri Western State College
St. Joseph, Missouri 64507
Fax (816)271-4574
e-mail: mullins@griffon.mwsc.edu

Walter Gulick
Eastern Montana College
Billings, Montana 59101
Fax (406)657-2037
Polanyi Society Membership

*Tradition and Discovery* is distributed to members of the Polanyi Society. This periodical supercedes a newsletter and earlier mini-journal published (with some gaps) by the Polanyi Society since the mid seventies. The Polanyi Society has members in thirteen different countries though most live in North America and the United Kingdom. The Society includes those formerly affiliated with the Polanyi group centered in the United Kingdom which published *Convivium: The United Kingdom Review of Post-critical Thought*. There are normally two or three issues of TAD each year.

The regular annual membership rate for the Polanyi Society is $20; the student rate is $12. The membership cycle follows the academic year; subscriptions are due September 1 to Richard Gelwick, University of New England, Biddeford ME 14005. Please make checks payable to the Polanyi Society. Members living outside North America can pay subscriptions by credit card by providing the following information: subscriber's name, the card name, and the card number and expiration date. Credit card subscription applications should be sent to Phil Mullins, Missouri Western State College, St. Joseph, MO 64507. (fax USA 816-271-4574). Changes of address and inquiries should be mailed, faxed or e-mailed to Mullins (mullins@griffon.mwsc.edu).

New members must provide the following subscription information: complete mailing address, telephone (work and home), institutional relationship, and e-mail address and/or fax number (if available). Institutional members should identify a department to contact for billing.

The Polanyi Society attempts to maintain a data base identifying persons interested in or working with Polanyi's philosophical writing. New members can contribute to this effort by writing a short description of their particular interests in Polanyi's work and any publications and/or theses/dissertations related to Polanyi's thought. Please provide complete bibliographic information. Those renewing membership are invited to include information on recent work.